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ON BANKRUPTCY’S PROMETHEAN GAP: 
BUILDING ENSLAVING CAPACITY INTO THE 
ANTEBELLUM ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
Rafael I. Pardo* 
As the United States contends with the economic crisis triggered by 
the COVID-19 pandemic, federal bankruptcy law is one tool that can 
be used to resolve the financial distress suffered by individuals and 
businesses.  When implementing this remedy, the question arises 
whether the law’s application should be viewed as limited to addressing 
private debt matters, without regard for the public interest.  This 
Article answers the question by looking to modern U.S. bankruptcy 
law’s first forebear, the 1841 Bankruptcy Act, which Congress enacted 
in response to the depressed economic conditions following the Panic 
of 1837.  That legislation created a judicially administered system that 
nationalized bankrupts’ assets, some of which featured prominently in 
the business of slavery.  This Article focuses on a specific episode from 
New Orleans, which at the time was the nation’s third-most-populous 
city, had the nation’s largest slave market, and had one of the nation’s 
largest money markets.  One of the bankruptcy cases commenced in 
that city involved the administration and sale of Banks Arcade, which 
was a premier commercial exchange for auctioning enslaved Black 
Americans.  This history about how the federal administrative state 
restructured one component of the U.S. slavery complex should 
prompt critical reflection on how present-day bankruptcy law manages 
the fallout from a financial crisis.  This Article concludes that courts 
 
* Robert T. Thompson Professor of Law, Emory University. For helpful discussions 
and suggestions, I am grateful to Deborah Dinner, Matthew Lawrence, Sasha Volokh, 
and Kathryn Watts. This Article also benefited from the commentary of participants 
in the Fordham Urban Law Journal’s 2020 Cooper-Walsh Colloquium, the 2020 Board 
of Judges Meeting and Winter Education Program for the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for 
the Central District of California, the Business History Collective’s 2020 Roundtable 
on Slavery and Business History, and a faculty workshop at Michigan State University 
College of Law. As more specifically indicated below, this Article excerpts material 
from my prior work originally published as Bankrupted Slaves, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1071 
(2018), and Federally Funded Slaving, 93 TUL. L. REV. 787 (2019). Copyright © 2021 
by Rafael I. Pardo. 
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have the authority to permit the public to advocate for its interests in 
distressed assets redeployed through the federal bankruptcy system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States, like much of the world, currently finds itself on 
the road to recovery following the severe financial crisis triggered by 
the COVID-19 pandemic. 1   When the national economy initially 
cratered, those adversely affected looked to the government for help.  
Congress fashioned new relief measures specifically meant to target the 
crisis at hand, such as the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic 
Security (CARES) Act,2 an economic stimulus package exceeding $2 
trillion that, according to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, was 
intended to “provide[] fast and direct economic assistance for 
American workers and families, small businesses, and preserve[] jobs 
 
 1. See Press Release, Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], G20 GDP 
Showed a Strong Recovery in the Third Quarter of 2020, but Remained Below Pre-
Pandemic High (Dec. 14, 2020), https://www.oecd.org/sdd/na/g20-gdp-growth-Q3-
2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/5S2H-AC6T]. 
 2. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No. 
116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020). 
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for American industries.”3  But Congress also relied on government 
programs predating the crisis, in some instances adding modifications 
responsive to the unique circumstances of the present situation.  For 
example, the CARES Act made a few amendments to the Bankruptcy 
Code,4 nearly all of which expressly refer to COVID-related issues.5  
This approach suggests that Congress has deemed the existing 
bankruptcy system to be sufficiently flexible, even in the context of a 
global pandemic, to address problems of overindebtedness.6 
At first blush, such faith may be warranted.  The Bankruptcy Code 
has been in effect for more than four decades,7 during which time the 
United States has gone through several recessions, including the Great 
Recession.8  If the Code helped financially distressed individuals and 
businesses navigate those crises, and in particular the latter one, then 
the Code, with some minor adjustments, should assuredly be ready to 
meet the exigencies of the severe economic contraction now facing the 
nation.  Or so the argument might go. 
Certainly, society has grown accustomed to seeing the federal 
bankruptcy system in action, from annually granting individual debtors 
hundreds of thousands of discharges,9 to reorganizing and liquidating 
 
 3. The Treasury Department Is Delivering COVID-19 Relief for All Americans, 
U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/cares 
[https://perma.cc/T5L7-B8M6] (last visited Mar. 1, 2021). 
 4. See CARES Act, § 1113, 134 Stat. at 310–12. 
 5. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(10A)(B)(ii)(V) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-
259) (excluding “[p]ayments made under Federal law relating to the national 
emergency declared by the President under the National Emergencies Act with respect 
to the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)” from the definition of “current monthly 
income” (citation omitted)); id. § 1325(b)(2) (same); id. § 1329(d) (providing special 
rules for modifying Chapter 13 plans confirmed before the subsection’s enactment 
pursuant to the CARES Act if “the debtor is experiencing or has experienced a 
material financial hardship due, directly or indirectly, to the coronavirus disease 2019 
(COVID-19) pandemic”). 
 6. For an example of a foreign government that has reconfigured its bankruptcy 
system more extensively (albeit to make it more akin to the U.S. bankruptcy system) 
in response to the financial crisis the COVID-19 pandemic caused, see Australia to 




 7. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 
2682 (providing a general effective date of October 1, 1979, for the Bankruptcy Code). 
 8. See US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. 
RSCH. (June 8, 2020), https://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html 
[https://perma.cc/7BLS-VEFJ]. 
 9. See, e.g., U.S. CTS., BAPCPA REPORT — 2019 (2019), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/bapcpa-report-2019 
[https://perma.cc/2FZN-D3VL]. 
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business enterprises that have been mainstays of our economy at one 
point or another: Bethlehem Steel, Brooks Brothers, Chrysler, Delta 
Airlines, Enron, General Motors, Lehman Brothers, Pacific Gas & 
Electric, Polaroid, RadioShack, Remington Arms, Sears, Texaco, and 
Washington Mutual, to name just a few. 10   To some extent, it is 
therefore understandable why society continues on this well-worn 
path. 
But somewhere along the way, many have lost sight (or perhaps 
never took adequate notice) of the true nature of the bankruptcy 
system’s role within the federal bureaucratic state.  This oversight (or 
perhaps reckless disregard) has fostered an imperfect understanding of 
what it means to forgive debt pursuant to the federal bankruptcy 
system.  Only after recognizing and acknowledging this limitation can 
we adequately evaluate whether “business as usual” serves society’s 
best interest.11   In other words, it may be necessary to rethink the 
implications of relying on bankruptcy law to respond to financial crises.  
To place this point in stark relief, let us revisit the fateful days before 
the end of World War II. 
Seventy-five years after the United States detonated an atomic 
bomb over the Japanese city of Hiroshima, Anne Harrington reflected 
on Claude Eatherly’s involvement in the first nuclear attack in human 
 
 10. Remington Arms Distrib. Co., No. 20-81695 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. July 27, 2020); 
In re BBGI US, Inc., No. 20-11785 (Bankr. D. Del. July 8, 2020) (Brooks Brothers); In 
re Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., No. 19-30088 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2019); In re Sears 
Holding Corp., No. 18-23538 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2018); In re Remington Arms 
Co., No. 18-10687 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 25, 2018); In re Gen. Wireless Operations Inc., 
No. 17-10506 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 8, 2017) (RadioShack); In re RS Legacy Glob. 
Sourcing Corp., No. 15-10204 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 5, 2015) (RadioShack); In re Motors 
Liquidation Co., No. 09-50026 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2009) (General Motors); In re 
Old Carco LLC, No. 09-50002 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2009) (Chrysler); In re Wash. 
Mut., Inc., No. 08-12229 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 26, 2008); In re Lehman Bros. Holdings 
Inc., No. 08-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2008); In re Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 
05-17923 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2005); In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2001); In re Bethlehem Steel Corp., No. 01-15288 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 15, 2001); In re Polaroid Corp., No. 01-10864 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 12, 2001); In re 
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., No. 01-30923 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2001); In re Texaco, Inc., 
No. 87-20142 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 1987). 
 11. Cf. Tim Wu, Opinion, Don’t Feel Sorry for the Airlines, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 
2020), https://nyti.ms/2QkNj3N [https://perma.cc/94RY-C9KB] (“We cannot permit 
American and other airlines to use federal assistance, whether labeled a bailout or not, 
to weather the coronavirus crisis and then return to business as usual. Before providing 
any loan relief, tax breaks or cash transfers, we must demand that the airlines change 
how they treat their customers and employees and make basic changes in industry 
ownership structure.”). 
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history.12  Eatherly, a major in the U.S. Army Air Forces, piloted a B-
29 Superfortress to assess weather conditions over Hiroshima and 
radioed the Enola Gay that conditions were clear to drop the bomb.13  
Harrington filters the story of Eatherly’s life-long struggle with guilt 
over his role in the attack through the lens of the “Promethean gap.”14  
The concept, created by German philosopher Günther Anders, focuses 
on “[t]he discrepancy between the tremendous power of humanity’s 
inventions and the limited ability of any single person to comprehend, 
let alone control the moral and practical implications of that power.”15  
Servicemen like Eatherly “were the prime example of people caught in 
the Promethean gap.”16  They were “cogs in the atomic machine” who 
“came closer to connecting with the physical consequences of and 
responsibility for their actions than any others.”17 
The Promethean gap is recursive.  In pursuit of solving problems, 
whether or not of their own making, humans have repeatedly devised 
solutions without fully anticipating, appreciating, or understanding 
their nature and effects.  Scientific advancement through the pursuit of 
nuclear technology undoubtedly constitutes one of the grimmest 
examples giving rise to a Promethean gap.  But we need not look to 
such extremes to find its manifestations.  Even solutions to relatively 
innocuous problems can create a gap.  The capacity of human ingenuity 
to produce suffering should not be understated or overlooked. 
One area likely to produce Promethean gaps is the law, which is 
often deployed to solve problems that adversely affect the human 
condition.  Legislatures may very well have good intentions when 
harnessing state power to ameliorate suffering.  But the fact remains 
that legislatures will also fail to comprehend — or worse, turn a blind 
eye to — the parade of horribles that can sometimes result from 
interpretation and execution of legal commands.  In such instances, 
actors responsible for giving effect to enacted law will find themselves 
in a Promethean gap. 
Historical study can reveal how prior legal responses to crises have 
been problematic from the outset by generating a Promethean gap.  
Moreover, by examining the behavior of those subsequently caught in 
 
 12. Anne I. Harrington, The Hiroshima Pilot Who Became a Symbol of 
Antinuclear Protest, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 6, 2020), https://nyti.ms/39XjO0G 
[https://perma.cc/9NZ6-6D3R]. 
 13. See id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
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the gap, we can critically ask whether instituting certain safeguards 
might have channeled control of the law toward more normatively 
desirable outcomes.  These lessons can enable policymakers to better 
evaluate whether their prescriptions for solving current crises have 
been optimally designed.18 
Returning to the financial crisis spawned by the COVID-19 
pandemic, why should we be wary of continuing to rely on the federal 
bankruptcy system to do the work that it has done without interruption 
for over 120 years?19  The answer, simply put, is that policymakers, 
courts, and participants in the bankruptcy system have generally failed 
to account for the fact that the system, as presently (and historically) 
structured, creates a legal entity to resolve the financial distress of 
debtors.  Moreover, that legal entity quite arguably constitutes an 
instrumentality of the United States.  On this view, when we rely on 
bankruptcy law to solve overindebtedness problems, we do so through 
“[a] means . . . used by the national government.”20  Consequently, this 
demands attention to how the choices made in bankruptcy proceedings 
entail federal policymaking that can have deleterious effects not only 
on internal stakeholders (e.g., creditors, shareholders) but also on the 
public. 21   Once we layer these concerns on top of those that 
traditionally accompany liquidations and reorganizations (e.g., the 
amount of debt forgiven, the amount and order of creditor repayment), 
we need to adjust the inputs for the decision-making calculus in 
bankruptcy and the mechanisms for regulating the conduct of those 
who administer the law.  Simply put, we need to mind the Promethean 
gap in bankruptcy. 
 
 18. Cf. Barry Eichengreen, The Analogy Trap in Economic Policy: A Lesson for 
the COVID-19 Crisis, ECON. HISTORIAN, https://economic-historian.com/2020/11/the-
analogy-trap-in-economic-policy/ [https://perma.cc/J4PM-3BBC] (last visited Mar. 12, 
2021) (“Where comparisons with past crises have value is precisely in highlighting how 
this crisis is different, and therefore how the policy response should vary.”). 
 19. Prior to the current Bankruptcy Code, the federal bankruptcy system operated 
pursuant to the 1898 Bankruptcy Act. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 
1978). Congress enacted the Code in 1978, which took effect on October 1, 1979. See 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682. 
 20. Federal Instrumentality, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 21. Cf. Lawrence Ponoroff, Enlarging the Bargaining Table: Some Implications of 
the Corporate Stakeholder Model for Federal Bankruptcy Proceedings, 23 CAP. U. L. 
REV. 441, 455 (1994) (“The collapse of a business enterprise implicates a broad range 
of diverse interests beyond the interests of those persons with cognizable state law 
claims against the assets of the business.”). 
2021] BANKRUPTCY’S PROMETHEAN GAP 807 
Because of the high concentration of commerce in urban areas,22 we 
might expect the effects of bankruptcy’s Promethean gap to be 
especially pronounced in cities.23  As the severity of a crisis increases, 
spreading further and further across multiple sectors of the economy, 
large swaths of urban enterprise will be implicated when sorting out 
the consequences of default.24  If there is a silver lining to this type of 
systemic shock, it is that renewal and rebirth might open the door to a 
better version of what previously existed.25  The post-crisis city may 
emerge stronger than its pre-crisis predecessor.  But for that to happen, 
 
 22. See, e.g., Patrick J. Foye & John Samuelsen, Opinion, The Subways Are Facing 
a Five-Alarm Fire, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2020), https://nyti.ms/3bjBGDn 
[https://perma.cc/2HWF-J5JT] (“The downstate New York region — New York City 
and the surrounding area — accounts for about 8 percent of the nation’s gross domestic 
product.”). 
 23. This is not to say that rural areas are immune to financial crisis. Economic 
downturns impact such communities, often in ways that merit a context-sensitive policy 
response. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1232 (providing bankruptcy relief for family 
farmers and family fishermen). 
 24. See, e.g., OECD, Cities Policy Responses 6–8 (July 23, 2020), https://read.oecd-
ilibrary.org/view/?ref=126_126769-yen45847kf&title=Coronavirus-COVID-19-Cities-
Policy-Responses [https://perma.cc/HKB9-TE6X]; Esther Fung, Malls File for 
Bankruptcy or Shut Their Doors as Pandemic Pain Spreads, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 10, 
2020, 7:50 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/malls-file-for-bankruptcy-or-shut-their-
doors-as-pandemic-pain-spreads-11605013664 [https://perma.cc/7M7T-4WG5]; 
Matthew Haag, Manhattan Emptied Out During the Pandemic. But Big Tech Is 
Moving In., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2020), https://nyti.ms/2GUvrLH 
[https://perma.cc/CFG2-74UQ]; Patrick McGeehan, Tourism, Engine for N.Y.C. 
Economy, May Not Fully Recover Until 2025, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2021), 
https://nyti.ms/32MIxT6 [https://perma.cc/7TVA-BUKW]; Dana Rubinstein & Jesse 
McKinley, Virus Siphons $2.5 Billion in N.Y.C. Property Tax Revenue, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 17, 2021), https://nyti.ms/2XFFJUF [https://perma.cc/94CM-3CN2]; Dana 
Rubinstein, “We’re at War”: New York City Faces a Financial Abyss, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
16, 2020), https://nyti.ms/3id9fZE [https://perma.cc/2S8L-Q5VG]; Josh Saul & Henry 
Goldman, New York Region Sees 40% Bankruptcy Surge, Braces for More, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 29, 2020, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2020-09-29/new-york-city-bankruptcies-
2020-pivotal-point-for-business-as-covid-cases-rise [https://perma.cc/W3HT-8XGD]. 
 25. See Tim Wu, Opinion, New York’s Commercial Rents Are “Too Damn High,” 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2020), https://nyti.ms/2IbCuQi [https://perma.cc/DYJ7-X9YL] 
(“As the cliché goes, every crisis presents an opportunity. New York City has been hit 
hard by the pandemic, and economically its small businesses have been hit the hardest. 
Yet New York, when it needs to be, can be creative: Its recent rapid transformation 
into a city of great outdoor dining is just one example.”); see also Fung, supra note 24 
(“Some analysts said the closure of outdated retail businesses and properties will result 
in a healthier business environment for both landlords and tenants.”); Pete Wells, 9 
Ways Outdoor Dining Will Change New York, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2020), 
https://nyti.ms/3265HTS [https://perma.cc/73VQ-BQGN] (“The stripped-down, nearly 
instant approval process that allows restaurants to set up sidewalk and street seating 
turned out to be far more fair than the complicated and expensive former system for 
getting sidewalk dining permits.”). 
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the right policy tools need to be available, and, just as important, they 
need to be properly implemented.  Anything less could result in a 
failure to capitalize on a golden opportunity.  Worse yet, refusing to 
make a break with the past might perpetuate preexisting injustice. 
To illustrate the problem, we can look to modern U.S. bankruptcy 
law’s first forebear, the 1841 Bankruptcy Act (the 1841 Act or Act),26 
which Congress enacted in response to the depressed economic 
conditions following the Panic of 1837.  New Orleans was among the 
cities that financially suffered the worst during that crisis,27 perhaps not 
surprisingly given its status then as “the only true metropolis in the 
slave South . . . [and] the chief citadel of southern merchant 
capitalism.”28  By the time of the Act, it was the nation’s third-most-
populous city, its slave market was the nation’s largest, and its money 
market was one of the nation’s largest, if not the largest.29  Because the 
business of slavery featured so prominently in the Crescent City’s 
economy, examining the 1841 Act’s execution there reveals many 
cautionary tales about bankruptcy’s Promethean gap. 
This contribution to the Fordham Urban Law Journal’s 2020 
Cooper-Walsh Colloquium, “The Impact of Financial Crisis on Urban 
Environments: Past, Present, and Future,” tells one such story: that of 
the bankruptcy administration and sale of Banks Arcade, a block-long, 
three-story building that was one of antebellum New Orleans’s premier 
commercial exchanges for auctioning enslaved Black Americans. 30  
Recounting this history about the role of the federal bureaucratic state 
in restructuring one component of the nation’s slavery complex is not 
just about ensuring that we remember the sins of the past, although 
that would be a valid end in itself.31  More broadly, this story is one that 
should prompt us to think critically in new ways about what it means 
 
 26. Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843). 
 27. See generally RICHARD HOLCOMBE KILBOURNE, JR., LOUISIANA COMMERCIAL 
LAW: THE ANTEBELLUM PERIOD 157–65 (1980) (discussing the 1837 financial crises in 
New Orleans, New York, and London); JESSICA M. LEPLER, THE MANY PANICS OF 
1837: PEOPLE, POLITICS, AND THE CREATION OF A TRANSATLANTIC FINANCIAL CRISIS 
(2013) (same). 
 28. SCOTT P. MARLER, THE MERCHANTS’ CAPITAL: NEW ORLEANS AND THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOUTH 16 (2013). 
 29. Rafael I. Pardo, Financial Freedom Suits: Bankruptcy, Race, and Citizenship in 
Antebellum America, 62 ARIZ. L. REV. 125, 149 (2020) [hereinafter Pardo, Financial 
Freedom Suits]. 
 30. Rafael I. Pardo, Bankrupted Slaves, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1071, 1148 (2018) 
[hereinafter Pardo, Bankrupted Slaves]. 
 31. For too long, inattention and unawareness concealed the federal bankruptcy 
system’s complicity in the domestic slave trade. See id. at 1094–98. 
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to manage the financial fallout from capitalistic excess through federal 
bankruptcy law. 
This Article proceeds in two parts.  Part I describes how the 1841 
Act’s provisions created a federal instrumentality for resolving core 
problems incident to financial failure.  Part II provides an account of 
how the federal government administered Banks Arcade as a 
distressed asset under the Act.  This Article concludes by reflecting on 
the lessons provided by this historical episode, connecting them to the 
present, and arguing that courts have the authority to permit the public 
to advocate for its interests in the redeployment of distressed assets 
through the federal bankruptcy system. 
I. BUILDING BANKRUPTCY INTO THE                                            
ANTEBELLUM FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
Any study of the federal bankruptcy system’s role during the 
antebellum era can focus at most on two statutory schemes, the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1800 (the 1800 Act) and the 1841 Act, each of which 
Congress quickly repealed after enactment.32  The 1841 Act’s reach far 
exceeded that of the 1800 Act “by virtue of (1) making the relief 
available to a much larger class of individuals, (2) allowing individuals 
to seek such relief voluntarily, and (3) having operative effect at a time 
when the nation consisted of more states (including ones that 
permitted slavery) and more people.”33 
The second distinguishing factor particularly warrants 
conceptualizing the 1841 Act system as “the origin story for modern-
day bankruptcy law” in the United States.34  By permitting debtors to 
“initiate on their own terms the process for obtaining forgiveness of 
debt,”35 the legislation “represented a seminal moment in reorienting 
bankruptcy law as a mechanism for debtor relief, shifting the focus 
 
 32. Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 
5 Stat. 614; Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19, repealed by Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 
6, 2 Stat. 248. After repealing the 1841 Act, Congress waited until after the Civil War 
to create the nation’s next bankruptcy system. See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 
517 (repealed 1878). 
 33. Pardo, Bankrupted Slaves, supra note 30, at 1082. 
 34. Pardo, Financial Freedom Suits, supra note 29, at 129. 
 35. Pardo, Bankrupted Slaves, supra note 30, at 1084. As a formal matter, the 1800 
Act provided that bankruptcy cases could only be commenced by creditors against 
debtors (i.e., involuntary relief from the debtor’s perspective). See § 2, 2 Stat. at 21. 
But cf. BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF 
AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 223 (2002) (“Although in form involuntary, in substance 
the 1800 Act could also be wielded by debtors. . . . [M]any of the filings were clearly 
collusive or cooperative, the result of insolvent debtors enlisting sympathetic creditors 
to sue out commissions of bankruptcy against them.”). 
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away from its origins primarily as a creditor-collection device.”36  To 
be sure, substantive differences exist between the 1841 Act’s federal 
bankruptcy system and its present-day analogue administered 
pursuant to the 1978 Bankruptcy Code.37  Despite those differences, 
the emphasis on debtor relief is one of the primary through-lines 
linking the two regimes,38 notwithstanding subsequent amendments to 
the Code that have sought to make forgiveness of debt less expansive.39  
This conceptual continuity justifies general comparisons between the 
two systems.  Moreover, as Section I.A discusses, specific parallels can 
be drawn once one considers the institutional-design elements of the 
two systems.  Accordingly, the 1841 Act serves as a useful historical 
 
 36. Pardo, Bankrupted Slaves, supra note 30, at 1083 (footnote omitted). For 
further discussion regarding the 1841 Act’s primary objective of providing financial 
relief to debtors adversely affected by the Panic of 1837, see infra notes 212–40 and 
accompanying text. 
 37. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as 
amended primarily at 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101–1532 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-
259)). 
 38. See Lawrence Ponoroff, Exemption Impairing Liens Under Bankruptcy Code 
Section 522(f): One Step Forward and One Step Back, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 6–7 
(1999) (“[T]here is no doubt that adoption of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978 marked a 
significant shift in favor of consumer debtor relief in the precarious and elusive balance 
that American bankruptcy law has long sought to achieve between the fresh start for 
individual debtors and protection of the legitimate collection rights of creditors.”); cf. 
Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 325, 365 (1991) (“The pro-debtor orientation of the 1898 act with respect 
to the discharge also was manifested in a drastic curtailment in the number of statutory 
grounds for denying the discharge. In section 29 of the 1867 act Congress, reacting to 
the pro-debtor bias of the 1841 law, had provided an extremely long list of such 
grounds. Accordingly a large percentage of debtors did not receive a discharge. The 
pendulum swung back sharply the other way in the 1898 act, which provided very few 
grounds for denying a discharge.” (footnote omitted)).  
 39. Compare Rafael I. Pardo, Eliminating the Judicial Function in Consumer 
Bankruptcy, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 471, 472 (2007) [hereinafter Pardo, Eliminating the 
Judicial Function in Consumer Bankruptcy] (“The panacea for the purported systemic 
abuse of the bankruptcy laws by individual debtors would be the means test, a 
formulaic statutory directive pursuant to which courts are to presume abuse of the 
bankruptcy system by Chapter 7 debtors who appear to have an ability to repay past 
debts with future income. Such debtors would be subject to having their cases 
dismissed. In theory, this approach will prevent can-pay debtors from obtaining an 
immediate discharge in Chapter 7 and instead will direct them to seek bankruptcy relief 
under Chapter 13 where discharge is granted after completion of a repayment plan.”), 
with Rafael I. Pardo, Self-Representation and the Dismissal of Chapter 7 Bankruptcy 
Cases, in BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 87, 106 (Samuel 
Estreicher & Joy Radice eds., 2016) (“During the five-year period of the 2014 Pardo 
Study, there were 81,123 Chapter 7 cases commenced by individual debtors in the 
Western District of Washington, of which 1,474 were dismissed. Of those dismissed 
cases, only 40 were dismissed on the basis of abuse — that is, only 2.71% of the 
dismissed cases and a mere 0.05% of all cases.”). 
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frame of reference for thinking about how the Code today resolves 
financial distress. 
This Part sets the stage for understanding the dynamics that shaped 
the bankruptcy administration and sale of Banks Arcade as a distressed 
asset nationalized by the federal government.  Section I.A describes 
how the 1841 Act created a legal entity for purposes of resolving the 
financial distress of debtors.  Section I.B argues that this entity 
constituted a federal instrumentality and explains how this public 
entity fit into the antebellum federal administrative state, creating the 
opportunity for residual bankruptcy policymaking by the judiciary. 
A. The 1841 Act Bankruptcy Trust 
Thomas Plank’s work theorizing the “bankruptcy trust” as a legal 
person is key to understanding how the 1841 Act created a legal 
entity. 40   His argument focuses on how the Bankruptcy Code’s 
structure and substance create a legal entity whose attributes 
correspond to, and in some instances are more robust than, those of a 
business trust, which is deemed to be an artificial legal person.41  As 
such, the bankruptcy trust should also be deemed to have the status of 
a legal entity. 42   Working through the key elements of Plank’s 
argument, this Section shows how they map onto the structure and 
substance of the 1841 Act, thereby leading to the conclusion that the 
Act also created a bankruptcy trust that was a legal entity. 
i. The Business Trust Baseline 
To make the case that “the Code provides for the creation of a 
separate entity upon the filing of a voluntary bankruptcy petition,”43 
Plank begins his argument with an account of why the business trust is 
distinguishable from other trust arrangements.  In describing the 
taxonomy of trusts, he notes the distinction between donative trusts 
and commercial trusts.44  He then discusses how the latter category can 
be further divided into two subcategories: (1) traditional trusts used for 
commercial purposes (e.g., indenture and grantor trusts), which are not 
constituted to “engage in broader business activities,” with the result 
that “[c]ontract and tort liability incurred in connection with the trust 
 
 40. Thomas E. Plank, The Bankruptcy Trust as a Legal Person, 35 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 251 (2000). 
 41. See id. at 252–76. 
 42. See id. at 276. 
 43. Id. at 253. 
 44. See id. at 255–56. 
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is generally the personal liability of the trustee and becomes the 
liability of the trust estate only in limited circumstances”;45 and (2) 
business trusts (e.g., real estate investment trusts), which “engage in an 
unlimited range of business activities” for which the trust, rather than 
the trustee, will be liable.46  While the law does not classify donative 
trusts and traditional commercial trusts as legal entities,47 “the business 
trust is designed to be a legal person, similar to a corporation, 
partnership, or limited liability company,”48 having “a legal existence 
separate from the persons who comprise it, the business trust trustee 
and the business trust’s beneficiaries.”49 
After establishing that a business trust constitutes a legal person, 
Plank then argues that the Bankruptcy Code creates a bankruptcy trust 
whose attributes correspond to those essential to a business trust.50  His 
analysis focuses on three prominent features of the Code’s scheme for 
operationalizing a collective proceeding that distributes a debtor’s 
property for the benefit of creditors:51 the creation of a bankruptcy 
estate, the appointment of the bankruptcy trustee to administer the 
bankruptcy estate, and the scope of the trustee’s powers and duties.52  
A historical comparison of the 1841 Act to the Code along these 
dimensions reveals that the Act likewise 
provide[d] for (1) the creation of a trust estate dedicated to a specific 
use, (2) the appointment in every case of a person that serve[d] as a 
trustee who control[ed] and use[d] this estate for the benefit of 
different classes of persons, and (3) the empowerment of the trustee 
to engage in a wide range of activities for the liquidation of the 
debtor’s assets . . . , for which the assets of the estate and not the 
trustee . . . incur[red] liability.53 
 
 45. Id. at 256–57. 
 46. Id. at 258–59; see also id. at 262–63. 
 47. See id. at 257. 
 48. Id. at 260. 
 49. Id. at 261. 
 50. See id. at 264. 
 51. See Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy 
Courts: An Empirical Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 405, 413–14 (2005) (“Two principles generally provide the metric against which 
bankruptcy law and policy are tested for their soundness: (1) a fresh start for the debtor 
(the fresh start principle) and (2) equal treatment of similarly situated creditors (the 
equality principle). . . . The equality principle . . . accords procedural relief to creditors 
in the form of an orderly, collective process that administers the assets of a debtor to 
its creditors as a response to the common pool problem that arises when a debtor has 
insufficient assets to repay his or her debts.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 52. See Plank, supra note 40, at 264–77. 
 53. Id. at 264–65. 
2021] BANKRUPTCY’S PROMETHEAN GAP 813 
As such, if one considers the Code to establish a bankruptcy trust that 
is a legal person, then the extensive functional overlap between the 
Code and the Act warrants concluding that the Act correspondingly 
created a bankruptcy trust that was a legal person. 
ii. The 1841 Act Bankruptcy Estate 
The Code provides that the filing of a petition commences a 
bankruptcy case,54  which immediately triggers other legal effects,55 
among them the creation of an estate comprising various categories of 
property, “wherever located and by whomever held,”56 including “all 
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the 
commencement of the case.”57  Plank describes the bankruptcy estate 
as “a trust estate dedicated to a specific use,”58 repeatedly emphasizing 
that this estate consists of a collection of property interests, but that it 
is not a legal person, 59  even though the language of some Code 
provisions might suggest otherwise.60 
Unlike the Code, the 1841 Act did not include a stand-alone 
provision that operationalized the bankruptcy estate.  That said, a 
functional analysis of the structure and substance of the Act’s 
provisions indicates that Congress did indeed provide for the creation 
of a bankruptcy estate under the Act. 
While the filing of a bankruptcy petition commenced an 1841 Act 
case, it did not have the legal effect of creating a bankruptcy estate; 
rather, such action merely set in motion the process for having the 
 
 54. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 301(a), 302(a), 303(b). 
 55. See, e.g., id. § 362(a) (providing that the commencement of a case “operates as 
a stay, applicable to all entities,” that prohibits a variety of conduct against the 
bankruptcy estate’s property, the debtor’s property, and the debtor). 
 56. Id. § 541(a). 
 57. Id. § 541(a)(1). 
 58. Plank, supra note 40, at 264. 
 59. See id. at 265 (noting that the Bankruptcy Code provision creating the 
bankruptcy estate “specifies [its] assets,” but that “[it] does not purport to create the 
estate as a legal person”); id. at 266 (“Although many commentators and courts have 
treated the ‘estate’ as a legal person, it is neither necessary nor appropriate.” (footnote 
omitted)); id. at 277 (“The Code does not expressly create the estate as a legal person 
with power to act on its own behalf. The estate by definition is a collection of property 
interests under the control of the bankruptcy trustee.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 281 
(stating that, “[b]y definition, the estate is a collection of assets”). 
 60. See id. at 265–66 (“A few provisions of the Code, however, appear to treat the 
estate as a person who may act. . . . This usage could suggest that the estate is a person 
that owns a property interest. In other cases, the use of the term ‘estate’ is compatible 
with either the estate as a collection of property interests or the estate as a legal 
person.” (footnote omitted)). 
814 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVIII 
debtor declared a bankrupt by the court.61  Notably, the Act required 
a voluntary petition (i.e., one filed by the debtor) to be accompanied 
by “an accurate inventory of [the debtor’s] property, rights, and credits, 
of every name, kind, and description, and the location and situation of 
each and every parcel and portion thereof.”62  Among other purposes, 
this information enabled administration of the debtor’s property in the 
event that the court deemed the debtor eligible to seek relief under the 
Act,63 a point underscored by decisional law stating that inadequate 
disclosure would preclude the court from declaring the debtor to be a 
bankrupt.64  If the court issued such a decree, then 
all the property, and rights of property, of every name and nature, and 
whether real, personal, or mixed, of every bankrupt . . . [would], by 
mere operation of law, ipso facto, from the time of such decree, be 
deemed to be divested out of such bankrupt, without any other act, 
assignment, or other conveyance whatsoever, and the same [would] 
be vested, by force of the same decree, in such assignee . . . appointed 
by the proper court for this purpose.65 
To be sure, the express language of this specific 1841 Act provision 
formally vested the bankrupt’s property in the assignee, the individual 
analogous to today’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee.66  But the Act’s 
other provisions indicate that the bankruptcy decree had the effect of 
creating a bankruptcy estate to be administered by an assignee.  
Moreover, the language employed by participants in the 1841 Act 
bankruptcy system — that is, those who enforced, practiced, and 
commentated on the law — further evidences that the system’s 
contemporaries viewed the legal landscape in this light. 
 
 61. See Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 1, 5 Stat. 440, 440 (repealed 1843). 
 62. Id. at 441. This disclosure was to be “verified by oath,” or alternatively “by 
solemn affirmation,” if the debtor were “conscientiously scrupulous of taking an oath.” 
Id. 
 63. See, e.g., In re Frisbee, 9 F. Cas. 959, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1842) (No. 5,130) (“Counsel 
must thus see the importance attached to the inventory. By the act, the assignee must 
have such a description of the property as would fix its location and enable him to 
identify it.”); BANKR. D. KY. R. X (“In the inventory of effects, the several parcels of 
the petitioner’s immovable property . . . shall be separately set forth, and so described 
that, by means of the calls for notorious objects and accessible documents, each of them 
may be found, on reasonable inquiry and proper examination, and their boundaries 
and extent certainly ascertained.”) (repealed), reprinted in S. DOC. NO. 27-19, at 84 
(1842). 
 64. See, e.g., In re Plimpton, 19 F. Cas. 874, 874 (S.D.N.Y. 1842) (No. 11,227) 
(“Another objection is, that the petitioner does not set out an accurate inventory of his 
property and every portion of it. This is a question of fact, and if he has not set it out 
properly, it would be fatal to his application.”). 
 65. § 3, 5 Stat. at 442–43. 
 66. See infra Sections I.A.ii–iii. 
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First and foremost, the 1841 Act repeatedly conceptualized the 
bankrupt’s surrendered property as an estate. 67   Courts likewise 
adopted this view.  U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice Joseph Story, 
writing for the majority in Ex parte Christy, argued that “[t]he obvious 
design of the Bankrupt Act of 1841 was to secure a prompt and 
effectual administration and settlement of the estate of all bankrupts 
within a limited period.”68  In discussing who would be accountable for 
the costs of administering an 1841 Act case, the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of New York noted that, “[i]f any assets are 
realized, the expenses will ultimately fall on the estate.”69  The U.S. 
District Court for the District of South Carolina referred to its 
“right . . . to issue injunctions against any persons who may interfere 
with the due administration of the assets of the bankrupt’s estates.”70  
In conducting its review of certain 1841 Act cases pending before it, the 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana noted “that in 
 
 67. See § 4, 5 Stat. at 444 (referring to “a false or fictitious debt against [the 
debtor’s] estate” and to the bankrupt’s “full disclosure and surrender of all his estate”); 
§ 6, 5 Stat. at 445 (referring to “the assignee of the estate” and to “the final distribution 
and settlement of the estate of the bankrupt”); § 11, 5 Stat. at 447 (referring to “any 
debts, or other claims, or securities due or belonging to the estate of the bankrupt”); 
§ 12, 5 Stat. at 447 (referring to dividend produced by the bankrupt’s “estate”); § 13, 5 
Stat. at 448 (referring to “the proof of any debt or other claim of any creditor or other 
person against the estate of the bankrupt”); § 14, 5 Stat. at 448 (referring to the separate 
estates of partners in trade who jointly filed for relief under the Act). 
 68. Ex parte Christy, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 292, 312 (1845) (Story, J.) (citation omitted). 
 69. In re Greaves, 10 F. Cas. 1067, 1068 (S.D.N.Y. 1842) (No. 5,744) (emphasis 
added). 
 70. Yeadon v. Planters’ & Mechs.’ Bank, 30 F. Cas. 793, 797 (D.S.C. 1843) (No. 
18,130) (emphasis added). The federal reporter that includes the Yeadon opinion 
identifies the deciding court as “District Court, E.D. South Carolina.” Id. at 793. In 
1898, the Supreme Court pronounced that the 1823 federal legislation creating the 
Eastern and Western Districts of South Carolina had the effect of “not . . . dividing the 
state into two judicial districts, as indicated in the title of the act, but into two districts 
in the sense of geographical divisions, which is in harmony with the language used in 
the body of the act.” Barrett v. United States, 169 U.S. 218, 228 (1898). In other words, 
“the state constituted but one judicial district, containing two divisions.” Id. (emphasis 
added). The Supreme Court’s view on this issue comported with the manner in which 
the federal district court’s clerk reported statistics to Congress regarding the district’s 
1841 Act cases. See H.R. DOC. NO. 29-223, at 14 (1846) (setting forth “[s]tatement 
exhibiting the number and amount of applications for relief under the act of Congress 
of August 19, 1841, . . . and the proceedings had thereon, in the district court of the 
United States for the district of South Carolina” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, 
consistent with The Bluebook, the citation in this footnote to the Yeadon opinion 
refers to the deciding court as the District of South Carolina. See THE BLUEBOOK: A 
UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 10.4, at 105–06 (Columbia L. Rev. Ass’n et al. eds., 
21st ed. 2020) (providing that, for citations to federal district court cases, the citation 
should indicate the deciding court by “giv[ing] the district but not the division” 
(emphasis added)). 
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various bankrupt estates in this Court no final reports have been made 
and no final accounts have been rendered by the Assignees of their 
administration of the property belonging to said Estates.” 71  
Furthermore, in exercising their bankruptcy rulemaking authority 
under the 1841 Act,72 federal district courts repeatedly promulgated 
rules referring to the bankruptcy estate. 73   Finally, in a letter to 
 
 71. 6 U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE E. DIST. OF LA., BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1841 MINUTES, 
2/1843–1/1861, at 515 (located in Record Group (RG) 21, The National Archives at 
Fort Worth, Texas); see also 5 id. at 85 (“It is therefore Ordered by the Court that 
Decrees in Bankruptcy be entered in their [i.e., the petitioning debtors’] favor 
respectively. And the several assignees hereinafter named be appointed to take charge 
of their Estates . . . .”); 3 id. (including minutes of September 20, 1843, on which date 
the federal district court ordered in connection with several cases “that the Clerk be 
authorized to pay to A.S. Robertson, U.S. Marshal, any money deposited to the credit 
of the Estate, the amount due him in each respective Estate”). The minute books for 
the 1841 Act cases filed in the Eastern District of Louisiana consist of “records of 
proceedings held in [those] cases.” Bankruptcy Act of 1841 Minutes, 2/1843–1/1861, 
NAT’L ARCHIVES CATALOG, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/4510563 (last visited Dec. 
18, 2020). 
 72. See § 6, 5 Stat. at 445–46 (stating that “it shall be the duty of the district court 
in each district, from time to time, to prescribe suitable rules and regulations, and forms 
of proceedings, in all matters of bankruptcy”). 
 73. See, e.g., BANKR. D.D.C. R. 47 (“The assignee shall keep succinct, clear, and 
separate accounts of the estates respectively assigned . . . .”) (repealed), reprinted in 
RULES AND REGULATIONS IN BANKRUPTCY, ADOPTED BY THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, FOR THE SAID DISTRICT 11 
(Washington, D.C., Peter Force 1842); BANKR. D. KY. R. CXLIV (“The clerk will keep 
a bank and deposite [sic] book, and enter therein, to the credit of an account for each 
bankrupt estate, the sum reported as having been deposited therein by the assignee, 
and charge the same in an account against the deposite [sic] bank . . . .”) (repealed), 
reprinted in S. DOC. NO. 27-19, at 109 (1842); BANKR. D. MASS. R. XVIII (“And every 
assignee shall within sixty days after receiving the same, pay all moneys which come to 
his hands, belonging to the estate, into court.”) (repealed), reprinted in PELEG W. 
CHANDLER, THE BANKRUPT LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 51 (Boston, James H. Weeks 
1842); BANKR. D.N.H. BANKR. R. IX (“The assignee . . . shall have full right . . . to 
contest the validity and amount of any debt or other claim, made by any creditor or 
creditors, at any time before a dividend is declared of the estate . . . .”) (repealed), 
reprinted in RULES AND REGULATIONS IN BANKRUPTCY, ADOPTED BY THE DISTRICT 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 6 (Concord, 
Isaac Hill & Sons 1842) [hereinafter D.N.H. BANKRUPTCY RULES]; BANKR D.S.C. R. 
65 (“The assignee shall keep succinct and clear accounts of the estate assigned . . . .”) 
(repealed); BANKR. S.D. MISS. R. 14 (“The assignee or assignees . . . shall also be 
allowed out of the estate, all necessary and proper disbursements made by them in the 
execution of their trusts, for the various clerks, attorneys and other agents necessarily 
employed by them, subject to the approval of the court.”) (repealed), reprinted in 
Rules, Regulations, and Forms of Proceedings in Bankruptcy, for the District Court, 
MISS. FREE TRADER & NATCHEZ WKLY. GAZETTE, Feb. 10, 1842, at 3 [hereinafter S.D. 
Miss. Bankruptcy Rules]; BANKR. E.D. PA. BANKR. R. 26 (“All monies paid into the 
court shall be entered by the clerk of the court to the credit of the particular estate in 
bankruptcy in a book to be kept for that purpose . . . .”) (repealed), reprinted in RULES 
AND FORMS IN BANKRUPTCY, IN THE DISTRICT COURT, OF THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF 
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Secretary of State Daniel Webster commenting on the operation of the 
1841 Act in the District of Kentucky, Judge Thomas Bell Monroe 
observed that “[t]he economy of both money and time, with the faithful 
administration of the bankrupt estate, so important in a system of 
bankruptcy, are, it is believed, attained in Kentucky and will be 
improved.”74 
Assignees also adopted the view that the 1841 Act created an estate 
for administration, as evidenced by documents filed in cases before the 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.75  William 
Christy, the assignee in In re Andrews, indicated in an accounting 
report that, on May 1, 1843, he had “paid [fifty dollars to] Geo. W. 
Christy att’y at law for legal services rendered in the affairs of said 
Estate.” 76   Robert Cammack, the assignee in In re Cucullu, 
represented in a sale petition that 
Seraphin Cucullu at the time of his Bankruptcy was seized and 
possessed of the estate and property in the schedule hereto 
annexed . . . [and] that it will be for the benefit of the said estate and 
of all parties having interest therein, that the same should be sold, 
transferred and assigned.77 
And Joseph Reynes, the assignee in In re Bergamini & Cestia, filed a 
memorandum of law discussing the “engagements contracted by the 
assignee for expenses attending the keeping selling etc. of the bankrupt 
 
PENNSYLVANIA 26 (Philadelphia, J. Young 1841) [hereinafter E.D. PA. BANKRUPTCY 
RULES]; BANKR. S.D.N.Y. R. 63 (“Any party interested in the estate, or the bankrupt 
himself, dissatisfied with the amount of effects designated and set apart by the assignee 
from the assignment, may except thereto at any time before the sale of the estate, and 
within ten days after the determination of the assignee.”), reprinted in RULES AND 
REGULATIONS IN BANKRUPTCY, ADOPTED BY THE CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURTS OF 
THE UNITED STATES, FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW-YORK 14 (New York, 
John S. Voorhies 1842) [hereinafter S.D.N.Y. BANKRUPTCY RULES]. 
 74. Letter from Thomas Bell Monroe, U.S. J., Dist. of Kentucky, to Daniel 
Webster, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Dec. 25, 1842) [hereinafter Letter from 
Thomas Bell Monroe to Daniel Webster], in S. DOC. NO. 27-19, at 145. 
 75. U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE E. DIST. OF LA., BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1841 CASE FILES, 
1842–1843 (located in Record Group (RG) 21, The National Archives at Kansas City, 
Missouri). These manuscript records include 
petitions, inventories of the petitioner’s property, orders, petitions for the 
discharge of the bankrupt, reports of the assignee who administered the 
estate, proofs of debts, depositions, petitions by creditors for the appointment 
of an assignee, rules, notices, schedules listing the assets and liabilities of the 
petitioner, motions, oppositions, and attachments. 
Bankruptcy Act of 1841 Case Files, 1842–1843, NAT’L ARCHIVES CATALOG, 
https://catalog.archives.gov/id/4513381 (last visited Feb. 21, 2021). 
 76. Account Current of Assignee, In re Andrews, No. 260 (E.D. La. May 11, 1843). 
 77. Petition of Assignee to Sell Estate of Bankrupt, In re Cucullu, No. 248 (E.D. 
La. July 9, 1842). 
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estate,” and noting that the assignee “can & is authorised to make the 
necessary expenses required by the estate to bring it to a proper 
conclusion.”78  The Eastern District’s 1841 Act case files abound with 
similar examples, and there is every reason to believe that assignees 
appointed in other federal judicial districts held similar views.79 
Lastly, commentators at the time understood the bankruptcy 
process as one that would entail the creation of an estate.  When the 
New Orleans Chamber of Commerce urged Congress in January 1841 
to enact federal bankruptcy legislation enabling those in financial ruin 
to once again “contribute to the general wealth and prosperity of the 
nation,” 80  the organization also lobbied for provisions that would 
“afford ample protection to the rights and privileges of the creditors; 
among which privileges, is the highly-important and vital one of 
appointing the assignee . . . to take charge of and manage the 
bankrupt’s estate.”81  After Congress passed the 1841 Act, one treatise 
writer’s enumeration of “[t]he general powers and duties of the district 
court in respect to matters of bankruptcy”82 included the power and 
duty “[t]o appoint assignees of the estates of bankrupts.”83  Another 
treatise writer remarked that an assignee’s powers to redeem and 
discharge mortgages and to compound debts were “indispensable in 
 
 78. Remarks of the Assignee, In re Bergamini & Cestia, No. 3 (E.D. La. July 27, 
1842). 
 79. See, e.g., Assignee’s Sale, BANGOR DAILY WHIG & COURIER, June 9, 1843, at 1 
(“By virtue of several Decrees of the District Court of the United States for the District 
of Maine, I shall sell . . . all the right, title and interest I have as Assignee, in and to the 
following described property belonging to the Estates of the several persons 
hereinafter named in Bankruptcy . . . .”); Assignee’s Sale, CHARLESTON COURIER, Feb. 
13, 1843, at 3 (“[I]n pursuance of an order of his Honor Judge Gilchrist, made in the 
Bankrupt Court on the 11th inst., will be sold . . . [t]he property of the Assigned 
Estate.”); Assignee’s Sale, VT. WATCHMAN & STATE J. (Montpelier), Sept. 12, 1842, at 
1 (announcing sale of various assets “[b]y virtue of sundry decrees in Bankruptcy, 
issued out of the District Court of the United States for the District of Vermont, vesting 
in me [i.e., the assignee] the several and joint estates of the Bankrupts therein set 
forth”); Notice of Sale by Assignee in Bankruptcy, SAVANNAH DAILY REPUBLICAN, 
Apr. 8, 1842, at 3 (announcing sale of various assets “belonging to the assigned estate 
of James A. Fawns, a declared and decreed Bankrupt”). Bankruptcy commissioners, 
who were appointed under the Act to assist the court with certain matters, such as 
receiving proof of debts, see Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 5, 5 Stat. 440, 445 (repealed 
1843), also likely viewed the Act to create an estate, see, e.g., Report of Jos Bancroft 
Commissioner, In re Bryan, No. 115 (D. Ga. Feb. 10, 1845) (“I respectfully report that 
I have examined the Books and papers of the General or Official Assignee in 
Bankruptcy in regard to the several amounts of money received by him from the Estate 
of the petitioner . . . .”). 
 80. S. DOC. NO. 26-123, at 1 (1841). 
 81. Id. at 2. 
 82. CHANDLER, supra note 73, at 8. 
 83. Id. at 9. 
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many cases to enable the assignees and the court to bring estates to a 
final settlement.”84  And, in a critique of the Act’s provision granting 
the court authority to appoint assignees, one law journal argued that 
the “bankrupt’s business creditors” would have been better situated to 
“select the person, whose character and business knowledge and 
capacity, and whose position in relation to the creditors, to the estate 
and to the bankrupt, especially fit him to be assignee.”85 
The historical record clearly indicates that the 1841 Act created an 
estate to be administered by an assignee.  One can assume that, like the 
estate created by the Code, the 1841 Act estate was a collection of 
property interests that did not constitute a legal entity.86  But as we 
shall see, the appointment, powers, and duties of the assignee in 
relation to the estate created a bankruptcy trust constituting a legal 
person.87 
iii. Appointment of the Bankruptcy Assignee 
Here, the Article focuses on Plank’s discussion of the appointment 
of a trustee appointed in Chapter 7 liquidation cases, given that 
Congress designed the 1841 Act to permit administration of cases only 
pursuant to a liquidation framework.88  Plank observes that, in Chapter 
7 cases, “[t]he Code provides for the prompt appointment of a 
bankruptcy trustee”89 and that the appointed individual “has the same 
fiduciary duties of loyalty and care that any trustee of a traditional trust 
or business trust has.”90 
The 1841 Act provided that the bankruptcy decree would have the 
effect of vesting the bankruptcy estate “in such assignee as from time 
 
 84. J.B. STAPLES, THE GENERAL BANKRUPT LAW 33 (New York, John S. Voorhies 
1841). 
 85. The Bankrupt Law, 4 LAW REP. 403, 405 (1842) (emphasis added). 
 86. See supra text accompanying notes 58–60. It should be noted that, just as 
today’s Code adopts a geographically expansive view of the property interests included 
in the bankruptcy estate, a similar view existed under the 1841 Act. Compare 11 U.S.C. 
§ 541(a) (providing that the bankruptcy estate consists of certain categories of property 
interests, “wherever located and by whomever held”), with BANKR. D. KY. R. CCXLII 
(providing mechanisms for the assignee to reach “any property or right of property, 
situated out of the United States and their territories,” which “the bankrupt owned or 
claimed, at the time of his petition filed, or at the time of the decree of his bankruptcy”) 
(repealed), reprinted in S. DOC. NO. 27-19, at 141 (1842). 
 87. Cf. Plank, supra note 40, at 266 (stating that, while the bankruptcy estate itself 
does not constitute a legal person, “[t]he other sections of the Code provide the 
essential ingredients for creating a bankruptcy trust as a legal person”). 
 88. See Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 10, 5 Stat. 440, 447 (repealed 1843). 
 89. Plank, supra note 40, at 267. 
 90. Id. at 267–68. 
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to time shall be appointed by the proper court for this purpose.”91  The 
legislation, however, left many gaps regarding the appointment 
process, as noted by one treatise writer.92  That same writer observed 
that the federal district courts would have to use their bankruptcy 
rulemaking authority to fill those gaps,93 stressing that the Act imposed 
a duty on the courts “to appoint the assignees immediately after the 
order or decree of bankruptcy”94 and that “the appointment of the 
assignees must immediately ensue, in order that some authorized 
person may have the charge of which the bankrupt has been 
divested.”95  As envisioned, some federal district courts promulgated 
rules for the immediate appointment of an assignee. 96   Others 
 
 91. § 3, 5 Stat. at 443. 
 92. See STAPLES, supra note 84, at 27 (“The act is silent as to the particular mode 
of the appointment of the assignees, or the form of the order for their appointment; 
and as to their number, and also as to their manner of proceeding.”). 
 93. See id. (“The courts are to establish forms and rules on these subjects, as they 
have full power, and it is made their duty to do, by this and other sections of the act.”). 
The 1841 Act provided that “it shall be the duty of the district court in each district, 
from time to time, to prescribe suitable rules and regulations, and forms of 
proceedings, in all matters of bankruptcy.” § 6, 5 Stat. at 445–46. 
 94. STAPLES, supra note 84, at 26 (emphasis added). 
 95. Id. at 26–27 (emphasis added); cf. A COMMENTARY ON THE BANKRUPT LAW OF 
1841, SHOWING ITS OPERATION AND EFFECT 35 (New York, Henry Anstice 1841) 
(noting that the order of “the decree of bankruptcy . . . will probably contain the 
appointment of the assignee”). 
 96. See, e.g., BANKR. D. CONN. R. 22 (“There shall be appointed one assignee in 
each county in this district, who shall act in all the cases in bankruptcy in such 
county . . . .”) (repealed), reprinted in RULES OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES, FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT, IN BANKRUPTCY; TOGETHER WITH A LIST 
OF THE APPOINTMENTS BY THE COURT, AND A TARIFF OF FEES 8 (Hartford, J. Holbrook 
1842) [hereinafter D. CONN. BANKRUPTCY RULES]; BANKR. D. KY. R. LVII (“On the 
adjudication, the case being found within the statute, and in sufficient form, the decree 
of the petitioner’s bankruptcy will be pronounced, the assignee appointed, the penalty 
of his bond with the number of the sureties fixed, and all entered in the following 
form . . . .”) (repealed), reprinted in S. DOC. NO. 27-19, at 96 (1842); BANKR. D. MO. 
IX (“Immediately after a decree declaring the debtor a Bankrupt, an assignee shall be 
appointed.” (emphasis added)) (repealed), reprinted in Rules, Regulations, and Forms 
of Proceedings in Bankruptcy in Missouri, RADICAL (Bowling Green), Mar. 12, 1842, 
at 2 [hereinafter D. Mo. Bankruptcy Rules]; BANKR. D. VT. R. 52 (“Whenever a party 
is declared a bankrupt, the clerk shall the same day cause to be delivered to the 
assignee, a certified copy of the decree of the court.” (emphasis added)) (repealed), 
reprinted in RULES AND REGULATIONS IN BANKRUPTCY, ADOPTED BY THE CIRCUIT 
AND DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, FOR THE DISTRICT OF VERMONT 9 
(Rutland, White & Guernsey 1842) [hereinafter VT. BANKRUPTCY RULES]; BANKR. 
N.D.N.Y. R. 62 (“The following named persons are designated as assignees in cases of 
bankruptcy, to act as such within their respective counties . . . .”) (repealed), reprinted 
in RULES REGULATING PROCEEDINGS IN BANKRUPTCY, ADOPTED BY THE DISTRICT 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW-YORK 16 
(Albany, Wm. & A. Gould & Co. 1842) [hereinafter N.D.N.Y. BANKRUPTCY RULES]. 
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promulgated rules providing for the prompt appointment of an 
assignee.97  Thus, the timing of an assignee’s appointment under the 
1841 Act closely tracked that of a Chapter 7 trustee’s appointment 
under the Code. 
Moreover, Congress envisioned that assignees would serve in a 
capacity partially corresponding to that of a nonbankruptcy trustee, as 
indicated by the 1841 Act’s language declaring that the bankrupt’s 
property would be surrendered “for the benefit of his creditors.”98  In 
other words, bankrupt estates, which assignees administered,99 were to 
be held in trust for certain beneficiaries, including the bankrupt’s 
creditors.100  The federal district courts likewise conceived of assignees 
serving in a trust capacity, as evidenced by decisional law,101 in addition 
to some of the bankruptcy rules that they promulgated.102 
 
 97. See, e.g., BANKR. D. MASS. R. VIII (stating that, “[a]s soon as conveniently may 
be after the decree declaring a party a bankrupt . . . , the court will proceed to the 
appointment of an assignee of the bankrupt’s estate”) (repealed), reprinted in 
CHANDLER, supra note 73, at 42; BANKR. D.N.H. R. VIII (same) (repealed), reprinted 
in D.N.H. BANKRUPTCY RULES, supra note 73, at 6. 
 98. § 4, 5 Stat. at 443. 
 99. See supra Section I.A.ii. 
 100. See BANKR. S.D. MISS. R. 17 (“Upon every dividend made to creditors, the 
costs, fees and expenses of their trust, chargeable to the estate of the Bankrupt, which 
shall have accrued, shall first be reserved and paid, and the balance divided pro rata 
among the creditors, after the payment of privileged claims under the act.”) (repealed), 
reprinted in S.D. Miss. Bankruptcy Rules, supra note 73; Coleman v. Tebbetts, 20 N.H. 
408, 409 (1845) (“The act contains other provisions, which it is not necessary to indicate 
particularly, but which, in connection with those parts which have been cited, show the 
plain purpose of the act to have been to vest the property of the bankrupt in the 
assignee, in trust, after deducting the necessary charges, for the ratable payment of the 
bankrupt’s debts, or, if sufficient, the entire payment of them.”). As will be discussed 
below, an 1841 Act bankrupt also qualified as a potential beneficiary of the Act’s 
bankruptcy trust. See infra notes 149–50 and accompanying text; infra Section I.B.i. 
 101. See In re Greaves, 10 F. Cas. 1067, 1068 (S.D.N.Y. 1842) (No. 5,744) (“The 
assignee stands as trustee in [the creditors’] behalf, stimulated by his personal interest, 
to search out and collect for their benefit every species of property belonging to the 
bankrupt . . . .”). 
 102. See, e.g., BANKR. D. KY. R. CCI (referring to “the assignee as the trustee of the 
assets” (emphasis added)) (repealed), reprinted in S. DOC. NO. 27-19, at 128 (1842); 
BANKR. D.S.C. R. 59 (stating that the assignee’s compensation would be in addition to 
“such sum as shall be certified by the Court to be just and reasonable for his actual and 
necessary expenses in and about the trust” (emphasis added)) (repealed); BANKR. 
N.D.N.Y. R. 62 (referring to “matters pertaining to the business of [assignees’] trust”) 
(repealed), reprinted in N.D.N.Y. BANKRUPTCY RULES, supra note 96, at 17; BANKR. 
S.D. MISS. R. 14 (“The assignee or assignees . . . shall also be allowed out of the estate, 
all necessary and proper disbursements made by them in the execution of their 
trusts . . . .” (emphasis added)), reprinted in S.D. Miss. Bankruptcy Rules, supra note 
73. 
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Concomitantly, like a nonbankruptcy trustee, a bankruptcy 
assignee’s duties would have been understood to be fiduciary.  In one 
of the Act’s provisions, Congress left no doubt that it viewed 
nonbankruptcy trustees to owe fiduciary duties to trust beneficiaries,103 
a point underscored by the Supreme Court’s observation that the 
provision covered “debts which had been incurred by a violation of 
good faith,” as well as by “[a] misapplication of trust-funds.”104  Given 
that assignees administered bankruptcy estates held in trust, one can 
ineluctably conclude that they owed duties of loyalty and care — that 
is, fiduciary duties — to the bankruptcy trust’s beneficiaries.  Thus, in 
certain respects, 1841 Act assignees resembled nonbankruptcy 
trustees.  But they also had powers and duties specific to, and at times 
exceeding, those of a business trust trustee. 
iv. The Powers and Duties of the Bankruptcy Assignee 
Plank notes that, under the Code, “[t]he powers and duties of the 
bankruptcy trustee to engage in wide-ranging activities resemble and 
exceed the powers and duties of a trustee in any business trust.”105  In 
discussing estate administration powers and duties, he differentiates 
between (1) those common to all bankruptcy trustees, regardless of the 
type of case that is administered (e.g., liquidation, reorganization) and 
(2) those specific to a trustee appointed in a particular type of case.106  
He further differentiates the common powers and duties based on 
whether they exceed the scope of those of a normal business person.107  
Here, the Article focuses on Plank’s discussion of the powers and 
duties common to all bankruptcy trustees, whether similar to or 
exceeding those of a normal business person, as well as the powers and 
 
 103. See § 1, 5 Stat. at 441 (referring to debts “created in consequence of a 
defalcation . . . as executor, administrator, guardian, or trustee, or while acting in any 
other fiduciary capacity”); see also Chapman v. Forsyth, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 202, 208 
(1844) (“The cases enumerated, ‘the defalcation of a public officer,’ ‘executor,’ 
‘administrator,’ ‘guardian,’ or ‘trustee,’ are not cases of implied but special trusts, and 
the ‘other fiduciary capacity’ mentioned, must mean the same class of trusts. The act 
speaks of technical trusts, and not those which the law implies from the contract.” 
(quoting § 1, 5 Stat. at 441)); STAPLES, supra note 84, at 21 (“This restriction is intended 
to prevent and to punish frauds on trust property . . . .”). For further discussion 
regarding this provision, see Pardo, Bankrupted Slaves, supra note 30, at 1084 n.59. 
 104. Chapman, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 207–08; cf. Duty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(11th ed. 2019) (stating that the definition of “fiduciary duty” includes “[a] duty of 
utmost good faith, trust, confidence, and candor owed by a fiduciary (such as . . . a 
trustee) to the beneficiary (such as . . . the beneficiaries of the trust)”). 
 105. Plank, supra note 40, at 270 (emphasis added). 
 106. See id. at 270–76. 
 107. See id. at 274–75. 
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duties specific to trustees appointed in Chapter 7 liquidation cases.  
The focus on the latter is warranted given that Congress designed the 
1841 Act to permit administration of cases only pursuant to a 
liquidation framework.108 
1. Powers and Duties Similar to Those of a Normal Business Person 
Regarding the duties and powers common to all bankruptcy trustees 
and akin to those of a business trust trustee, Plank notes that the 
bankruptcy trustee’s duties include representing the bankruptcy trust 
and complying with nonbankruptcy law regulating the bankruptcy 
trust’s property. 109   Likewise, the 1841 Act assignee served as the 
bankruptcy trust’s representative.110  For evidence that the individuals 
serving as assignees understood themselves to be bound by 
nonbankruptcy laws regulating property of the bankruptcy trust, one 
scenario squarely falls within the space where federal bankruptcy law 
and slavery overlapped: assignees paying municipal taxes on enslaved 
persons in the 1841 Act cases of bankrupt slaveholders.  For example, 
in the case of Gregorio Curto,111 R.P. Gaillard, the assignee, paid New 
Orleans’s First Municipality112 six dollars in 1843 on account of a city 
property tax assessed for the 1842 tax year on three enslaved persons 
whom Curto had owned and subsequently surrendered to the 
assignee.113  Assignees in other 1841 Act cases also paid taxes incurred 
 
 108. See § 10, 5 Stat. at 447. 
 109. See Plank, supra note 40, at 271. 
 110. See, e.g., In re Greaves, 10 F. Cas. 1067, 1068 (S.D.N.Y. 1842) (No. 5,744) (“The 
assignee stands as trustee in [the creditors’] behalf, stimulated by his personal interest, 
to search out and collect for their benefit every species of property belonging to the 
bankrupt . . . .”); Rugely v. Robinson, 10 Ala. 702, 741 (1846) (referring to the 1841 Act 
assignee “as the representative of the creditors”); S. DOC. NO. 27-19, at 132 (1842) 
(referring to the assignee, in material relating to the rules, regulations, and forms of 
proceedings in 1841 Act cases before the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Kentucky, “as the representative of the creditors”). 
 111. In re Curto, No. 167 (E.D. La. Apr. 13, 1842). 
 112. For background information on the 1836 division of New Orleans into three 
separate municipalities, see ROBERT C. REINDERS, END OF AN ERA: NEW ORLEANS, 
1850–1860, at 51 (1964). 
 113. See Voucher for $23.50 Annexed to Assignee’s Final Account, In re Curto, No. 
167 (E.D. La. Mar. 3, 1849) [hereinafter Curto Voucher] (itemizing a tax of $17.50 on 
real estate with an assessed value of $3,500 and a tax of $6 on three enslaved persons). 
As of 1840, New Orleans municipal law provided that “[f]rom and after the first of 
May, in each year, there shall be levied an annual tax on the lots, houses, slaves and 
other real property situate within the limits of the city and incorporated suburbs of 
New-Orleans.” New Orleans, La., An Ordinance for Imposing a Tax on Slaves and 
Real Property in the City of New-Orleans, and Its Incorporated Suburbs art. 1 (Aug. 
11, 1829), reprinted in JOHN CALHOUN, DIGEST OF THE ORDINANCE AND RESOLUTIONS 
OF THE SECOND MUNICIPALITY OF NEW-ORLEANS, IN FORCE MAY 1, 1840, at 119 (New 
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by the bankruptcy trust.114  While Plank argues that “[t]he taxation of 
the bankruptcy trust is not relevant to the status of the bankruptcy trust 
as a legal person,”115 the example of assignees paying taxes incurred by 
the 1841 Act bankruptcy trust is relevant to establishing that assignees 
understood their duties to include compliance with nonbankruptcy law 
regulating the bankruptcy trust’s property. 
As for powers common to all bankruptcy trustees under the Code, 
Plank observes that trustees can (1) sue and be sued, (2) employ 
professionals, (3) use, sell, or lease estate property, (4) invest the 
estate’s money, (5) borrow money, (6) recover certain property 
interests from third parties, and (7) examine the debtor.116  Assignees 
had similar powers under the 1841 Act. Equivalent to (1) above, the 
1841 Act vested assignees with “all the rights, titles, powers, and 
authorities . . . to sue for and defend” the bankruptcy trust. 117  
Analogous to (2) above, bankruptcy rules promulgated by the federal 
district courts permitted assignees to employ professional persons who 
would help them carry out their duties under the Act. 118  
Corresponding to (3) above, the Act vested in assignees “all the rights, 
 
Orleans, F. Cook & A. Levy 1840). At that point in time, the tax rate was “[t]wo dollars 
for every thousand dollars of the assessed value of every real estate” and “[o]ne dollar 
for every slave.” Id. art. 3, reprinted in CALHOUN, supra note 113, at 120. It thus 
appears that, by the time that Gaillard paid taxes in 1843 on the bankruptcy estate’s 
behalf, the rate had increased to five dollars for every thousand dollars of the assessed 
value of real estate and two dollars for every enslaved person. See Curto Voucher, 
supra note 113. 
 114. See, e.g., 2nd Report of Assignee, In re Maurin, No. 437 (D. La. June 10, 1845) 
(reporting payment of $160.81 by assignee on April 22, 1844, for “[t]axes due in 
Natchitoches”). Congress consolidated the Eastern and Western Districts of Louisiana 
into the District of Louisiana in 1845, see Act of Feb. 13, 1845, ch. 5, 5 Stat. 722, and 
subsequently divided the district once again into the Eastern and Western Districts of 
Louisiana in 1849, see Act of Mar. 3, 1849, ch. 114, 9 Stat. 401. Accordingly, some 
citations in this Article to court filings in 1841 Act cases originally commenced in the 
Eastern District of Louisiana involve references to the District of Louisiana as the 
geographical jurisdiction of the federal district court administering the case. 
 115. Plank, supra note 40, at 276 n.144; see also id. at 260 n.51 (explaining that 
“whether an entity is a separate entity for tax purposes has very little relevance to 
whether the entity is a separate juridical person for other purposes”). 
 116. Id. at 271. 
 117. Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 3, 5 Stat. 440, 443 (repealed 1843). 
 118. See, e.g., BANKR. D. KY. R. CCXIX (“Where the assignee is not a lawyer, or 
has a controversy in a court in which he does not practice, he will be allowed the 
reasonable fees paid by him to counsel necessarily employed . . . .”) (repealed), 
reprinted in S. DOC. NO. 27-19, at 138 (1842); BANKR. S.D. MISS. R. 14 (“The assignee 
or assignees, . . . shall also be allowed out of the estate, all necessary and proper 
disbursements made by them in the execution of their trusts, for the various clerks, 
attorneys and other agents necessarily employed by them, subject to the approval of 
the court.”) (repealed), reprinted in S.D. Miss. Bankruptcy Rules, supra note 73. 
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titles, powers, and authorities to sell, manage, and dispose of” the 
bankruptcy estate.119  Comparable to (7) above, assignees further had 
the power to examine bankrupts. 120   While assignees also had the 
power to recover certain property interests from third parties (like (6) 
above), to borrow money (resembling (5) above), and perhaps even to 
invest the bankruptcy trust’s money (approximating (4) above), 
drawing those parallels to the Code requires detailed explanation. 
First, in support of the proposition that bankruptcy trustees today 
have the power to “recover certain property interest from third 
parties,”121 Plank partly focuses on the Code’s provision authorizing 
the trustee to compel a third party to turn over estate property that the 
trustee may use, sell, or lease. 122   He also focuses on the Code’s 
provision authorizing the trustee to recover “a debt that is property of 
the estate and that is matured, payable on demand, or payable on 
order.”123  Bankruptcy rules promulgated by the federal district courts 
under the 1841 Act enabled assignees to obtain turnover orders 
directed at third parties,124 and the Act also gave assignees the power 
to recover debts owed to the bankruptcy trust.125 
 
 119. § 3, 5 Stat. at 443. As will be discussed below, the assignee’s power to lease 
estate property features prominently in the story about the bankruptcy administration 
of Banks Arcade. See infra Part II. 
 120. See, e.g., BANKR. D. KY. R. LXXXII, CXIV (repealed), reprinted in S. DOC. 
NO. 27-19, at 100, 105; BANKR. D. MASS. R. X (repealed), reprinted in CHANDLER, 
supra note 73, at 44; cf. § 4, 5 Stat. at 444 (providing that the “bankrupt shall at all times 
be subject to examination, orally, or upon written interrogatories, in and before such 
court, . . . on oath, . . . in all matters relating to such bankruptcy, and his acts and doings, 
and his property and rights of property, which, in the judgment of such court, are 
necessary and proper for the purposes of justice”). 
 121. Plank, supra note 40, at 271. 
 122. See id. at 271 n.99 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 542(a)). 
 123. 11 U.S.C. § 542(b); see also Plank, supra note 40, at 271 n.99 (discussing 11 
U.S.C. § 542(b)). 
 124. See, e.g., BANKR. D.N.C. R. 40 (“[T]he assignee, on proper evidence and by 
motion to the court, if necessary, may have the requisite order or process of the court, 
to put him in possession of the bankrupt’s estate, books, vouchers, accounts, &c.”) 
(repealed), reprinted in RULES AND REGULATIONS IN BANKRUPTCY, ADOPTED BY THE 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA 7 
(Fayetteville, Edward J. Hale 1842) [hereinafter N.C. BANKRUPTCY RULES]; BANKR. 
D. VT. R. 53 (same) (repealed), reprinted in VT. BANKRUPTCY RULES, supra note 96, 
at 10; BANKR. N.D.N.Y. R. 43 (same) (repealed), reprinted in N.D.N.Y. BANKRUPTCY 
RULES, supra note 96, at 12; BANKR. S.D.N.Y. R. 54 (same) (repealed), reprinted in 
S.D.N.Y. BANKRUPTCY RULES, supra note 73, at 12. 
 125. See, e.g., BANKR. D. KY. R. LXXX (“The assignee shall, with all convenient 
despatch, exert every proper means for the collection of every debt and demand . . . .”), 
reprinted in S. DOC. NO. 27-19, at 100; BANKR. S.D.N.Y. R. 55 (“The assignee shall 
cause to be presented for acceptance all unaccepted bills of exchange immediately after 
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Second, in support of the proposition that bankruptcy trustees today 
have the power to “borrow money,”126 Plank exclusively focuses on the 
Code’s provision authorizing the trustee to obtain credit or incur debt 
on a variety of terms for the bankruptcy trust’s benefit.127   Just as 
bankruptcy trustees today obtain unsecured credit or incur unsecured 
debt on behalf of the bankruptcy trust,128 so too did assignees under 
the 1841 Act.  For example, on December 8, 1843, Francis B. Conrad, 
the assignee in In re Maurin, paid $571.99 to A. Rivarde & Co., a New 
Orleans firm of commission merchants,129 for expenses incurred by the 
bankruptcy trust while operating a cotton plantation in June, October, 
November, and December 1843.130  Or for yet another example, the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Kentucky promulgated 
bankruptcy rules permitting the bankruptcy trust to become indebted 
to creditors who advanced funds enabling the assignee to pursue causes 
of action or exercise property rights that would enlarge the estate.131  
These examples demonstrate how assignees under the 1841 Act had 
the power to borrow money on the bankruptcy trust’s behalf. 
Third, in support of the proposition that bankruptcy trustees today 
may “invest money of the estate,”132 Plank exclusively focuses on the 
Code’s provision authorizing a trustee to deposit or invest estate 
money.133  That provision specifically authorizes the trustee to “make 
such deposit or investment of the money of the estate for which such 
trustee serves as will yield the maximum reasonable net return on such 
money, taking into account the safety of such deposit or investment.”134  
A leading bankruptcy treatise notes that, “[a]s a fiduciary, the trustee 
 
the same come to his possession . . . .”), reprinted in S.D.N.Y. BANKRUPTCY RULES, 
supra note 73, at 12. 
 126. Plank, supra note 40, at 271. 
 127. See id. at 271 n.98 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 364(a)–(d)). 
 128. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 364(a)–(b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-259). 
 129. See NEW ORLEANS DIRECTORY FOR 1842, at 349 (New Orleans, Pitts & Clarke 
1842) [hereinafter NEW ORLEANS DIRECTORY]. 
 130. See 2nd Report of Assignee, supra note 114. 
 131. See, e.g., BANKR. D. KY. R. LXXXIV (discussing assignee suits to recover 
property for the benefit of the bankruptcy trust and their funding “by means of the 
assets of the estate, or the advances and on security of a creditor” (emphasis added)), 
reprinted in S. DOC. NO. 27-19, at 101 (1842); id. XCII (“If the assignee shall be unable 
to obtain the money out of the assets, by any justifiable means, to effect the redemption 
of any valuable property, or right, he shall confer with the creditors, or such of them as 
he can in proper time; and if, thereupon, any of them advance the money to effect such 
redemption, it shall be reimbursed him, with interest, out of the general assets of the 
estate . . . .” (emphasis added)), reprinted in S. DOC. NO. 27-19, at 102. 
 132. Plank, supra note 40, at 271. 
 133. Id. at 271 n.97 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 345). 
 134. 11 U.S.C. § 345(a). 
2021] BANKRUPTCY’S PROMETHEAN GAP 827 
must act as a prudent person” and that “[t]he interest or gain realized 
on the deposit or investment of the estate’s funds will in general 
become property of the estate and thereby increase the recovery of the 
creditors.”135  Accordingly, trustees may pursue only a limited range of 
investment opportunities.136  To the extent that assignees under the 
1841 Act could invest the bankruptcy trust’s money, they too faced 
restrictions. 
The Act provided that “all assets received by the assignee in money, 
shall, within sixty days afterwards, be paid into the court, subject to its 
order respecting its future safekeeping and disposition,”137 and federal 
district courts promulgated rules requiring such funds to be deposited 
in a bank.138  For example, the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of New York required assignees to “deposit all moneys 
belonging to the bankrupt’s estates . . . either in the State Bank at 
Albany, the Oneida Bank at Utica, the Cayuga County Bank at 
Auburn, or the Bank of Monroe at Rochester.”139  Moreover, while 
one of the rules promulgated by the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Kentucky prohibited the assignee from “loan[ing] to any other 
person, with or without interest, any portion of the money, or paper in 
representation thereof, or any evidences of a demand of the estate, 
which shall come to his hands or control,” that same rule provided the 
assignee with an option that could be viewed as somewhat functionally 
equivalent to the limited investment opportunity granted to 
bankruptcy trustees today, stating that “the assignee may, at his own 
risk, receive bank notes commonly passing as money, at about their 
current discount; and in such cases, he shall immediately convert them 
into lawful money, and account for any gain which may happen 
 
 135. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 345.01. (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 
16th ed. 2020). 
 136. See id. (stating that, while the Code section on investing estate money “provides 
a trustee with some latitude as to whether to invest funds of the estate,” it also “imposes 
burdens on the party with whom the funds may be invested, limiting, as a practical 
matter, the investments a trustee can make” (emphasis added)). 
 137. Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 9, 5 Stat. 440, 447 (repealed 1843). 
 138. A leading bankruptcy treatise incorrectly states that “[t]he early bankruptcy 
laws of the United States made no express provision for the custody and safekeeping 
of the moneys of bankruptcy estates.” 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 135, 
¶ 345.LH[1]. 
 139. BANKR. N.D.N.Y. R. 44 (repealed), reprinted in N.D.N.Y. BANKRUPTCY 
RULES, supra note 96, at 12. For other federal district court rules governing the deposit 
of estate funds in banks, see, for example, BANKR. D. KY. R. XCVIII–CII (repealed), 
reprinted in S. DOC. NO. 27-19, at 103 (1842); BANKR. D. VT. R. 54–55 (repealed), 
reprinted in VT. BANKRUPTCY RULES, supra note 96, at 10; BANKR. E.D. PA. R. 25–26 
(repealed), reprinted in E.D. PA. BANKRUPTCY RULES, supra note 73, at 25–26. 
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thereon.”140   Thus, the possibility did exist for some investment of 
estate money by assignees under the 1841 Act, albeit under a narrow 
set of circumstances. 
The duties specific to a Chapter 7 trustee further parallel the duties 
of 1841 Act assignees.  Plank notes that Chapter 7 trustees must collect 
estate property, reduce it to money, and close the estate 
expeditiously. 141   While the 1841 Act framed these duties as ones 
imposed on the court, 142  courts and commentators at the time 
understood these duties to extend to assignees.143  Plank further notes 
that Chapter 7 trustees must account for property that they have 
collected, 144  a duty likewise imposed on 1841 Act assignees. 145  
Additionally, just as Chapter 7 trustees must dispose of estate property 
subject to third-party interests,146 the 1841 Act called for “a dividend 
and distribution of such assets as shall be collected and reduced to 
money, or so much thereof as can be safely so disposed of, consistently 
with the rights and interests of third persons having adverse claims 
thereto.”147  Plank points out that the Code’s Chapter 7 distribution 
 
 140. BANKR. D. KY. R. CII (emphasis added), reprinted in S. DOC. NO. 27-19, at 103. 
 141. Plank, supra note 40, at 272 & n.103. 
 142. § 10, 5 Stat. at 447 (stating “[t]hat in order to ensure a speedy settlement and 
close of the proceedings in each case in bankruptcy, it shall be the duty of the court to 
order and direct a collection of the assets, and a reduction of the same to money, and 
a distribution thereof at as early periods as practicable”). 
 143. For example, to compel assignees to settle bankruptcy estates expeditiously, the 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana promulgated a bankruptcy 
rule mandating that “[i]t shall be the duty of the assignee, in all cases, as soon as 
practicable after his appointment, to file in court a petition for the sale of all the 
property assigned by the bankrupt, whether real or personal.” Transcript of Record at 
18, Nugent v. Boyd, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 426 (1845) (No. 158) [hereinafter Nugent Record 
Transcript]. One treatise writer commented that the Act’s provision for settling 
bankruptcy estates “is intended to expedite proceedings under the act, and to make it 
the duty of the court and assignees, and other officers to act with promptness and 
despatch.” STAPLES, supra note 84, at 33 (emphasis added). 
 144. Plank, supra note 40, at 272. 
 145. See, e.g., BANKR. D. MASS. R. XVIII (“And every assignee is hereby required 
to keep full, exact and regular books of account of all receipts, payments and 
expenditures of moneys by him; and also of all property, and assets, which have come 
to his hands, and of all property and rights of property of the bankrupt, which have 
come to his knowledge, or of which he has received credible information.”) (repealed), 
reprinted in CHANDLER, supra note 73, at 51; BANKR. D.N.C. R. 51 (“The assignee 
shall keep succinct and clear accounts of the estate assigned . . . .”) (repealed), 
reprinted in N.C. BANKRUPTCY RULES, supra note 124, at 8; BANKR. E.D. PA. R. 25 
(same) (repealed), reprinted in E.D. PA. BANKRUPTCY RULES, supra note 73, at 25. 
 146. Plank, supra note 40, at 272 & n.105 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 725). 
 147. § 10, 5 Stat. at 447. On this front, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District 
of Louisiana promulgated a rule that permitted, upon court approval of an assignee’s 
petition to sell estate property subject to a mortgage, transfer of the mortgage to the 
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scheme requires trustees to distribute estate property to creditors and 
debtors, with distributions to the latter only when surplus funds 
remain.148   While the 1841 Act’s distribution scheme made express 
reference to “creditors who ha[d] proved their debts” as the only 
category of beneficiary entitled to estate dividends and distributions,149 
courts did recognize an 1841 Act bankrupt’s entitlement to surplus 
funds remaining in the estate.150 
In addition to the marshaling and distribution functions carried out 
by Chapter 7 trustees, Plank focuses on their duties requiring 
(1) investigation of the debtor’s financial affairs, (2) examination of 
creditors’ proofs of claims, (3) objection to the allowance of improper 
claims, (4) production of estate administration reports, and 
(5) contestation of a debtor’s discharge, whether before or subsequent 
to its grant. 151   Similarly, as evidenced by bankruptcy rules 
promulgated pursuant to the 1841 Act, federal courts envisioned that 
assignees would investigate a bankrupt’s financial affairs,152 examine 
proofs of claims and object to their allowance if improper,153 produce 
reports on estate administration activities,154 and presumably object to 
a bankrupt’s discharge request if warranted.155 
 
proceeds generated by the sale of that property. See Transcript of Record at 94, 
Houston v. City Bank of New Orleans, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 486 (1848) (No. 144) 
[hereinafter Houston Record Transcript]; infra notes 363–68 and accompanying text. 
 148. Plank, supra note 40, at 272 & n.106 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 726). 
 149. § 10, 5 Stat. at 447. 
 150. See, e.g., Cromwell v. Comegys, 7 Ala. 498, 499 (1845); Coleman v. Tebbetts, 
20 N.H. 408, 409 (1845). For further evidence that creditors did not constitute the only 
category of beneficiary under the 1841 Act, see, for example, McLean v. Lafayette 
Bank, 16 F. Cas. 258, 259 (C.C.D. Ohio 1844) (No. 8,886) (“The assignee not only 
represents the bankrupts, but their creditors . . . .”); A COMMENTARY ON THE 
BANKRUPT LAW OF 1841, SHOWING ITS OPERATION AND EFFECT, supra note 95, at 34 
(“[A]nd in case of breach the bond shall be sued and suable under the order of the 
court, for the benefit of the creditors and other persons in interest.” (emphasis added)). 
 151. Plank, supra note 40, at 272. 
 152. See, e.g., BANKR. D. KY. BANKR. R. LXXXI–LXXXII (repealed), reprinted in 
S. DOC. NO. 27-19, at 100 (1842); BANKR. D. MASS. R. X (repealed), reprinted in 
CHANDLER, supra note 73, at 44. 
 153. See, e.g., BANKR. D. MASS. R. IX, reprinted in CHANDLER, supra note 73, at 43; 
BANKR. D.N.H. R. IX (repealed), reprinted in D.N.H. BANKRUPTCY RULES, supra 
note 73, at 6; BANKR. E.D. PA. R. 16 (repealed), reprinted in E.D. PA. BANKRUPTCY 
RULES, supra note 73, at 20. 
 154. See, e.g., BANKR. D. KY. R. LXXXV–LXXXVI, XCVII, reprinted in S. DOC. 
NO. 27-19, at 101–02; BANKR. D. MASS. R. XVIII, L, reprinted in CHANDLER, supra 
note 73, at 51, 67; BANKR. S.D. MISS. R. 16 (repealed), reprinted in S.D. Miss. 
Bankruptcy Rules, supra note 73. 
 155. For example, an 1841 Act bankrupt’s eligibility for discharge partly depended 
on the bankrupt having made a “bona fide surrender [of] all his property, and rights of 
property.” Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 4, 5 Stat. 440, 443 (repealed 1843). To monitor 
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Finally, Plank observes that the Code empowers a Chapter 7 trustee 
to operate the debtor’s business upon court authorization.156  While the 
Act did not have a provision that expressly referred to the assignee’s 
operation of a bankrupt’s business, one can conclude that a statutory 
basis did exist for such operational authority and that assignees did 
exercise it.  Initially, it should be noted that legal entities, such as 
corporations, were ineligible for relief under the 1841 Act,157 thereby 
limiting the scope of opportunity for an assignee to operate a business 
to those cases involving natural persons who were engaged in sustained 
commercial activity. 158   Second, the Act expressly gave assignees 
authority to “manage” estate property, 159  thus suggesting the 
possibility of an assignee continuing the commercial activity in which 
the bankrupt had been engaged, provided that it was in the bankruptcy 
trust’s best interest.  Third, evidence from 1841 Act case files reveals 
 
compliance with this requirement, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
New York mandated that, “[on] or before the day appointed by the court to show cause 
why the bankrupt shall not have his discharge and certificate, the assignee shall file 
with the clerk a report, stating whether the bankrupt has bona fide surrendered to the 
assignee all his property and right of property.” BANKR. N.D.N.Y. R. 49 (repealed), 
reprinted in N.D.N.Y. BANKRUPTCY RULES, supra note 96, at 13. Other federal judicial 
districts had the same rule. See, e.g., BANKR. D.N.C. R. 47 (repealed), reprinted in N.C. 
BANKRUPTCY RULES, supra note 124, at 7; BANKR. E.D. PA. R. 33, reprinted in E.D. 
PA. BANKRUPTCY RULES, supra note 73, at 27. More broadly, the 1841 Act provided 
standing to object to a bankrupt’s discharge “to all creditors who have proved their 
debts, and other persons in interest.” § 4, 5 Stat. at 443 (emphasis added); cf. BANKR. 
D. KY. R. CLXXXVI (providing “any creditor, who has proved his debt, or other 
person in interest” with standing to raise a discharge objection against the bankrupt 
(emphasis added)), reprinted in S. DOC. NO. 27-19, at 118. 
 156. Plank, supra note 40, at 272–73. Plank includes the Chapter 7 trustee’s power 
to operate the debtor’s business among the duties of such a trustee. See id. (“In 
Chapter 7 liquidations, the trustee has the duty to: . . . if authorized by the court, 
operate the business of the debtor.”). But the Code provision cited by Plank in support 
of his proposition, see id. at 273 n.112 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 721), does not impose an 
affirmative obligation on a Chapter 7 trustee to operate the debtor’s business; instead, 
that provision entails discretionary conferral of operational authority to the trustee by 
the court upon the trustee’s request. See 11 U.S.C. § 721; In re Sher-Del Foods, Inc., 
186 B.R. 358, 363 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1995); In re A & T Trailer Park, Inc., 53 B.R. 144, 
147–48 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985). Put another way, the provision contemplates the grant 
of a specific power to the trustee upon the satisfaction of certain conditions. Cf. Power, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (stating that the definition of “power” 
includes “[t]he legal right or authorization to act”). Other Code provisions govern the 
powers and duties of a Chapter 7 trustee who has the authority to operate the debtor’s 
business. See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 135, ¶ 721.02. 
 157. See § 1, 5 Stat. at 440–42 (specifying persons eligible for bankruptcy relief). 
 158. Under the Code, natural persons and legal entities are eligible for Chapter 7 
relief: most categories of persons may be debtors under Chapter 7, see 11 U.S.C. 
§ 109(b), and the Code defines the term “person” to include an “individual, 
partnership, and corporation,” id. § 101(41). 
 159. § 3, 5 Stat. at 443. 
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instances in which an assignee’s management of estate property could 
not be construed as anything other than operating a business. 
On this front, reconsider the case of In re Maurin, in which the 
assignee incurred unsecured debt on behalf of the bankruptcy trust in 
order to continue operating the bankrupt’s cotton plantation.160  While 
various expenses of the bankruptcy trust stemmed from multiple 
“[b]ins of sundries” sent by A. Rivarde & Co. to supply the plantation, 
an especially noteworthy expense was the $400 that the assignee “paid 
Luc Poché Overseer in full for all claims for wages as Overseer for the 
year 1844.”161  During the first half of 1844, as a result of the forced 
labor of enslaved Black Americans, the Maurin bankruptcy trust 
generated more than $4,400 of gross proceeds from the sale of 125 bales 
of cotton, which A. Rivarde & Co. sold on the bankruptcy trust’s behalf 
for a fee.162  This type of activity reflects how assignees under the 1841 
Act had the opportunity to and did in fact continue operating the 
businesses of some bankrupts. 
In light of the aforementioned general and context-specific 
considerations under the Code, Plank concludes that “[b]ecause these 
powers and duties transcend the duties of a trustee of a traditional trust 
of simply preserving and distributing the trust estate, the bankruptcy 
trust in a Chapter 7 liquidation resembles a business trust and, thus, 
qualifies as a legal person to the same extent.”163   Given the high 
degree of substantive similarities between the Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
trust and the 1841 Act bankruptcy trust, one ought to conclude that the 
latter also constituted a legal person.  That conclusion becomes even 
more compelling once one considers Plank’s argument that all 
bankruptcy trustees under the Code have powers and duties whose 
scope exceeds those of a normal business person.164  The same can be 
said of assignees under the 1841 Act. 
2. Powers and Duties Exceeding Those of a Normal Business Person 
In his analysis of a bankruptcy trustee’s powers that exceed those of 
a normal business person, Plank notes that, in addition to authorizing 
trustees to avoid certain prebankruptcy transfers by the debtor that 
could similarly have been avoided by creditors under nonbankruptcy 
 
 160. See supra text accompanying note 130. 
 161. 2nd Report of Assignee, supra note 114. 
 162. See id. 
 163. Plank, supra note 40, at 273. 
 164. See id. at 274–75. 
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law,165 the Code grants trustees “powers that . . . further the goals of 
bankruptcy, such as the power to assume or reject executory contracts, 
to avoid preferential transfers and certain other transfers, and to 
abandon to the debtors burdensome or inconsequential property.”166  
Along similar lines, the 1841 Act expressly gave assignees the power to 
avoid the functional equivalent of preferences and fraudulent transfers 
under the Code. 167   Although the Act did not contain express 
provisions analogous to the Code’s provisions on the assumption, 
assignment, and rejection of executory contracts and unexpired 
leases,168 as well as the abandonment of estate property,169 courts did 
recognize assignees as having such powers.170 
Plank notes that, when trustees exercise these unique powers under 
the Code, they do so “ow[ing] a fiduciary duty to enhance the 
bankruptcy estate for the benefit of the creditors and, in the rare case 
when the assets exceed the liabilities, for the benefit of an individual 
debtor.”171   Comparatively, the 1841 Act implicitly referred to the 
assignee’s avoidance powers as ones to be exercised for the benefit of 
the bankruptcy trust’s beneficiaries,172 which included both creditors 
 
 165. See id. (“The trustee’s prerogatives include powers that the creditors under 
non-bankruptcy law could exercise, such as the power to avoid unperfected liens or to 
avoid fraudulent transfers.” (footnote omitted)). 
 166. Id. at 275 (footnotes omitted). 
 167. See Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 2, 5 Stat. 440, 442 (“[A]ll future payments, 
securities, conveyances, or transfers of property, or agreements made or given by any 
bankrupt, in contemplation of bankruptcy, and for the purpose of giving any creditor, 
endorser, surety, or other person, any preference or priority over the general creditors 
of such bankrupts; and all other payments, securities, conveyances or transfers of 
property or agreements made or given by such bankrupt in contemplation of 
bankruptcy, to any person or persons whatever, not being a bona fide creditor or 
purchaser, for a valuable consideration, without notice, shall be deemed utterly void, 
and a fraud upon this act; and the assignee under the bankruptcy shall be entitled to 
claim, sue for, recover, and receive the same as part of the assets of the 
bankruptcy . . . .”) (repealed 1843). 
 168. 11 U.S.C. § 365. 
 169. Id. § 554. 
 170. See, e.g., BANKR. D. KY. R. LXXXVI–LXXXVII (setting forth rules for the 
treatment of claims and demands belonging to the estate and abandoned by the 
assignee) (repealed), reprinted in S. DOC. NO. 27-19, at 101 (1842); Smith v. Gordon, 
22 F. Cas. 554, 556 (D. Me. 1843) (No. 13,052) (discussing power of the assignee to 
reject an unexpired lease and to abandon burdensome estate property to the 
bankrupt); Doremus v. Walker, 8 Ala. 194, 200 (1845) (discussing power of the assignee 
to abandon burdensome estate property to the bankrupt). 
 171. Plank, supra note 40, at 275. 
 172. See § 2, 5 Stat. at 442 (stating that “the assignee under the bankruptcy shall be 
entitled to claim, sue for, recover, and receive the [voided transfers] as part of the assets 
of the bankruptcy”). 
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and the bankrupt.173  Moreover, federal courts expressly referred to an 
assignee’s correlative duty to augment the estate when exercising their 
unique powers.174 
Plank concludes his argument that the bankruptcy trust is a legal 
person by examining the liabilities of the bankruptcy trust and its 
trustee.  The costs of administering the trust, referred to by the Code 
as “administrative expenses,” 175  fall squarely on the trust, whether 
those costs relate to the estate’s preservation, debt incurred by the 
bankruptcy trust, or even torts committed by trustees acting within the 
scope of their authority.176  As for the trustee’s liability, Plank points 
out that, “unlike the trustee of a traditional trust, but like a trustee of 
a statutory business trust, the bankruptcy trustee . . . does not incur 
personal liability for the activities of the trust unless the trustee violates 
its duties of loyalty and care.”177  Under the 1841 Act, federal courts 
promulgated rules generally providing that the bankruptcy trust would 
be liable for the costs of its administration.178  Moreover, the Act itself 
 
 173. See supra notes 149–50 and accompanying text. 
 174. See, e.g., BANKR. D. KY. R. LXXXIII (mandating that, because the assignee 
was “charged with the duty of claiming and recovering, for the benefit of the general 
creditors, any property, money, or such rights, previously transferred, conveyed, paid, 
or released, by the bankrupt, in violation of the statute, and in fraud of such creditors, 
and of annulling any security, agreement, or other act, so given, entered into, or 
executed, it shall be his duty to examine and inquire into the facts of every case having 
such appearance, and to regard the suggestions of any creditor, touching such 
transactions; and thereupon to institute suit for the recovery of such property or 
money, whenever sufficient grounds shall appear, and the assets of the estate shall 
afford, or the creditor furnish the means of defraying the charges”), reprinted in S. 
DOC. NO. 27-19, at 100–01; McLean v. Lafayette Bank, 16 F. Cas. 258, 259 (C.C.D. 
Ohio 1844) (No. 8,886) (proclaiming that it was the assignee’s “duty to contest the 
validity of all liens set up by a part of the creditors to the exclusion of others, where 
there is any reason to suppose that such liens have been created in violation of the 
bankrupt law”). When an assignee sought to reject an unexpired lease or to abandon 
estate property, federal courts expressly and impliedly referred to the need for a cost-
benefit analysis by the assignee substantiating the exercise of such powers. See BANKR. 
D. KY. R. LXXXVI–LXXXVII (repealed), reprinted in S. DOC. NO. 27-19, at 101; 
Smith, 22 F. Cas. at 556; Doremus, 8 Ala. at 200. Put another way, the assignee had a 
duty to determine that the bankruptcy trust would be better off without the property 
in question. 
 175. 11 U.S.C. § 503. 
 176. See Plank, supra note 40, at 275–76. 
 177. Id. at 276 (footnote omitted). 
 178. See, e.g., BANKR. D. CONN. R. 24 (repealed), reprinted in D. CONN. 
BANKRUPTCY RULES, supra note 96, at 8; BANKR. D.N.C. R. 41 (repealed), reprinted 
in N.C. BANKRUPTCY RULES, supra note 124, at 7; BANKR. D. VT. R. 57 (repealed), 
reprinted in VT. BANKRUPTCY RULES, supra note 96, at 10; BANKR. E.D. PA. R. 32 
(repealed), reprinted in E.D. PA. BANKRUPTCY RULES, supra note 73, at 27; BANKR. 
N.D.N.Y. R. 47 (repealed), reprinted in N.D.N.Y. BANKRUPTCY RULES, supra note 96, 
at 13; BANKR. S.D. MISS. R. 17 (repealed), reprinted in S.D. Miss. Bankruptcy Rules, 
834 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVIII 
imposed liability on assignees only in the event that they breached their 
fiduciary duties.179  As such, the 1841 Act allocated liability between 
the bankruptcy trust and its representative in a way that mirrored 
today’s analogous scheme under the Code. 
* * * 
Having worked through the key elements of Plank’s argument that 
the Code creates a bankruptcy trust, we can turn to his conclusion, 
which has corresponding implications for how we should think about 
the 1841 Act bankruptcy trust: 
 The bankruptcy trust has all of the attributes of a business trust 
that constitutes a legal person.  Although it is not created by an 
express agreement, private parties may create a bankruptcy trust by 
filing a bankruptcy petition.  A trustee in control of trust assets 
conducts a business, albeit a specialized type of business, of gathering 
property of the estate and . . . liquidating . . . the debtor and its assets.  
In the course of this business activity, the bankruptcy trust incurs 
liability as an enterprise.  It is more than just a relationship between 
the trustee and the beneficiaries of the trust.  It is more than just a 
judicial officer in control of specified assets.  It has an existence 
separate from its settlor, its trustee, and its beneficiaries.  
Accordingly, the bankruptcy trust should be treated as a legal 
person.180 
 
supra note 73; BANKR. S.D.N.Y. R. 58 (repealed), reprinted in S.D.N.Y. BANKRUPTCY 
RULES, supra note 73, at 12. Some federal bankruptcy rules further provided that the 
bankrupt would be liable for the costs of administration in cases involving an 
administratively insolvent estate. See, e.g., BANKR. D. CONN. R. 15, 24, reprinted in D. 
CONN. BANKRUPTCY RULES, supra note 96, at 6, 8; see also In re Greaves, 10 F. Cas. 
1067, 1068 (S.D.N.Y. 1842) (No. 5,744) (stating that the assignee’s expenses constituted 
“one of the charges the bankrupt must meet as necessarily incident to his proceeding” 
when the bankruptcy estate was administratively insolvent). 
 179. See Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 9, 5 Stat. 440, 447 (stating that “the court may 
require of such assignee a bond, with at least two sureties, in such sum as it may deem 
proper, conditioned for the due and faithful discharge of all his duties” (emphasis 
added)) (repealed 1843); cf. BANKR. D. MASS. R. XVIII (providing that the assignee’s 
“wilful or negligent omission to [properly deposit estate funds] . . . shall be deemed a 
good cause in the discretion of the court for his removal from office”) (repealed), 
reprinted in CHANDLER, supra note 73, at 51; BANKR. E.D. PA. R. 25 (“Every wilful or 
negligent omission to comply with these directions [regarding the deposit of estate 
funds], will be deemed a good cause of removal of the assignee in the discretion of the 
court.”), reprinted in E.D. PA. BANKRUPTCY RULES, supra note 73, at 26; STAPLES, 
supra note 84, at 33 (stating that, with regard to carrying out the Act’s marshaling and 
distribution functions, “[a]ny unnecessary delay or wilful negligence on the part of the 
assignee or other officer, will be ground of removal and of the summary interposition 
of the court”). 
 180. Plank, supra note 40, at 276 (footnotes omitted). 
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As demonstrated in this Section, the substance and structure of the 
1841 Act bankruptcy trust significantly overlap with the substance and 
structure of today’s bankruptcy trust.  If the latter constitutes a legal 
person, then so too did the former.181 
Conceptualizing the 1841 Act bankruptcy trust as an artificial entity 
is a necessary but insufficient condition for establishing that the Act 
created a federal instrumentality for resolving core problems incident 
to financial failure.  As discussed in the next Section, that claim 
depends on an analytical framework for distinguishing between private 
and public legal entities. 
B. Nationalizing Financially Distressed Assets 
In discussing the implications of conceptualizing the bankruptcy 
trust as legal person, Plank identifies federal bankruptcy jurisdiction as 
an area where the concept can generate significant analytical clarity.182  
His commentary on this point includes the following observations: 
“The bankruptcy trust is a legal person created specifically pursuant to 
federal law.  In this context, it has all of the attributes of a privately 
owned railroad chartered under federal law or a national banking 
association charted under the National Bank Act.”183 
Plank does not explain, however, why the bankruptcy trust should 
be classified as a private (i.e., nongovernmental) legal entity or, for that 
matter, how the bankruptcy trust is akin to the private legal entities 
that he identifies as comparators.184  Notably, five years before the 
publication of Plank’s article, the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in 
 
 181. If one accepts the argument that the 1841 Act bankruptcy trust constituted a 
legal person, then the temporal relationship between the business trust and the 
bankruptcy trust needs to be reevaluated. Plank dates the innovation of the business 
trust in the United States to the late nineteenth century. See id. at 259 & n.43. His 
reliance on the business trust as an analogue to the bankruptcy trust suggests that Plank 
might view the former to be the latter’s historical antecedent. Cf. id. at 253–54 
(“Specifically, the Code creates an entity that has all of the attributes — and more — 
of a business trust. American law recognizes the business trust as a legal person. 
Accordingly, the bankruptcy trust should be recognized as a legal person.” (footnote 
omitted)). But if the 1841 Act bankruptcy trust had attributes equivalent to and 
sometimes exceeding those of the business trust from the late nineteenth century, then 
the 1841 Act bankruptcy trust ought to be viewed as the business trust’s precursor. It 
is beyond the scope of this Article to consider whether the 1800 Act also created a 
bankruptcy trust that constituted a legal person. That said, it should be noted that 
courts that applied the 1841 Act viewed it to be significantly different in substance and 
structure than the 1800 Act. See, e.g., Carr v. Gale, 5 F. Cas. 118, 120 (C.C.D. Me. 1847) 
(No. 2,434); Griswold v. Pratt, 50 Mass. (9 Met.) 16, 21 (1845). 
 182. See Plank, supra note 40, at 280–82. 
 183. Id. at 281 (footnote omitted). 
 184. See id. at 280–82. 
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Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. offered signposts for 
analyzing when “Government-created and -controlled corporations” 
might be deemed federal instrumentalities.185  That opinion surveyed 
“the long history of corporations created and participated in by the 
United States for the achievement of governmental objectives.” 186  
That survey included references to the second Bank of the United 
States and the Union Pacific Railroad,187 both of which Plank mentions 
in his analysis of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction through the lens of the 
bankruptcy trust. 188   When one considers the indicia of a federal 
instrumentality identified in Lebron, a compelling argument emerges 
for classifying the 1841 Act bankruptcy trust as a public legal entity. 
Initially, it should be noted that the Court in Lebron sought to 
answer whether the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (i.e., 
Amtrak) constituted “an agency or instrumentality of the United 
States for the purpose of individual rights guaranteed against the 
Government by the Constitution.”189  This Article’s argument here is 
not that the Lebron framework is definitively apt for determining 
whether the 1841 Act bankruptcy trust constituted a federal 
instrumentality.  Rather, the argument is that, pursuant to that 
framework, one would be disposed to conclude that the 1841 Act 
bankruptcy trust is a federal instrumentality.190 
Before setting forth the indicia pointing to Amtrak’s federal 
instrumentality status, the Court in Lebron emphatically made the 
following point: “That Government-created and -controlled 
corporations are (for many purposes at least) part of the Government 
itself has a strong basis, not merely in past practice and understanding, 
but in reason itself.”191  In Lebron, the critical characteristics for the 
Court’s classification of Amtrak as a federal instrumentality were its 
 
 185. Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 394 (1995). 
 186. Id. at 386. 
 187. See id. at 386–87. 
 188. See Plank, supra note 40, at 281 & n.171. 
 189. Lebron, 513 U.S. at 394. 
 190. The fact that Congress delegated administration of the 1841 Act bankruptcy 
trust to the federal judiciary should not affect our understanding of the trust’s status as 
a legal entity. Furthermore, recall that the bankruptcy trust was akin to a business trust, 
see supra Sections I.A.ii–iv, which shares similarities with a corporation, see supra text 
accompanying notes 48–49. Accordingly, the Lebron framework strikes me as good as 
any other potential point of origin for exploring whether the bankruptcy trust should 
be classified as a public legal entity. Cf. id. (stating that the Court’s holding on 
Amtrak’s federal instrumentality status “accord[s] with public and judicial 
understanding of the nature of Government-created and -controlled corporations over 
the years”). 
 191. Id. at 397. 
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“establish[ment] and organiz[ation] under federal law for the very 
purpose of pursuing federal governmental objectives, under the 
direction and control of federal governmental appointees.”192   The 
Court additionally stressed that the federal government exerted 
control over Amtrak “not as a creditor but as a policymaker.” 193  
Twenty years after its decision in Lebron, the Court reaffirmed these 
criteria in holding that Amtrak constituted a governmental entity for 
purposes of analyzing whether certain metrics and standards issued by 
the corporation violated the Constitution’s separation-of-powers 
provisions.194 
Analyzing the 1841 Act bankruptcy trust pursuant to the Lebron 
framework compels the conclusion that the trust should be deemed to 
have been a federal instrumentality.  First, as detailed above, federal 
law established and organized the trust.195  And, for the reasons that 
follow, it is clear that (1) the trust existed for the very purpose of 
pursuing federal governmental objectives, (2) federal governmental 
appointees directed and controlled the trust, and (3) the federal 
government exerted control over the trust as a policymaker. 
i. The Purpose of the 1841 Act Trust 
Prior work examining the politics leading to the passage of the 1841 
Act196 describes how the legislation constituted part of “a muscular 
response by the federal government” to the depressed financial 
conditions following the Panic of 1837 and how the Whigs spearheaded 
that effort with the hope that it “would reinforce and grow the nation’s 
commercial and manufacturing sectors, which they anticipated would 
have positive spillover effects throughout the rest of the economy.”197  
Members of Congress who advocated for a federal bankruptcy system 
 
 192. Id. at 398. 
 193. Id. at 399. 
 194. See Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 575 U.S. 43, 54–55 (2015). 
 195. See supra Section I.A. 
 196. See Rafael I. Pardo, Federally Funded Slaving, 93 TUL. L. REV. 787, 815–23 
(2019) [hereinafter Pardo, Federally Funded Slaving]. 
 197. Id. at 816; see also MARLER, supra note 28, at 59 (referring to the Whig Party’s 
“support for activist economic policies by the state”); M. SUSAN MURNANE, 
BANKRUPTCY IN AN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY: A HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 20 (2015) (“The idea of a national uniform 
bankruptcy act was very controversial throughout the nineteenth century. . . . The 
debate over bankruptcy paralleled a deeper debate over the meaning of America. 
During the nineteenth century, an ideological battle raged between those who believed 
expanding commerce and industry promoted a unified American nation able to hold 
its own on the world stage and those who grounded republican virtue in local 
institutions and small-scale proprietary capitalism.”). 
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as a key component to the nation’s economic recovery repeatedly 
emphasized that private creditor interests would be subordinated to 
the federal government’s objectives. 
Senator Henry Clay from Kentucky argued that “[t]he right of the 
State . . . to the use of the unimpaired faculties of its citizens as 
producers, as consumers, and as defenders of the Commonwealth, is 
paramount to any rights or relations which can be created between 
citizen and citizen,” adding for good measure “that the public rights of 
the State . . . [are] paramount to any supposed right which appertain to 
a private creditor.” 198   According to Clay, the latter statement 
represented “the great principle which lies at the bottom of all 
bankrupt laws, and it is this which . . . imposes upon Congress the duty 
of enacting a bankruptcy system.”199 
Echoing these sentiments, Senator William Fessenden of Maine 
argued that “those rights and those interests [arising from the 
obligation of contracts] must yield to high considerations of public 
policy,” insisting that such rights and interest “must necessarily be 
made subservient to the good of the state.” 200   Lest anyone 
misunderstand his position on a federal bankruptcy system, Fessenden 
proclaimed it in no uncertain terms: 
Legislation of this kind must be founded upon higher views, and more 
commanding principles — principles which look to the general weal 
— to national objects.  When these are brought into action, they 
necessarily ride over all these considerations which affect individuals 
merely, and become imperative upon every statesman whose eye is 
single to the welfare of the whole country.201 
These sentiments were not limited to lawmakers who pushed the 
legislation across the finish line.202  After the Act took effect, the U.S. 
 
 198. CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 847 (1840) (statement of Sen. Clay). 
 199. Id. 
 200. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 470 (1841) (statement of Sen. 
Fessenden). 
 201. Id. 
 202. Prior to the 1841 Act’s passage, interest groups who lobbied Congress to enact 
a federal bankruptcy system argued that such legislation was a national economic 
imperative in the public interest. For example, the New Orleans Chamber of 
Commerce in 1841 warned Congress that, 
unless such a law is passed as will give [debtors] relief, a very large portion of 
the sufferers will never be able to emerge from it, and, as a necessary 
consequence, will no longer be able to support their families, or contribute to 
the general wealth and prosperity of the nation. 
S. DOC. NO. 26-123, at 1 (1841). And the year before, the Baltimore Board of Trade 
opined “that such a law would be beneficial to the citizens of the United States.” S. 
DOC. NO. 26-469, at 1 (1840). A bankruptcy treatise published after the Act’s passage 
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Senate adopted a resolution on December 13, 1842, seeking feedback 
from those responsible for executing the law. 203   As part of this 
intelligence-gathering operation, Secretary of State Daniel Webster 
sent a letter to the federal courts, and the responses soon began 
flooding back from all quarters.204  Significantly, several respondents 
from the judiciary echoed the points made by congressional advocates 
who championed the 1841 Act, but they did so based on experience 
rather than theory.  U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice Story, who 
is credited as one of the principal drafters of the 1841 Act,205 remarked, 
“I have not the slightest hesitation in saying that, as far as my 
observation and experience extend in my own circuit . . . , the system 
has worked well and been for the public benefit . . . .”206  U.S. District 
 
but before its effective date expressed similar sentiments. See STAPLES, supra note 84, 
at 6 (“There has never been a period since the formation of the Constitution, when a 
general law on the subject was more imperatively called for, nor when it could exert a 
more salutary influence than now. A violent and sudden convulsion in the pecuniary 
affairs of the country has taken place, . . . reducing thousands of our best citizens to 
hopeless insolvency.”). 
 203. See CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 3d Sess. 46 (1842) (“Resolved, That the 
Secretary of State do communicate, with all convenient despatch [sic], with the judicial 
officers of the United States who have had the execution of the bankrupt law, and 
ascertain from them the number of applications under the act, both voluntary and 
involuntary; the number of discharges; the opinions of the judges as to any 
amendments or modifications of the act; and such other information as he may deem 
necessary to show the effects and operations of the act; and that he report the same to 
the Senate, from time to time, as soon as the information shall be received.”). 
 204. See Letter from Daniel Webster, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, to the U.S. 
Senate (Dec. 27, 1842) (“In compliance with the resolution of the Senate of the 13th 
instant, circular letters were addressed by this Department to the judges and clerks of 
the courts of the United States, and to the district attorneys. Answers to many of these 
letters having now been received they are herewith transmitted to the Senate.”), in S. 
DOC. NO. 27-19, at 1 (1842). 
 205. See 2 LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 407 (Boston, William M. Story ed., 
Charles C. Little & James Brown 1851). 
 206. Letter from Joseph Story, Assoc. J., U.S. Sup. Ct., to Daniel Webster, Sec’y of 
State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Dec. 24, 1842) [hereinafter Letter from Joseph Story to 
Daniel Webster], in S. DOC. NO. 27-19, at 27. Justice Story repeatedly referred to the 
1841 Act as a means for achieving public justice. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Great Works 
Milling & Mfg. Co., 17 F. Cas. 496, 500 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Me. 1843) (No. 
9,662) (remarking “that after a little experience in the workings of the system, with the 
aid of some amendments by congress, the courts of the United States would soon attain 
punctuality, uniformity, and promptitude, in administering the system, so as to 
accomplish in the fullest manner all the ends of private, as well as of public justice” 
(emphasis added)); Letter from Joseph Story, Assoc. J., U.S. Sup. Ct., to John 
McPherson Berrien, U.S. Sen. for Georgia (Apr. 29, 1842) (predicting that the 1841 
Act bankruptcy system “will be one of the most lasting benefits ever conferred upon 
our country” and offering suggestions about the Act “dictated solely by the desire to 
further a due administration of public justice” (emphasis added)), in 2 LIFE AND 
LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY, supra note 205, at 405. 
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Court Judge Andrew Judson observed that “[t]he commercial interests 
of the country are deeply involved in maintaining this law.”207  U.S. 
District Court Judge Archibald Randall stated that the legislation “has 
had a beneficial effect on the business community in this district.”208  
U.S. District Court Judge Alfred Conkling noted that “the operation 
of the act appears to me to have been in accordance with those great 
principles of justice and public policy on which it rests, and to which it 
was designed to give effect.”209   U.S. District Court Judge Monroe 
opined that the Act’s “operation in the liberation of the citizen, and 
restoring him to this independence, and thereby exciting him to new 
industry and self-respect, must improve the public morals; and, in this 
mode, the law must advance, and contribute to maintain, the general 
welfare, to every intent.” 210   He further predicted that the Act’s 
“continued operation will have the effects of improving the fairness of 
the transactions of men, and preserving a more healthy action in all our 
business and commercial operations.”211 
These responses to Secretary Webster’s inquiry demonstrate that a 
segment of the federal judiciary viewed the 1841 Act as positively 
accomplishing its public policy objective.  But what specifically was that 
objective, and how did Congress design the Act’s machinery to 
accomplish the legislation’s purpose?  For a contemporary answer to 
the former question, consider U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice 
Henry Baldwin’s response to Secretary Webster.  He advised that the 
law should be stripped down to its provisions on involuntary 
bankruptcy cases, based on the view that the Act’s primary objective 
had been met — namely, providing financial relief to debtors adversely 
affected by the Panic of 1837.212 
 
 207. Letter from Andrew T. Judson, U.S. J., Dist. of Connecticut, to Daniel Webster, 
Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Dec. 24, 1842), in S. DOC. NO. 27-19, at 32. 
 208. Letter from Archibald Randall, U.S. J., E. Dist. of Pennsylvania, to Daniel 
Webster, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Dec. 24, 1842), in S. DOC. NO. 27-19, at 
50. 
 209. Letter from Alfred Conkling, U.S. J., N. Dist. of New York, to Daniel Webster, 
Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Dec. 26, 1842), in S. DOC. NO. 27-19, at 67. 
 210. Letter from Thomas Bell Monroe to Daniel Webster, supra note 74, in S. DOC. 
NO. 27-19, at 150. 
 211. Id., in S. DOC. NO. 27-19, at 151. 
 212. See Letter from Henry Baldwin, Assoc. J., U.S. Sup. Ct., to Daniel Webster, 
Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Dec. 30, 1842) (“In taking a general view of the 
effects and operation of the act, my opinion is, that they have been salutary. A peculiar 
state of things existed before, and at the time of its passage, which called for 
appropriate provisions to meet the exigency of the times, by incorporating into a 
system of bankruptcy the new and anomalous feature of a proceeding on the 
application of the debtor, whereby he could obtain a discharge without any movement 
on the part of the creditor. Such a provision is inconsistent with the policy of bankrupt 
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Other responses to Secretary Webster from those responsible for 
executing the law confirm that many perceived the Act’s main goal to 
have been the creation of a robust debtor-relief system that relegated 
creditor interests. 213   U.S. District Court Judge Samuel R. Betts 
reported that “[c]reditors complain that too many advantages are 
awarded bankrupts, and that the proceedings are too summary.”214  
Joseph C. Potts, the U.S. Court Clerk for the District of New Jersey, 
observed that “the chief objection urged against the voluntary part of 
the law, aside from its retrospective operation, is the helpless condition 
in which it places creditors.”215  John L. Hayes, the U.S. Court Clerk 
for the District of New Hampshire, commented that “[i]t [wa]s difficult 
to conceive that so large an amount of indebtment, with so small a 
proportion of available assets, could ever have been cancelled by any 
other operation than that of the bankrupt law.”216 
Given that the paramount federal governmental objective under the 
1841 Act was debtor relief, what statutory mechanism did Congress 
rely upon to accomplish this end?  The answer, simply put, was the 
 
laws, and ought not to be retained in a system intended to be permanent. An existing 
and pressing emergency was deemed to exist, calling for relief to a debtor, as well as 
providing a remedy to the creditors of a specified class of debtors; but the time has 
probably arrived when the causes which led to the adoption of a provision for voluntary 
applications have ceased — the evident object having been rather to afford a relief for 
the past, than to confer a right for the future debts of the applicants by their discharge. 
On this subject, my opinion is, that the effect of the act has been favorable, so far as 
relates to transactions before its passage; but that it will be otherwise as to debts 
contracted in the future; that so much of it as refers to voluntary applications ought to 
be repealed . . . .”), in S. DOC. NO. 27-19, at 70–71. U.S. District Court Judge Ashur 
Ware made a similar recommendation to Secretary Webster. See Letter from Ashur 
Ware, U.S. J., Dist. of Maine, to Daniel Webster, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State 
(Dec. 22, 1842) (“On the whole, looking at the system of voluntary bankruptcy as 
somewhat in the nature of an experiment, the effects of which can be determined only 
by longer experience, I should say, that if any substantial alteration is made, at present, 
it should be by a simple repeal of the law so far as it enables a person to be declared a 
bankrupt and obtain a discharge by proceedings instituted by himself, leaving it in force 
without alteration so far as it establishes a system of compulsory bankruptcy.”), in S. 
DOC. NO. 27-19, at 23. 
 213. But cf. Letter from Ross Wilkins, U.S. J., Dist. of Michigan, to Daniel Webster, 
Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Dec. 26, 1842) (“I am satisfied that with both 
creditor and debtor the law gives very general satisfaction in the district. Every day’s 
experience in its administration produces in my mind the conviction that it requires but 
little amendment or modification.”), in S. DOC. NO. 27-19, at 72. 
 214. Letter from Samuel R. Betts, U.S. J., S. Dist. of New York, to Daniel Webster, 
Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Dec. 19, 1842), in S. DOC. NO. 27-19, at 10. 
 215. Letter from Joseph C. Potts, U.S. Ct. Clerk, Dist. of New Jersey, to Daniel 
Webster, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Dec. 19, 1842), in S. DOC. NO. 27-19, at 
12. 
 216. Letter from John L. Hayes, U.S. Ct. Clerk, Dist. of New Hampshire, to Daniel 
Webster, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Jan. 1843), in S. DOC. NO. 27-19, at 160. 
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grant of a discharge under the Act, which cut off the ability of creditors 
to recover their prebankruptcy debts as a personal liability of the 
bankrupt,217 thus severely limiting creditors’ postbankruptcy recourse 
to collect any amounts that remained owing on the bankrupt’s 
discharged debts.218  A discharge represented the successful outcome 
of a bankrupt’s application for a government benefit,219 one that was 
the functional equivalent of a financial grant.220 
To understand why the discharge granted to bankrupts under the 
1841 Act was functionally equivalent to a financial award by the federal 
government — a government grant — to the bankrupt, consider an 
immutable characteristic of the bankruptcy discharge that has been 
true at least since voluntary relief first became available, if not earlier: 
when a court enters a bankruptcy discharge order, that order 
“constitutes the court’s exercise of its in rem jurisdiction to issue a 
judgment declaring the debtor’s status as a discharged debtor.”221  The 
 
 217. See Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 4, 5 Stat. 440, 444 (providing that the 
“discharge and certificate . . . shall be and may be pleaded as a full and complete bar 
to all suits brought in any court of judicature whatever”) (repealed 1843). Because the 
bankruptcy discharge constituted an affirmative defense to a judicial collection effort 
by a creditor, see, e.g., Fellows v. Hall, 8 F. Cas. 1132, 1133 (C.C.D. Mich. 1843) (No. 
4,722), the possibility existed that the defense would be waived if not properly raised, 
see, e.g., Bank of Mo. v. Franciscus, 15 Mo. 303, 308–09 (1851), thus negating the 
benefit of discharge with respect to that creditor. 
 218. One possibility for postbankruptcy collection on a discharged debt included a 
formal agreement (i.e., a contract) between the parties that the former bankrupt would 
repay the debt. See, e.g., Bach v. Cohn, 3 La. Ann. 101, 102 (1848) (stating that “the 
effect of the [discharge] certificate [under the 1841 Act] may be avoided by a new 
contract, entered into bonâ fide by the bankrupt after his discharge”). 
 219. See James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial Power, the 
Adverse-Party Requirement, and Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, 124 YALE L.J. 1346, 
1361, 1373 (2015) (pointing to the grant of discharge in federal bankruptcy proceedings 
as one example of “ex parte court proceedings as a method for the determination of 
government benefit claims in the early Republic”); cf. Alec P. Ostrow, 
Constitutionality of Core Jurisdiction, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 91, 105 (1994) (“[T]he 
discharge in bankruptcy is part of a federal regulatory scheme that has no antecedent 
in the common law, and was enacted by Congress pursuant to one of its enumerated 
powers. It is in the nature of a government benefit, and is not required to be conferred 
by the judiciary.”). 
 220. The discussion in infra notes 221–39 and accompanying text is excerpted, with 
some revisions, from Pardo, Federally Funded Slaving, supra note 196, at 832–35. 
 221. Rafael I. Pardo, The Undue Hardship Thicket: On Access to Justice, 
Procedural Noncompliance, and Pollutive Litigation in Bankruptcy, 66 FLA. L. REV. 
2101, 2168 (2014); cf. Ralph Brubaker, One Hundred Years of Federal Bankruptcy 
Law and Still Clinging to an In Rem Model of Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, 15 BANKR. 
DEV. J. 261, 263 (1999) (“American bankruptcy jurisdiction, of course, developed from 
an English system, which itself had quite a history. The English model of a jurisdiction 
in bankruptcy was, very explicitly, an in rem, property-based jurisdiction — centered 
around the construct of a bankrupt’s ‘estate.’”). 
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Supreme Court in Shawhan v. Wherritt, one of its decisions involving 
the 1841 Act, described proceedings under the Act as “in the nature of 
a proceeding in rem, before a court of record having jurisdiction.”222  
At the turn of the century, in Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, a 
decision involving the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the 1898 Act),223 the 
Court reaffirmed this principle, relying on its prior decision in 
Shawhan.224  Two decades later, in Myers v. International Trust Co., 
also a decision involving the 1898 Act, the Court further specified that 
“[a]n adjudication of bankruptcy, or of discharge therefrom, is a 
judgment in rem.”225  In the twenty-first century, the Supreme Court 
has continued to hold fast to this principle, stating that “[t]he discharge 
of a debt by a bankruptcy court is . . . an in rem proceeding” and citing 
to its prior decision in Hanover, among others, to support the 
proposition.226   It is thus beyond peradventure that “[a]n order of 
discharge, like an adjudication of bankruptcy, is an in rem 
determination of status.”227 
Given that an in rem proceeding is one “[i]nvolving or determining 
the status of a thing, and therefore the rights of persons generally with 
respect to that thing,”228 we must ask what interest in property is at 
stake when a court makes a discharge determination.  The answer is 
“the bundle of legal liabilities of the debtor.”229  In the same way that 
the 1841 Act bankruptcy trust’s property included the bankrupt’s 
claims against third parties,230 the trust also included third-party claims 
against the bankrupt (i.e., another category of property) in order to 
resolve the bankrupt’s financial distress.231 
 
 222. Shawhan v. Wherritt, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 627, 643 (1849). 
 223. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). 
 224. Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 192 (1902) (“Proceedings in 
bankruptcy are, generally speaking, in the nature of proceedings in rem . . . .” (citing 
Shawhan, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 643)). 
 225. Myers v. Int’l Trust Co., 263 U.S. 64, 73 (1923) (emphasis added). 
 226. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 447 (2004) (citing 
Hanover, 186 U.S. at 192). 
 227. James Wm. Moore, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in Bankruptcy, 68 
YALE L.J. 1, 23 (1958). 
 228. In Rem, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 229. Christopher Klein, Lawrence Ponoroff & Sarah Borrey, Principles of 
Preclusion and Estoppel in Bankruptcy Cases, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 839, 889 (2005). 
 230. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 11, 5 Stat. 440, 447 (referring to “any 
debts, or other claims, or securities due or belonging to the estate of the bankrupt”) 
(repealed 1843); BANKR. D. KY. R. LXXXVI–LXXXVII (setting forth rules for the 
treatment of claims and demands belonging to the estate and abandoned by the 
assignee) (repealed), reprinted in S. DOC. NO. 27-19, at 101 (1842). 
 231. Cf. Conrad v. Prieur, 5 Rob. 49, 53 (La. 1843) (“Here, every creditor seems to 
be made, by the law itself, a party to the bankruptcy; all are cited, and there is an issue 
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When thinking about that resolution process, one of its key features 
must be noted.  The release of personal liability from debts conferred 
by a discharge order does not have the effect of eliminating them; 
instead, that order precludes creditors from pursuing personal 
remedies against the debtor to recover discharged debts.232  Or, in the 
language of the 1841 Act, the “discharge and certificate . . . shall be and 
may be pleaded as a full and complete bar to all suits brought in any 
court of judicature whatever.”233  Accordingly, when a federal district 
court issued a discharge order under the 1841 Act, that order changed 
the rights that the bankrupt and the bankrupt’s creditors had regarding 
the bankrupt’s bundle of legal liabilities. 
With these principles in mind, consider why the discharge given to 
bankrupts under the 1841 Act was functionally equivalent to a 
government grant.  Imagine a debtor who owed his creditors $10,000 
but who had no assets or income — in other words, a debtor with a 
negative net worth of $10,000.  Seeking to give the debtor relief from 
his debts and others similarly situated, the government might pursue 
one of two options, among many others, if working on a blank canvas.  
On the one hand, the government could create a program that would 
tap the public fisc and provide the debtor with $10,000 that he could 
then use to pay his creditors in full, thus increasing the debtor’s net 
worth to $0.  In this instance, the $10,000 provided to the debtor by the 
government would constitute a grant, albeit one limited to a restricted 
use — namely, use of the funds to pay off creditors.234 
 
joined between them and the bankrupt, who, in consideration of the surrender, sues 
them for his discharge.”); Max Radin, The Nature of Bankruptcy, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 
9 (1940) (“Whatever purposes bankruptcy attempts to carry out, it does by working on 
the creditors primarily, by compelling them to reorganize their relations to the debtor 
or to each other in regard to the debtor’s property.”). 
 232. See Moore, supra note 227, at 24 & n.122 (citing Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U.S. 625 
(1913); Helms v. Holmes, 129 F.2d 263 (4th Cir. 1942)). But see Zarega’s Case, 30 F. 
Cas. 916, 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1842) (No. 18,204) (stating that the 1841 Act’s discharge 
provision “extinguishes the debt”); Fisher v. Currier, 48 Mass. 424, 430 (1844) (“If 
granted, of course all debts proveable under it are extinguished, and cannot be proved 
under the insolvent law [of Massachusetts], or be treated in any other way as existing 
debts.”). 
 233. § 4, 5 Stat. at 444. 
 234. Cf. USF Fed. Credit Union v. Gateway Radiology Consultants, P.A. (In re 
Gateway Radiology Consultants, P.A.), 983 F.3d 1239, 1247 (11th Cir. 2020) (“The PPP 
[i.e., Paycheck Protection Program] is directed at small businesses and its principal 
function is to provide potentially forgivable loans to them. It is designed to give loans 
to eligible businesses and, if the loaned funds are used for specified expenses, to allow 
those loans to be forgiven. The recipient can receive loan forgiveness if it uses the funds 
to cover payroll and certain other expenses like mortgage or rent payments and utility 
expenses. Generally the amount of the loan that is forgiven is the amount used to pay 
those costs. But the bulk of the funds, at least 60 percent, must be spent on payroll.” 
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On the other hand, rather than tapping the public fisc to give the 
debtor a stack of money with which to pay off his creditors, the 
government could instead create a system that would provide the 
debtor with relief in the form of a court order precluding the debtor’s 
creditors from recovering their debts personally from him — in other 
words, a liability shield.  Although the debts would continue to exist, 
the debtor would theoretically no longer be accountable for them.235  
The shield option would not increase the debtor’s net worth to $0 given 
that the debtor would have to expend predischarge costs (e.g., court 
fees and attorney’s fees) to obtain the order and possibly postdischarge 
costs to enforce it.236  But even when taking into account such costs, the 
discharge order would generally have the effect of increasing the 
debtor’s net worth,237 thus representing to the debtor a property right 
with positive value.238   Given that such an order would have been 
 
(footnote and citations omitted)); Luke Broadwater, Jesse Drucker & Rebecca R. 
Ruiz, Buried in the Pandemic Aid Bill: Billions to Soothe the Richest, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 22, 2020), https://nyti.ms/2Kkl31F [https://perma.cc/2KFT-Z6Y4] (“The 
Paycheck Protection Program was the most visible part of the federal government’s 
coronavirus relief efforts in the spring to keep small businesses afloat. So far, the 
government has distributed more than $500 billion in loans, which could be forgiven 
and turned into permanent grants as long as the businesses use most of the money to 
pay workers and keep people employed.”). 
 235. See supra note 217 (noting that the bankruptcy discharge under the 1841 Act 
was a waivable affirmative defense to judicial collection efforts by creditors seeking to 
recover discharged debts). 
 236. For a discussion of the direct costs of obtaining bankruptcy relief under the 1841 
Act, see Pardo, Bankrupted Slaves, supra note 30, at 1089 n.87. 
 237. Cf. Martin J. McMahon Jr. & Daniel L. Simmons, A Field Guide to 
Cancellation of Debt Income, 63 TAX LAW. 415, 420 (2010) (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s decision in United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931), which 
addressed the treatment of cancelled debt as federal taxable income, and stating that 
the decision “often has been interpreted to be grounded on the rationale that when a 
debt is discharged for less than full repayment, the portion of the debt cancelled 
without payment is income because the borrower’s net worth has been increased”). 
 238. As analogous support for this proposition, consider modern federal tax law, 
which generally treats discharge of indebtedness as gross income. See 26 U.S.C. 
§ 61(a)(11). Such treatment rests on the basic principle that, “when a borrower receives 
money in a loan transaction and is later discharged from the liability without repaying 
the debt, the borrower has realized an accession to wealth.” McMahon & Simmons, 
supra note 237, at 417. While gross income does not include indebtedness discharged 
in a bankruptcy case, see 26 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1)(A), Congress created the exception in 
recognition that bankruptcy’s fresh-start policy would be undermined if the law 
imposed tax liability as a direct consequence of receiving a bankruptcy discharge, see 
S. REP. NO. 96-1035, at 10 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7017, 7025. Such a 
rationale simultaneously acknowledges that debt forgiveness through a bankruptcy 
discharge permits a debtor to realize an accession to wealth, but that countervailing 
policy considerations warrant ignoring the economic benefit for tax purposes. 
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issued pursuant to “a general system of statutory regulation,”239 we can 
functionally conceptualize discharges under the 1841 Act as 
governmental financial awards to bankrupts that flowed through the 
bankruptcy trust.  Pursuant to this conceptualization, we can conclude 
that the trust existed for the very purpose of pursuing the federal 
government’s objective of robust debtor relief.240 
ii. Direction and Control of the 1841 Act Trust 
Undoubtedly, the 1841 Act gave the federal district courts full 
authority to direct and control the bankruptcy trust.  In discussing the 
Act’s provision vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the federal district 
courts “in all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy arising under th[e] 
[A]ct,”241 Justice Story observed that “Congress . . . intended to secure 
the complete administration of the whole system in its own courts.”242  
He further emphasized this point by noting that “[s]ound policy . . . and 
a just regard to public as well as private interests, manifestly dictated 
 
 239. New Lamp Chimney Co. v. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co., 91 U.S. 656, 662 
(1875); cf. Germain v. Conn. Nat’l Bank, 988 F.2d 1323, 1332 (2d Cir. 1993) (referring 
to “the public regulatory scheme” created by the Bankruptcy Code). But cf. Susan M. 
Freeman & Marvin C. Ruth, The Scope of Bankruptcy Ancillary Jurisdiction After 
Katz as Informed by Pre-Katz Ancillary Jurisdiction Cases, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 155, 155 (2007) (“[T]he substantive provisions of bankruptcy statutes are not 
regulatory laws, and do not apply to the populace at large or mandate or proscribe any 
action in the course of everyday affairs.”). While the Supreme Court used this phrase 
in describing the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 
(repealed 1878), there is no reason why the description should not equally apply in this 
context. Cf. Ex parte Christy, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 292, 312 (1845) (Story, J.) (stating that, 
with respect to the 1841 Act, “it was indispensable that an entire system . . . should be 
provided by Congress, capable of being worked out through the instrumentality of its 
own courts”). 
 240. For further evidence of the primacy of debtor relief under the 1841 Act, 
consider U.S. District Court Judge Henry Potter’s advisory opinion on a debtor’s 
eligibility for relief in no-asset cases (i.e., cases in which the debtor did not have any 
assets for liquidation), which he issued to the general public in a notice printed by the 
Fayetteville Weekly Observer on the day after the 1841 Act took effect. See Bankrupt 
Law. United States — North Carolina District., FAYETTEVILLE WKLY. OBSERVER, 
Feb. 2, 1842, at 1 (“It is my opinion, that all persons coming within the purview of the 
Act, though they may be entirely destitute of property, are entitled to its benefits.”); 
see also Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 17, 5 Stat. 440, 449 (providing that the 1841 Act’s 
effective date would be February 1, 1842) (repealed 1843). Most 1841 Act cases were 
no-asset cases. See Pardo, Bankrupted Slaves, supra note 30, at 1118–19. For a 
bankrupt who earnestly announced his no-asset case, consider John Shaw Kennedy 
from New Orleans, whose asset schedule stated, “None! All having been used in the 
payment of my debts and Current Expenses.” Schedule of Liabilities & Effects of J.S. 
Kennedy at 1, In re Kennedy, No. 383 (E.D. La. Sept. 2, 1842). 
 241. § 6, 5 Stat. at 445 (“[T]he district court in every district shall have jurisdiction in 
all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy arising under this act . . . .”). 
 242. Ex parte Christy, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 320. 
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to Congress the propriety of vesting in the District Court full and 
complete jurisdiction . . . in the due administration and final settlement 
of the bankrupt’s estate.”243 
As previously discussed, 1841 Act assignees played a critical role in 
the bankruptcy trust’s administration,244 albeit one completely subject 
to the will of the federal district court, which held the power to appoint, 
direct, control, and remove assignees.245  As described by the Circuit 
Court for the District of Ohio, the assignee was “an officer of the law, 
and bound to discharge his duties under the special direction of the 
court.” 246   Federal bankruptcy rules governing deposits and 
withdrawals of estate funds exemplify the strict controls imposed by 
federal district courts on assignees.  In conformity with the Act,247 
deposit rules required assignees to promptly (if not immediately) 
deposit estate funds into bank accounts maintained in the court’s 
name.248  Moreover, such funds could not be withdrawn without court 
approval.249 
 
 243. Id. at 321. Several years before his opinion in Ex parte Christy, Justice Story 
made a similar point when responding to Secretary of State Webster’s inquiry about 
the 1841 Act’s operation. See Letter from Joseph Story to Daniel Webster, supra note 
206 (stating that “the judges themselves have the entire supervision of the whole 
system”), in S. DOC. NO. 27-19, at 27 (1842). 
 244. See supra Sections I.A.iii–iv. 
 245. See § 3, 5 Stat. at 443. 
 246. McLean v. Lafayette Bank, 16 F. Cas. 253, 255 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 8,885). 
 247. See § 9, 5 Stat. at 447 (stating that “all assets received by the assignee in money, 
shall, within sixty days afterwards, be paid into the court, subject to its order respecting 
its future safekeeping and disposition”). 
 248. See, e.g., BANKR. D. KY. R. XCVIII (“The money which shall come to the hands 
of the assignee, as assets of the estate, shall be all deposited in the bank designated by 
the court, immediately, or at farthest, within sixty days after it is received, except such 
small sums as may be indispensable for the payment of the current charges of the 
proceedings.” (emphasis added)) (repealed), reprinted in S. DOC. NO. 27-19, at 103; id. 
C (“The deposites [sic] shall be all made to the credit of the United States Kentucky 
District Court in Bankruptcy, with a specification in each entry of the name of the 
assignee by whom deposited . . . .”), reprinted in S. DOC. NO. 27-19, at 103; BANKR. D. 
MASS. R. XVIII (“And whereas the Act of Congress provides that all assets received 
by any assignee in money shall within sixty days afterwards be paid into the court, 
subject to its order respecting its future safe keeping and disposition; the court, in 
obedience to this injunction, do order, that every assignee shall strictly comply with the 
same . . . .”) (repealed), reprinted in CHANDLER, supra note 73, at 51; id. XIX (“All 
moneys [paid into the Court] shall be forthwith deposited by the clerk in such bank or 
banks in the district as shall be designated by the court, in the name and to the credit 
of the court . . . .”), reprinted in CHANDLER, supra note 73, at 52. 
 249. See, e.g., BANKR. D. MASS. R. XIX (“[N]o moneys so deposited shall be drawn 
from such bank or banks unless upon a check or draft signed by the clerk of the court, 
stating the date and the sum and the account for which it is drawn, and certified by the 
judge as allowed by him.”), reprinted in CHANDLER, supra note 73, at 52; BANKR. D. 
VT. R. 55 (“[N]o deposit shall be withdrawn without the order of the court first entered 
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The exclusive and extensive power of the federal district court over 
the assignee, while drawing support from some quarters,250 also drew 
criticism from others.  On the judiciary’s appointment power, one law 
journal argued that creditor involvement in the selection of the 
assignee would have been a more optimal procedure. 251   On the 
judiciary’s direction of and control over the assignee’s estate 
administration,252 the same journal lamented that “the assignee is not 
left to use the judgment and business talent he may possess.”253  The 
U.S. Attorney for the District of Massachusetts voiced a similar 
critique to Secretary Webster, observing that “[a] large discretion is 
wanted in the assignee as to sales, compromises, &c., preventing so 
frequent a recurrence to the court, which now makes unnecessary delay 
and expense.”254  These criticisms aside, the reality was that the federal 
judiciary directed and controlled administration of the 1841 
bankruptcy trust, with assignees essentially serving as agents of the 
court.255 
 
on the docket.”) (repealed), reprinted in VT. BANKRUPTCY RULES, supra note 96, at 
10; BANKR. N.D.N.Y. R. 45 (same) (repealed), reprinted in N.D.N.Y. BANKRUPTCY 
RULES, supra note 96, at 12. 
 250. See, e.g., Letter from H.M. Watts, U.S. Att’y, E. Dist. of Pennsylvania, to 
Daniel Webster, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Dec. 23, 1842) (“Both the assignee 
and the estate assigned ought, in my humble judgment, to be kept under the control of 
the court, according to the general provisions of the bankrupt act.”), in S. DOC. NO. 27-
19, at 14. 
 251. The Bankrupt Law, supra note 85, at 405. Some federal district courts 
promulgated bankruptcy rules that permitted creditors to play an active role in the 
appointment of assignees, but that still preserved the court’s ultimate say on the matter. 
See, e.g., BANKR. D. MO. R. IX (“The creditors may nominate a suitable person for 
assignee.”) (repealed), reprinted in D. Mo. Bankruptcy Rules, supra note 96; BANKR. 
E.D. PA. R. 15 (“Every appointment of an assignee by the court, shall be open for 
reconsideration . . . .”) (repealed), reprinted in E.D. PA. BANKRUPTCY RULES, supra 
note 73, at 20; BANKR. S.D. MISS. R. 13 (“A majority in value of the creditors, may 
select the assignee, subject to the approval of the Court or Judge.”) (repealed), 
reprinted in S.D. Miss. Bankruptcy Rules, supra note 73. 
 252. See, e.g., § 3, 5 Stat. at 443 (providing that the assignee’s “rights, titles, powers, 
and authorities to sell, manage, and dispose of the [estate] . . . [were] subject to the 
orders and directions of [the] court”); BANKR. D. MASS. R. XVI (“No sales, transfers, 
or other conveyances of bankrupt’s property, or rights of property, shall be made by 
any assignee, except at such times and places, and upon such terms as shall be 
appointed and ordered by the court upon a petition filed for that purpose.”), reprinted 
in CHANDLER, supra note 73, at 49–50. 
 253. The Bankrupt Law, supra note 85, at 405. 
 254. Letter from Franklin Dexter, U.S. Att’y, Dist. of Massachusetts, to Daniel 
Webster, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Dec. 26, 1842), in S. DOC. NO. 27-19, at 
26. 
 255. See Letter from Peleg Sprague, U.S. J., Dist. of Massachusetts, to Daniel 
Webster, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Dec. 24, 1842) [hereinafter Letter from 
Peleg Sprague to Daniel Webster] (referring to “[t]he power with which the district 
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iii. Residual Policymaking Under the 1841 Act 
Scholarship on judicial administration of the Bankruptcy Code 
observes “that, from the earliest days of the Republic and with every 
iteration of the bankruptcy laws, Congress tasked the federal courts 
with administration of the bankruptcy system.”256  This arrangement 
has repeatedly entailed an intentional choice by Congress “to delegate 
policymaking power in the bankruptcy arena to the courts rather than 
an administrative agency.”257  This Section shows how this argument 
especially applies with respect to the 1841 Act legal regime. 
When designing the 1841 Act bankruptcy system, Congress had the 
option of making the Act either an agency-administered statute or a 
judicially administered statute.  One might be inclined to think that this 
was merely a theoretical choice given that the federal administrative 
state was relatively undeveloped at that time.258  In their analysis of “ex 
parte court proceedings as a method for the determination of 
government benefit claims in the early Republic,” James Pfander and 
Daniel Birk observe that “Congress apparently chose to rely on the 
federal courts to hear such claims in part because of the absence of the 
sort of federal administrative apparatus available today.” 259   They 
further remark that “[a]side from the postal service, customs collectors, 
district attorneys, marshals, and lighthouse keepers, early Congresses 
had little administrative capacity at their disposal and understandably 
 
court is invested by the statute . . . to appoint its own officers” for purposes of carrying 
out the court’s “duty of executing the law” (emphasis added)), in S. DOC. NO. 27-19, at 
25; cf. In re Linton, 136 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[A] trustee in bankruptcy is 
working in effect for the court that appointed or approved him, administering property 
that has come under the court’s control by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code.”); Missouri 
v. Gleick, 135 F.2d 134, 137 (8th Cir. 1943) (describing the bankruptcy trustee under 
the 1898 Act “as an agent and officer of the court”). Federal district courts also 
received assistance from other officers of the law who were subject to court control. 
See, e.g., § 5, 5 Stat. at 445 (“[A]ll such proof of debts shall be made before the court 
decreeing the bankruptcy, or before some commissioner appointed by the court for 
that purpose; but such court shall have full power to set aside and disallow any 
debt . . . .”). 
 256. Rafael I. Pardo & Kathryn A. Watts, The Structural Exceptionalism of 
Bankruptcy Administration, 60 UCLA L. REV. 384, 445 (2012). 
 257. Id. at 386–87. 
 258. Cf. Douglas G. Baird, Blue Collar Constitutional Law, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 3, 
15 (2012) (“One can easily imagine that bankruptcy law would have a different shape 
if Congress had waited to put it into place. The bankruptcy docket looks on its face like 
that of many administrative agencies. It resolves huge numbers of cases, and many of 
them go through a process that is entirely clerical. The typical individual debtor never 
sees the inside of a courtroom. The issues that are adjudicated are largely those 
embedded in a complicated federal law. Congress might have created an agency 
charged with administering the bankruptcy laws.”). 
 259. Pfander & Birk, supra note 219, at 1361. 
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turned to the federal courts to evaluate benefit claims.”260  Notably, 
their examples of federal judicial administration of government benefit 
claims include bankruptcy proceedings.261 
A meaningful choice of delegate, however, did exist at the time of 
the 1841 Act.  Over the course of the prior decade, Congress had 
initially authorized and subsequently reauthorized on multiple 
occasions an agency-administered program for the discharge of debt.  
In March 1831, Congress enacted legislation providing that a debtor 
who had been insolvent on or before January 1, 1831, and who was 
“indebted to the United States for any sum of money then due, which 
he is unable to pay, . . . may make application in writing, under oath or 
affirmation, to the Secretary of the Treasury, for the purpose of 
obtaining a release or discharge of the said debt.”262  The legislation 
further required the Secretary to appoint “commissioners of 
insolvency” in each federal judicial district to investigate the debtor’s 
application and to issue a report to the Secretary. 263   During this 
process, the U.S. Attorney for the federal judicial district where the 
debtor resided would “appear and act before [the commissioners] as 
 
 260. Id.; cf. Aaron Hall, Slavery and Emancipation in the Federal Courts, in FED. 
JUD. CTR., APPROACHES TO FEDERAL JUDICIAL HISTORY 45, 64 (Gautham Rao, 
Winston Bowman & Clara Altman eds., 2020) (“They [i.e., antebellum federal courts] 
were instruments of governance at the heart of the American state. They operated 
primarily to produce order and serve populations who held power — economic, 
political, cultural, social, and racial.”). But see Jerry L. Mashaw, Reluctant 
Nationalists: Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Republican Era, 
1801–1829, 116 YALE L.J. 1636, 1643 (2007) (“John Quincy Adams, the last 
‘Republican’ President, bequeathed to Andrew Jackson a General Land Office, thirty-
nine local land offices, and a system of administrative land claims commissioners whose 
adjudicatory output rivaled that of the judiciary.”); Nicholas R. Parrillo, A Critical 
Assessment of the Originalist Case Against Administrative Regulatory Power: New 
Evidence from the Federal Tax on Private Real Estate in the 1790s, 130 YALE. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 2), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3696860 
[https://perma.cc/9CWV-SSSM] (stating that administration of the 1798 direct tax, 
“measured by personnel, was the largest federal administrative endeavor, outside the 
military, of the Constitution’s first two decades”). 
 261. See Pfander & Birk, supra note 219, at 1371–73. 
 262. Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 62, § 1, 4 Stat. 467, 467. 
 263. § 3, 4 Stat. at 468. See generally Mashaw, supra note 260, at 1731 (“From the 
viewpoint of the first quarter of the nineteenth century, claims adjudication was 
standard legislative business — when the claims were against the United States. . . . Yet 
when claims involved a substantial class of persons, such as those applying for relief, 
Congress often set up commissions to decide the worthiness of claims of particular 
individual petitioners. . . . These claims commissions not only set precedents that 
affected the development of the American welfare state; they were also precedents for 
the use of commissions, rather than courts or Congress, to decide voluminous claims 
to be paid out of public monies.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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counsel in behalf of the United States.” 264   After considering the 
commissioner report, and upon being satisfied that the debtor did not 
have the ability to pay the debt due to the United States and had not 
committed fraudulent acts, the Secretary had the authority to 
“compromise with the said debtor, upon such terms and conditions as 
he may think reasonable and proper under all the circumstances of the 
case, and may execute a release to him or her for the amount of the 
said debt or debts.”265   Although the legislation initially had been 
approved to last for only three years,266 Congress proceeded to amend 
and reauthorize it,267 including in May 1840,268 just slightly more than 
a year before passage of the 1841 Act.269  Accordingly, when designing 
the 1841 Act bankruptcy system, Congress could have sought to build 
on the agency-administered program for discharging debt that existed 
at the time.  But instead, Congress chose to create a judicially 
administered system.270 
Importantly, “statutory gaps in the 1841 Act . . . created ample 
opportunity for the federal district courts to engage in residual 
bankruptcy policymaking,”271 and they often took that opportunity by 
 
 264. § 2, 4 Stat. at 467–68. 
 265. § 4, 4 Stat. at 468. 
 266. § 10, 4 Stat. at 469. 
 267. Act of July 14, 1832, ch. 230, 4 Stat. 595; Act of June 7, 1834, ch. 45, 4 Stat. 676; 
Act of Mar. 2, 1837, ch. 23, 5 Stat. 154. 
 268. Act of May 27, 1840, ch. 26, 5 Stat. 381. 
 269. See Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843). 
 270. In the 1840 reauthorization of the agency-administered program for the 
discharge of federal government debt, Congress provided that the program would 
“apply to cases of insolvency, which shall have occurred on or before the passage of 
this act [i.e., May 27, 1840], or shall occur during the [ensuing] three years.” § 2, 5 Stat. 
at 381. Comparatively, debtors had the opportunity to commence 1841 Act cases from 
February 1, 1842, through March 2, 1843. See § 17, 5 Stat. at 449; Act of Mar. 3, 1843, 
ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614. While courts disagreed whether the scope of an 1841 Act discharge 
included government debts, including those owed to the federal government, the more 
compelling argument was that such debts were dischargeable. See Pardo, Bankrupted 
Slaves, supra note 30, at 1087 & n.78. Regardless of which was the correct view, the 
fact remains that some courts construed the Act to discharge federal government debt. 
Accordingly, for a window of time, certain individuals indebted to the federal 
government could pursue one of two paths to obtain financial relief. In 1843, Congress 
reauthorized the agency-administered program for the discharge of federal 
government debt for another three-year period. See Act of Jan. 28, 1843, 5 Stat. 597. 
 271. Pardo, Bankrupted Slaves, supra note 30, at 1108; cf. Julian Davis Mortenson 
& Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2021) (manuscript at 7–8), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3512154 [https://perma.cc/W9KE-
S832] (“Early Congresses . . . adopted dozens of laws that broadly empowered 
executive and judicial actors to adopt binding rules of conduct.” (emphasis added)); 
Pfander & Birk, supra note 219, at 1409 (“[S]cholars agree that courts exercising non-
contentious jurisdiction perform somewhat the same role as administrative officers or 
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using their rulemaking authority under the Act.272  The judges of those 
courts understood that their use of that authority enabled them to 
execute the law by filling its substantive gaps, as demonstrated by the 
federal judiciary’s responses to Secretary Webster’s request for 
information on the Act’s operation. 273   U.S. District Court Judge 
Thomas Irwin reported that “[o]ur rules . . . have met other difficulties, 
which the act at first presented.”274  U.S. District Court Judge Peleg 
Sprague noted that, among other tools available to the court, 
[t]he power . . . to make new rules as occasion may require . . . will . . . 
enable the court to obviate nearly all the practical inconveniences 
which experience may develop (should it be deemed just by Congress 
to impose upon that tribunal the continued duty of executing the 
law).275 
 
agencies.”); Ann Woolhandler, Judicial Deference to Administrative Action — A 
Revisionist History, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 197, 199–200 (1991) (“Historically, however, 
the courts exercised significant lawmaking powers both under the common law and 
under nineteenth-century administrative law. The pre-ICC law tends to demonstrate 
the long pedigree of inelegant allocations of lawmaking authority between courts and 
agencies that persisted until the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council transferred significant lawmaking authority from 
the courts to the agencies.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 272. See § 6, 5 Stat. at 445–46 (stating that “it shall be the duty of the district court 
in each district, from time to time, to prescribe suitable rules and regulations, and forms 
of proceedings, in all matters of bankruptcy”). More broadly, it appears that some 
federal district court judges sought to coordinate their efforts in administering the Act 
with the hope of attaining interdistrict consistency in the law’s application, as 
evidenced by a notice to the public that U.S. District Court Judge Henry Potter from 
North Carolina arranged for the Fayetteville Weekly Observer to publish on the day 
after the 1841 Act took effect. See Bankrupt Law. United States — North Carolina 
District., supra note 240 (“But I am now engaged in a correspondence with several 
District Judges, with the view of reconciling, as far as we can, the discrepancies of the 
Act, and of aiming, at least, at something like a uniformity of practice. I shall, however, 
hold myself in readiness to put the Act in operation, according to its spirit and the best 
of my ability, whether it be amended or not.”); see also § 17, 5 Stat. at 449 (providing 
that the 1841 Act’s effective date would be February 1, 1842). During the time of the 
1841 Act, each federal district court consisted solely of one judge. See The U.S. District 
Courts and the Federal Judiciary, FED. JUD. CTR., 
https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/u.s.-district-courts-and-federal-judiciary 
[https://perma.cc/S64U-X8GS] (last visited Feb. 18, 2021); see also Kellen Funk, The 
Handmaid of Justice: Power and Procedure in the Federal Courts, in APPROACHES TO 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL HISTORY, supra note 260, at 27, 33, 40 (“For decades, entire federal 
districts might be staffed by a single judge who was thereby the sole rulemaker of 
federal practice in his district.”). 
 273. See supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
 274. Letter from Thomas Irwin, U.S. J., W. Dist. of Pennsylvania, to Daniel Webster, 
Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Dec. 24, 1842), in S. DOC. NO. 27-19, at 50 (1842). 
 275. Letter from Peleg Sprague to Daniel Webster, supra note 255, in S. DOC. NO. 
27-19, at 25. 
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But perhaps the strongest statement, by a judge who administered 
the 1841 Act and viewed himself to be vigorously engaged in residual 
policymaking, was that by Judge Monroe, who ended up promulgating 
over 260 federal bankruptcy rules for the District of Kentucky:276 
The statute having been of necessity the establishment of only the 
general principles of the system, with the outlines of the machinery 
for its execution, to be carried out by the judicial courts, the details of 
the law and mode of its execution, established by the courts, must 
discover much of its probable operation, and aid as much as almost 
anything else, at this early stage, in forming an opinion of its probable 
effects.  There will be, therefore, forwarded to you herewith a copy of 
the rules of the court of this district . . . .  It is not supposed that this 
system is near complete; on the contrary it is apprehended that much 
remains to be done to meet every branch of the subject, and to cover 
every case which will occur; but as all the proceedings in this district, 
thus far, have been had in the mode prescribed, and governed by 
these rules, they will afford all the information which can be furnished 
from here by such means.277   
And despite his perception that more gap-filling work remained to be 
done, Judge Monroe nonetheless celebrated how his efforts up to that 
point had enabled the 1841 Act to function smoothly.278 
In administering the 1841 Act, which required directing and 
controlling bankruptcy trusts, the federal district courts operated as 
policymakers.  Having addressed the last indicia of the Lebron 
framework for discerning federal instrumentality status, a summary of 
its application to the bankruptcy trust is in order, as is a consideration 
of the significance of the trust’s classification as a public legal entity. 
* * * 
The 1841 Act bankruptcy trust, a legal entity created by federal 
law, 279  existed for the primary purpose of pursuing Congress’s 
objective to provide robust relief to financially distressed debtors 
through the discharge of debt, which was functionally equivalent to a 
 
 276. See S. DOC. NO. 27-19, at 83–143 (setting forth the bankruptcy rules 
promulgated by Judge Monroe under the 1841 Act). 
 277. Letter from Thomas Bell Monroe to Daniel Webster, supra note 74, in S. DOC. 
NO. 27-19, at 144. 
 278. Id. (“This system of rules has been found to work well. It was and is being put 
into operation with less inconvenience than was expected; and in the progress of the 
business, success in the several objects of their construction is witnessed, while their 
operations are becoming still more facile and satisfactory.”), in S. DOC. NO. 27-19, at 
145. 
 279. See supra Section I.A. 
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government grant.280  A bankrupt’s request for this government benefit 
claim was administered through the vehicle of the bankruptcy trust, 
which the federal district courts directed and controlled with the 
assistance of their agents (e.g., assignees and commissioners).281  In 
exerting control over the trust, the federal district courts used their 
residual policymaking authority to ensure that the 1841 Act’s 
machinery would properly function.282  Given the institutional-design 
features of this system, the bankruptcy trust was a federal 
instrumentality. 
To be clear, the argument here is not that Congress or participants 
in the bankruptcy system would have necessarily understood the 1841 
Act to create a federal instrumentality.  Indeed, the example of R.P. 
Gaillard, the assignee in In re Curto who paid municipal taxes on 
enslaved persons belonging to the bankruptcy trust, 283  is some 
evidence that the system’s participants did not have such an 
understanding.  The ordinance pursuant to which the taxes were 
imposed did not apply to real property, including enslaved persons, 
that belonged to the United States.284  If Gaillard had understood the 
bankruptcy trust to be a federal instrumentality that owned the 
enslaved persons taxed by the First Municipality, one would have 
expected him not to have paid the tax or, alternatively, to have paid it 
under protest, with evidence of such objection in the Curto case file.285  
 
 280. See supra Section I.B.i. 
 281. See supra Section I.B.ii. 
 282. See supra Section I.B.iii. 
 283. See supra notes 111–13 and accompanying text. 
 284. See New Orleans, La., An Ordinance for Imposing a Tax on Slaves and Real 
Property in the City of New-Orleans, and Its Incorporated Suburbs arts. 1–2 (Aug. 11, 
1829), reprinted in CALHOUN, supra note 113, at 119–20. Louisiana law defined 
enslaved persons as real property rather than personal property. See LA. CIV. CODE 
art. 461 (1825) (“Slaves, though moveables by their nature, are considered as 
immoveables, by the operation of law.”), invalidated by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
 285. Cf. United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 735 (1982) (“[T]ax immunity is 
appropriate in only one circumstance: when the levy falls on the United States itself, 
or on an agency or instrumentality so closely connected to the Government that the 
two cannot realistically be viewed as separate entities, at least insofar as the activity 
being taxed is concerned.”); Gagne v. Brush, 30 F. Supp. 714, 716 (D.N.H. 1940) (“I 
hold that a trustee in bankruptcy is an ‘instrumentality of the United States’ and not 
subject to an excise tax under the Social Security Act.”). But cf. Missouri v. Gleick, 135 
F.2d 134, 136 (8th Cir. 1943) (“Only by a strained construction can the phrase 
‘instrumentality . . . of the United States’ be held to include a trustee in bankruptcy. 
The language in question more aptly describes an administrative agency of some 
department of the government, or a corporation wholly owned by the government, 
whose employees are paid directly by the government or some other corporation 
created as an instrumentality of the United States and which is exempt from such 
taxation under the terms of a federal statute.” (omission in original)). 
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Even so, Gaillard’s tax payment illustrates bankruptcy’s Promethean 
gap in action.  Congress created a novel and extraordinary federal 
bankruptcy system in order to improve the condition of suffering 
debtors, but it did so without comprehending the nature of its creation 
and thus the power it had bestowed on those responsible for 
administering the system’s machinery.286  And, for that matter, those 
wielding the power, like Gaillard, did not understand it or the 
consequences of its execution. 
Recognizing the public entity status of the 1841 Act bankruptcy trust 
sheds new light on the meaning of the federal government’s reliance 
on the Act to resolve the financial fallout stemming from the Panic of 
1837.  As part of the price of discharge, debtors had to surrender all of 
their property and property rights — with the exception of a limited 
amount of exempt property meant to support debtors and, if 
applicable, their families — existing as of the date that the court 
decreed them to be bankrupts and therefore eligible to request a 
discharge of debts.287   As previously discussed, this decree had the 
effect of creating the bankruptcy estate, with the result that the 
bankruptcy trust acquired all of the bankrupt’s property rights.288  With 
respect to property owned by the bankrupt at the time of the 
bankruptcy decree, this meant that the bankruptcy trust became the 
owner of the property.  Because the trust was a federal instrumentality, 
it meant that the U.S. government had become that property’s owner.  
In other words, Congress had created a system for resolving financial 
distress that would entail nationalization of certain bankrupts’ 
assets.289  And it just so happens that some of these nationalized assets 
 
 286. For evidence that Congress may have understood the 1841 Act to create a 
federal instrumentality, consider that the Act permitted a federal district court to 
require of [the] assignee a bond . . . in such sum as it may deem proper, 
conditioned for the due and faithful discharge of all his duties, and his 
compliance with the orders and directions of the court; which bond shall be 
taken in the name of the United States. 
Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 9, 5 Stat. 440, 447 (emphasis added). That the assignee 
had to indemnify the United States suggests that the federal government could be 
harmed if the assignee failed to adhere to the district court’s direction and control.   
 287. See §§ 3–4, 5 Stat. at 442–43. The price of discharge would also have included 
the direct costs of obtaining that relief, such as attorney’s fees and court fees. See, e.g., 
H.R. DOC. NO. 27-172, at 17–18 (1843) (setting forth a table of fees under the 1841 Act 
for an unopposed bankruptcy case in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania, administered in the city or county of Philadelphia, and listing a total 
amount of $30.45). 
 288. See supra Section I.A.ii. 
 289. Cf. Edward L. Rubin, Uniformity, Regulation, and the Federalization of State 
Law: Some Lessons from the Payment System, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1251, 1251 (1989) 
(“The growth of federal law at the expense of the states may be referred to as the 
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featured prominently in the business of slavery,290 as demonstrated by 
the story of the bankruptcy administration and sale of Banks 
Arcade.291 
II. BUILDING ENSLAVING CAPACITY INTO                                                     
THE ANTEBELLUM ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
To understand the role of Banks Arcade as an iconic site of the U.S. 
slavery complex, consider the varying approaches of different localities 
in constituting their antebellum markets for selling enslaved persons.292  
In her work documenting the geography and architecture of the 
Southern slave trade, Maurie McInnis identifies various distinctions 
that made the New Orleans slave trade unique.  Its massive scope 
placed the city among a select group of “cities with a large slave market 
[that] had a significant infrastructure dedicated to the buying and 
selling of humans,” such as Richmond, in contrast to most other 
Southern towns and cities where “the trade did not have a permanent 
physical location.” 293   The New Orleans slave trade further 
distinguished itself from those cities with a dedicated slave-trade 
infrastructure by “boldly assert[ing] itself as part of the competitive 
 
‘federalization’ of our legal system. This term is actually a bit awkward, since it sounds 
a good deal like ‘federalism,’ which is largely an opposing tendency. But the most 
convenient alternative, ‘nationalization,’ is generally reserved for governmental 
ownership of previously private property. Nationalization can be a rather powerful 
device for asserting central government control, but it is not the same thing as 
federalization, and it has not been a major component of that process in our country.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 290. For over a period lasting more than a decade, the federal government ended up 
owning and selling enslaved persons in 1841 Act cases filed by bankrupt slaveowners. 
See Pardo, Bankrupted Slaves, supra note 30. 
 291. Regardless of whether this Article’s federal instrumentality claim is correct, it 
is a historical fact that the federal judiciary (i.e., the U.S. government) had a substantial 
role under the 1841 Act in directing and controlling the business of slavery. Cf. Hall, 
supra note 260, at 57 (“Yet in exercising significant indirect control over the practice, 
experience, and scope of slavery, federal courts surely wielded a more substantial kind 
of power. . . . [I]t would seem that federal courts’ regulation of the subject of such 
enormous conflict and consequence for seven decades signifies a particular 
institutional capacity. Indeed, this record on slavery suggests that a revised 
understanding of federal courts might be brought into the new history of the American 
state.”). 
 292. Some of the discussion in infra notes 293–306 and accompanying text is 
excerpted, with revisions, from Pardo, Bankrupted Slaves, supra note 30, at 1148–49. 
 293. Maurie D. McInnis, Mapping the Slave Trade in Richmond and New Orleans, 
BLDGS. & LANDSCAPES, Fall 2013, at 102, 102 [hereinafter McInnis, Mapping the Slave 
Trade]; see also id. at 103 (“What was particularly distinctive in these larger markets is 
that cities had dozens of permanent business establishments, both buildings and 
persons, dedicated to the trade.”). 
2021] BANKRUPTCY’S PROMETHEAN GAP 857 
commercial landscape,” in contrast to, for example, the Richmond 
slave trade, which was “tucked away” and “occupied a shadow 
landscape, largely unseen by the city’s elite residents.”294  In short, the 
New Orleans slave trade was “the most conspicuous” of all the major 
markets,295  “tak[ing] place in grand public spaces,” such as “in the 
octagonal bar at the St. Charles Hotel and in the rotunda of the St. 
Louis Hotel.”296 
Like these two hotels, Banks Arcade also featured prominently in 
the Crescent City’s commercial landscape.  Designed for Thomas 
Banks by architect Charles F. Zimpel and constructed in 1833, the 
Arcade was located in the American Sector on Magazine Street and 
ran the entire block between Natchez and Gravier Streets, consisting 
of a continuous three-story edifice made of red brick “with granite 
pillars at the first level and a parapet with central pediment.”297  Stores 
occupied the building’s façade on Magazine Street, “behind which [a] 
glass pedestrian arcade extended through the block.”298  Within the 
building were “a hotel, offices, the armory of the Washington Artillery 
(Armory Hall), saloons, a restaurant, and the Toutine, a spacious, 
lushly decorated coffee house.” 299   Additionally, the New-Orleans 
 
 294. Id. at 112. 
 295. MAURIE D. MCINNIS, SLAVES WAITING FOR SALE: ABOLITIONIST ART AND THE 
AMERICAN SLAVE TRADE 164 (2011) [hereinafter MCINNIS, SLAVES WAITING FOR 
SALE]. 
 296. McInnis, Mapping the Slave Trade, supra note 293, at 113; see also FREDERIC 
BANCROFT, SLAVE TRADING IN THE OLD SOUTH 312 (Univ. of S.C. Press 1996) (1931) 
(“Nowhere else . . . was slave-trading on a large scale so conspicuous. In New Orleans 
it sought public attention: slave-auctions were regularly held in its two grand hotels 
besides other public places . . . . Slave-trading there had a peculiar dash: it rejoiced in 
its display and prosperity; it felt unashamed, almost proud.”). 
 297. Architectural Inventory, in 2 NEW ORLEANS ARCHITECTURE: THE AMERICAN 
SECTOR (FAUBOURG ST. MARY) 93, 183 (Mary Louise Christovich et al. eds., 2d prtg. 
1978); see also REINDERS, supra note 112, at 210–11 (describing Banks Arcade in 
similar terms). For more on Zimpel, see Ellen Terrell, Charles Zimpel: Architect, 
Surveyor, Businessman, LIBR. CONG.: INSIDE ADAMS (Sept. 24, 2018), 
https://blogs.loc.gov/inside_adams/2018/09/charles-zimpel-architect-surveyor-
businessman/ [https://perma.cc/P2V2-JGXL]. A map of New Orleans produced for an 
1845 guidebook, Norman’s New Orleans and Environs, marks the location of Banks 
Arcade. That map appears as an inset in the back of the 1976 facsimile reproduction of 
the guidebook, see BENJAMIN MOORE NORMAN, NORMAN’S NEW ORLEANS AND 
ENVIRONS (Matthew J. Schott ed., La. State Univ. Press 1976) (1845), and can also be 
viewed online, Norman’s Plan of New Orleans & Environs, 1845, LIBR. CONG., 
https://www.loc.gov/item/98687133/ [https://perma.cc/2457-PJES] (last visited Mar. 5, 
2021). 
 298. Architectural Inventory, supra note 297, at 183. 
 299. REINDERS, supra note 112, at 211. 
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Commercial Bulletin had its office in the building at the corner of 
Gravier Street.300 
The Arcade’s proximity to, among other places, the Mississippi 
River, St. Charles and St. Louis Hotels, and U.S. Custom House, which 
was home to the Eastern District of Louisiana’s federal district court,301 
signified that the Arcade was advantageously situated in the Crescent 
City’s corridor of commerce, information,302 and government power.303  
Banks thus appears to have fulfilled his vision of creating a premier 
commercial venue.304  And like many Southern business enterprises 
during the antebellum era, Banks Arcade heavily relied on the 
domestic slave trade.  The site would eventually rank as “one of the 
five or six most popular [slave] marts” in New Orleans.305  As such, the 
Arcade constituted one of New Orleans’s “very public places 
[where] . . . the disparity between the refinement that Southern riches 
allowed and the barbarity of the slave trade on which Southern riches 
depended was most conspicuously contrasted.”306   Importantly, the 
1841 Act introduced a new dimension to this dynamic.  As the riches 
of some Southern debtors who were involved in the business of slavery 
crumbled away, thereby prompting them to seek relief under the Act, 
the resulting bankruptcy trusts in those cases provided the federal 
government with an opportunity to nationalize assets at the heart of 
the domestic slave trade, including Banks Arcade. 
 
 300. Architectural Inventory, supra note 297, at 183. For background information 
on the Bulletin, see REINDERS, supra note 112, at 227. 
 301. See NORMAN, supra note 297, at 89; infra Figure 1. 
 302. See LEPLER, supra note 27, at 115 (discussing the “local information network” 
that existed at Banks Arcade). 
 303. For a description of what the impressions of a mid-nineteenth-century visitor 
to this area might have been, see Leonard V. Huber, Foreword to 2 NEW ORLEANS 
ARCHITECTURE: THE AMERICAN SECTOR (FAUBOURG ST. MARY), supra note 297, at 
vii, vii. 
 304. See Architectural Inventory, supra note 297, at 183 (stating that Banks Arcade 
“was intended to be a gathering place for merchants and to serve the community above 
Canal [Street] in the same manner as Maspero’s Exchange did below Canal”); Mary 
Louise Christovich & Roulhac Toledano, Banking and Commerce, in 2 NEW ORLEANS 
ARCHITECTURE: THE AMERICAN SECTOR (FAUBOURG ST. MARY), supra note 297, at 
65, 70–71 (stating that “Banks Arcade . . . was envisioned by its promoter, Thomas 
Banks, as a commercial center on Magazine Street to compete with Maspero’s 
Exchange in the French Quarter”). 
 305. BANCROFT, supra note 296, at 324. 
 306. MCINNIS, SLAVES WAITING FOR SALE, supra note 295, at 164. 
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Figure 1: Location of Banks Arcade307 
 
Before turning to the bankruptcy administration and sale of the 
Arcade, one should recognize that this story is not just about a 
distressed asset.  The Arcade, as a center for the business of slavery, 
had a gravitational pull that brought many individuals who made a 
living from the trade into the building’s domain, some of whom also 
commenced 1841 Act cases to escape their burdensome debts.  In this 
regard, the Act at times had a multiplier effect that redoubled the 
federal government’s direct involvement in the business of slavery.  To 
illustrate how this phenomenon unfolded during the bankruptcy 
administration of Banks Arcade, we can focus on one individual, 
Joseph A. Beard, also known as “‘Major Beard, the great slave-
auctioneer of New Orleans,”308 who quite likely sold more enslaved 
 
 307. Figure 1 is a close-up image of the map produced for the 1845 guidebook titled 
Norman’s New Orleans and Environs. See NORMAN, supra note 297. The map has been 
altered by adding the location labels paired with straight lines pointing to the 
corresponding locations. The original map is oriented with its upper right-hand corner 
pointing north and so too is the close-up image. See Norman’s Plan of New Orleans & 
Environs, 1845, supra note 297. 
 308. BANCROFT, supra note 296, at 324 (quoting JAMES STIRLING, LETTERS FROM 
THE SLAVE STATES 239 (London, John W. Parker & Son 1857)). 
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persons during the 1840s and 1850s than anyone else in the city,309 a 
particularly ignominious achievement given that New Orleans had 
hundreds of traders.310 
Much of Beard’s slave-auctioneering activity occurred in Banks 
Arcade.311   For example, a Commercial Bulletin advertisement on 
March 24, 1840, announced that he would conduct an auction the 
following day at the Arcade for the cash sale of 16 enslaved Black 
Americans, including Grace, a 23-year-old field hand, and her two 
children, Martha, who was seven years old, and Andrew, who was three 
years old. 312   Fast forward to February 8, 1842, and yet another 
Commercial Bulletin advertisement announced a Beard auction at 
Banks Arcade the next day involving (1) the credit-based sale of 
Nelson and his mother, Mary Ann, a “confidential house girl, first rate 
cook, washer and ironer,” pursuant to which a portion of the purchase 
price would be financed on a secured basis; and (2) the cash-only sale 
of John and his mother, Maria, “a first rate French and American 
cook.” 313   Exactly one month after that advertisement, Beard 
commenced his 1841 Act case, 314  owing creditors a total of 
$64,513.67.315  Five days after seeking bankruptcy relief, his plans for 
regaining financial stability suffered a major setback when the St. 
Charles Theatre fire damaged his Camp Street Auction Mart,316 which 
was located just a couple of blocks from Banks Arcade. 317  
 
 309. Id.; cf. Richard Tansey, Bernard Kendig and the New Orleans Slave Trade, 23 
LA. HIST. 159, 169 n.30 (1982) (“During the 1855–1856 fiscal year, J.A. Beard sold 569 
slaves on his block, charging a two-and-one-half percent commission for each slave.”). 
 310. See, e.g., BANCROFT, supra note 296, at 314; STEVEN DEYLE, CARRY ME BACK: 
THE DOMESTIC SLAVE TRADE IN AMERICAN LIFE 153 (2005). 
 311. See BANCROFT, supra note 296, at 324. 
 312. Valuable Negroes at Auction, NEW-ORLEANS COM. BULL., Mar. 24, 1840, at 2. 
 313. Superior House Servants, NEW-ORLEANS COM. BULL., Feb. 8, 1842, at 2. The 
precise terms set for the sale of Nelson and Mary Ann were “[o]ne half cash, balance 
at 4 months credit for approved endorsed paper with mortgage until final payment.” 
Id. 
 314. Joseph A Beard & Charles B. Bioren v. Their Individual Creditors & the 
Creditors of the Firm of Beard & Bioren, In re Beard & Bioren, No. 96 (E.D. La. Mar. 
8, 1842). 
 315. Pardo, Federally Funded Slaving, supra note 196, at 802. This amount would 
exceed $2 million in 2019 dollars according to a conservative estimate of relative value 
based on changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). See Samuel H. Williamson, 
Seven Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar Amount 1790 to Present, 
MEASURINGWORTH, https://www.measuringworth.com/calculators/uscompare/ 
[https://perma.cc/44ML-M8UK] (last visited Feb. 5, 2021). At the other end of the 
spectrum, if estimating relative value based on changes in per capita gross domestic 
product (GDP), this amount would exceed $47 million in 2019 dollars. See id. 
 316. See Pardo, Federally Funded Slaving, supra note 196, at 798–99. 
 317. See id. at 799 fig.2. 
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Notwithstanding this adversity, Beard would bounce back, ultimately 
seeking to re-establish himself by moving his business to the Arcade.318 
But before we reach that point in the story, we need to return our 
attention to Banks, who added his name to the steadily growing list of 
case-filing statistics for the 1841 Act.  More precisely, the U.S. Court 
Clerk for the Eastern District’s federal district court (or someone 
working for him) recorded Banks’s case, commenced on July 30, 1842, 
as case number 353 in the court’s 1841 Act docket books.319  Banks 
purportedly ended up in financial ruin “because of his support of the 
Texas Revolution and financial speculations in New Orleans.”320  The 
schedule of assets that he filed with his bankruptcy petition stated that 
he owned “[t]he block of three story brick buildings, forming the entire 
front of Magazine street, between Gravier and Natchez streets, with 
rear block known as the Arcade Exchange, valued at $350,000.00.”321 
 
 318. See infra notes 330–32 and accompanying text. 
 319. 1 U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE E. DIST. OF LA., BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1841 DOCKETS, 
1842–1843, at 353 (located in Record Group (RG) 21, The National Archives at Fort 
Worth, Texas). Those docket books, which set forth “the case number, name of the 
petitioner, and a brief abstract of papers filed and actions” taken in each case, 
Bankruptcy Act of 1841 Dockets, 1842–1843, NAT’L ARCHIVES CATALOG, 
https://catalog.archives.gov/id/4513372 (last visited Feb. 5, 2021), would ultimately 
include a total of 763 bankruptcy cases, see Pardo, Financial Freedom Suits, supra note 
29, app. A at 173–75. 
 320. Architectural Inventory, supra note 297, at 183. 
 321. Houston Record Transcript, supra note 147, at 91. Individuals sometimes 
referred to Banks Arcade as the Arcade Exchange, just as Banks did in his schedule of 
assets. For example, an 1842 New Orleans directory includes a listing for “Hewlett & 
Cenas, auctioneers, 44 Magazine street.” NEW ORLEANS DIRECTORY, supra note 129, 
at 196. That address was located in Banks Arcade. See Houston Record Transcript, 
supra note 147, at 109. A Daily Picayune advertisement on May 1, 1842, announced 
that Hewlett & Cenas would sell a steamer the following day “at the Arcade Exchange, 
Magazine street.” Auction Notice!, DAILY PICAYUNE (New Orleans), May 1, 1842, at 
3 [hereinafter Auction Notice! (May 1, 1842)] (emphasis added). Also, individuals 
sometimes amalgamated Banks Arcade and the Arcade Exchange into a single name 
when referring to the building. For example, a Daily Picayune advertisement from 1844 
announced a sale at “Banks’ Arcade Exchange, by virtue of and in obedience to an 
order from the honorable the Probate Court . . . the following described Property, 
situated in the city of New Orleans, belonging to the succession of P. P. Rea, deceased.” 
Succession Sale. By J.W. Furness., DAILY PICAYUNE (New Orleans), May 1, 1844, at 3. 
Rea was one of the Commerical Bulletin’s publishers. See, e.g., NEW-ORLEANS COM. 
BULL., Jan. 2, 1843, at 1 (listing “P.P. & T. Rea & J. Beardslee” as the newspaper’s 
publishers). The scheduled value of Banks Arcade would exceed $11.3 million in 2019 
dollars according to a conservative estimate of relative value based on the CPI. See 
Williamson, supra note 315. At the other end of the spectrum, if estimating relative 
value based on per capita GDP, this amount would exceed $4.6 billion in 2019 dollars. 
See id. For a contemporary comparison that provides an additional perspective of the 
scheduled value of Banks Arcade, consider the original St. Charles Theatre, which was 
built in 1835 at a cost ranging from $250,000 to $300,000 and which at the time was the 
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On September 5, 1842, U.S. District Judge Theodore Howard 
McCaleb declared and decreed Banks a bankrupt under the 1841 
Act.322  That same day, Judge McCaleb appointed Francis B. Conrad, 
an attorney whose office was located in the French Quarter at 29 
Exchange Place, just a few blocks away from the federal district 
court,323 to serve as the assignee of Banks’s estate.324  Judge McCaleb 
further ordered Conrad to “give security in a bond to the United 
States . . . in the sum of thirty thousand dollars, conditioned for the due 
and faithful discharge of all his duties as such assignee, and his 
compliance with the orders and directions of the court.”325  Four days 
later, Conrad filed the bond with the clerk’s office of the federal district 
court, declaring himself to be “held and firmly bound to pay the United 
States of America in the sum of thirty thousand dollars” and further 
stating that the bond was “conditioned for the due and faithful 
discharge of all his duties . . . as . . . assignee, and for his compliance 
with the orders and directions of the court in the matter of the 
bankruptcy of . . . Thomas Banks.”326 
Based on the legal principles previously discussed,327 September 5, 
1842, marked the day when the Banks bankruptcy trust was created, 
thereby making the federal government the owner of the Arcade, 
which Conrad would administer subject to Judge McCaleb’s direction 
and control.  The fact that Judge McCaleb used his discretion under 
the 1841 Act to set Conrad’s bond for the eye-popping amount of 
$30,000 accentuates the importance of that trust to the federal 
government.328  To date, I have documented the assignee bond amount 
for approximately 37% (283 of 763) of the Eastern District’s 1841 Act 
cases.  In those cases, the median and mean amounts of the assignee’s 
 
fourth largest theatre in the world. See Pardo, Federally Funded Slaving, supra note 
196, at 794–95, 794 n.33. 
 322. Houston Record Transcript, supra note 147, at 91. For a discussion of Judge 
McCaleb’s role in the Eastern District’s bankruptcy slave trade, see Pardo, Bankrupted 
Slaves, supra note 30, at 1142–61. 
 323. See NEW ORLEANS DIRECTORY, supra note 129, at 88. Exchange Place appears 
parallel to Chartres and Royal Streets and perpendicular to Canal Street. See supra 
Figure 1. 
 324. See Houston Record Transcript, supra note 147, at 91–92. 
 325. Id. at 92. 
 326. Id. 
 327. See supra Part I. 
 328. This amount would equal $971,000 in 2019 dollars according to a conservative 
estimate of relative value based on the CPI. See Williamson, supra note 315. For a 
discussion of the bonding requirement that a federal district court could impose on an 
1841 Act assignee and how that requirement might constitute evidence of Congress’s 
understanding that the Act created a federal instrumentality, see supra note 286. 
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bond were, respectively, $50 and $1,118.329  The amount that Conrad 
had to post for his assignee bond in Banks’s case was not only 600 times 
and 27 times greater than, respectively, the median and mean bond 
amounts in these cases, but it was also the highest amount among all of 
them.  This further underscores the significance and value of the Banks 
bankruptcy trust’s assets, including the Arcade. 
After Conrad posted his bond and began tackling the work of 
marshaling and liquidating the trust’s assets, Beard announced in a 
Daily Picayune notice dated September 14, 1842, and addressed to “his 
friends and public generally, that his Auction Office [wa]s removed to 
No. 45 Magazine street, next to the Arcade Bar-room.” 330   Beard 
further informed his audience about his “services for the sale of Real 
Estate, Negroes, Syndics’ and Bankrupt Estates.” 331   He ended by 
noting that adjacent to his office was “a Broker’s Office, for the 
purchase and sale of every description of property.” 332   Beard’s 
relocation from the Camp Street Auction Mart placed him in the heart 
of the Arcade, as a result of which he would enter into a lease 
agreement with the Banks bankruptcy trust.333 
Within the first month in his role as assignee, Conrad began 
evaluating the trust’s estate and devising a game plan for marshaling 
and liquidating its assets.  That initial assessment led him to conclude 
fairly quickly that liquidating the Arcade would present significant 
challenges, which in turn prompted him to begin the process for 
obtaining court approval of responsive measures.  Conrad’s attorney, 
Judah P. Benjamin, whose law office was closely located to Conrad’s 
office,334 filed and presented Conrad’s initial petition to the Eastern 
District’s federal district court on October 10, 1842.335   The Banks 
bankruptcy trust could not have had a more elite attorney representing 
its interests: Benjamin would “emerge as the most prominent New 
 
 329. According to a conservative estimate of relative value based on the CPI, the 
approximate median and mean amounts of the assignee’s bond in 2019 dollars would 
respectively be $1,780 and $37,085. See Williamson, supra note 315. 
 330. Auction Notice!, DAILY PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Sept. 15, 1842, at 3 
[hereinafter Auction Notice! (Sept. 15, 1842)]. For background information on the 
Picayune, see REINDERS, supra note 112, at 227–28. 
 331. Auction Notice! (Sept. 15, 1842), supra note 330. 
 332. Id. 
 333. See infra notes 370–76 and accompanying text. 
 334. Benjamin’s office was located at 11 Exchange Place, see NEW ORLEANS 
DIRECTORY, supra note 129, at 29, and Conrad’s office was located at 29 Exchange 
Place, see supra text accompanying note 323. 
 335. See Houston Record Transcript, supra note 147, at 93–94. 
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Orleanian of his century,” 336  serving as one of Louisiana’s U.S. 
Senators, 337  declining a nomination to serve on the U.S. Supreme 
Court,338  and serving as Attorney General, Secretary of State, and 
Secretary of War for the Confederate States of America during the 
Civil War.339  On that pleasantly crisp fall day,340 this high-powered 
attorney sought to convince Judge McCaleb that it would be in the 
trust’s best interests to delay the sale of Banks Arcade and that a 
hearing on the matter should be scheduled. 
In his petition, Conrad began by noting “[t]hat the property 
surrendered by [Banks] is very large and valuable, and consists in part 
of the establishments known in the city of New Orleans as the City 
Hotel, the Arcade Exchange, the National Hotel, and the Commercial 
Hotel.” 341   He explained his rationale for why the circumstances 
warranted delaying the sale of the properties: “[T]hese establishments 
are each of such great value that if sold in block, in the present 
embarrassed state of affairs, so few persons have the means of 
purchasing, that there would be no competition, and the sale would be 
attended with a very ruinous sacrifice.”342  In order to generate the best 
return for the bankruptcy trust, Conrad advocated for reconfiguring 
the properties: “It would be much more advantageous to subdivide said 
establishments as far as practicable, so as to reduce the value of each 
property to an amount that would admit of competition amongst 
bidders at the sale.”343 
This strategy would make it “necessary to have plans made of the 
property, [and] division walls erected,”344 all of which would take time.  
As such, a sale could not take place earlier than the start of the 
following year, which complicated matters given that the properties 
were subject to leases, most of which were soon to expire in 
approximately three weeks’ time, on November 1.345  Relying on his 
knowledge of the Crescent City’s leasing practices, Conrad bolstered 
 
 336. ROBERT DOUTHAT MEADE, JUDAH P. BENJAMIN: CONFEDERATE STATESMAN 
44 (1943). 
 337. Id. at 86. 
 338. Id. at 84–85. 
 339. Id. at 161, 208, 235. 
 340. See NEW-ORLEANS COM. BULL., Oct. 11, 1842, at 2 (“The cool weather 
yesterday was quite favorable for outdoor transactions.”). 
 341. Houston Record Transcript, supra note 147, at 93 (emphasis added). 
 342. Id. (emphasis added). 
 343. Id. 
 344. Id. 
 345. Id. 
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his proposed plan of attack by framing it in terms of his business 
judgment.  He contended 
that the usual and most advantageous terms of lease, in New Orleans, 
are annual leases, terminating on the first of November of each year; 
that not only will better [prices] be obtained by renting the property 
for one year from the first November next, but prices more 
advantageous will be given for property when sold with tenants 
occupying it, than if not occupied; and that petitioner is therefore 
desirous of being authorized to lease the property of the bankruptcy 
for the space of one year from the first of November next . . . up to 
the thirty-first October, eighteen hundred and forty-three.346 
Conrad’s plan, however, faced a further complication.  Banks had 
mortgaged nearly all of the properties.  The mortgage creditors had 
indicated in their negotiations with Conrad that they would be willing 
to go along with his proposed plan to delay the sale of the properties, 
and in the interim partition and lease them for a year, but only “on the 
condition that the accruing rents shall enure to their benefit under the 
mortgages, so far as may be necessary to liquidate their claims against 
the property.” 347   However, Conrad anticipated that the mortgage 
creditors would be willing to divert a portion of the rental income 
stream for the benefit of the Banks bankruptcy trust: “[T]he rents 
which will accrue will, in the opinion of petitioner, suffice not only to 
pay the accruing interest on the mortgage debts, but also to extinguish 
a part of the capital, and defray the expenses of repairs, insurance, 
plans, &c.”348  Moreover, Conrad represented that he would seek a 
concession from the mortgage creditors that distributions to them from 
the rental income would be subordinate to the bankruptcy trust’s claim 
to the income for purposes of paying the expenses of administering the 
mortgaged properties.349  These were the terms proposed by Conrad to 
the court in seeking authority “to compromise with the mortgage 
creditors” and to lease the properties, “so far as he . . . deem[ed] 
expedient,” for one-year terms ending on October 31, 1843.350 
 
 346. Id. (alteration in original). 
 347. Id. 
 348. Id. 
 349. Id. at 93–94 (“Wherefore, this petitioner humbly prays to be permitted . . . to 
compromise with the mortgage creditors as follows, viz., that they shall consent to a 
postponement of the sale until the necessary preparations can be made as hereinbefore 
explained, on condition that the accruing rents shall, after payment of the expenses of 
repairs, insurance, &c., be applied towards the satisfaction of the debts secured by 
mortgage respectively on the property on which such rents shall accrue.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 350. Id. at 93. 
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Judge McCaleb deemed Conrad’s plan sufficiently persuasive to 
warrant a hearing on the matter.  Judge McCaleb ordered Conrad to 
place notices in the New-Orleans Bee and the Commercial Bulletin 
and scheduled the hearing for the morning of October 24, 1842,351 
“when and where the bankrupt, the creditors and all other persons in 
interest, [could] appear and show cause, if any they ha[d], why the 
prayer of [Conrad’s] petition should not be granted.”352  In addition to 
issuing this order on October 10, 1842, the court took further action 
that significantly impacted the administration and sale of the Arcade.  
On that same day, the court adopted a bankruptcy rule that enhanced 
an assignee’s power to administer a bankruptcy trust’s mortgaged 
property.353  Although it is unclear whether Judge McCaleb abstractly 
devised this rule, divorced from any considerations regarding any 
particular proceeding, including the Banks matter before him that 
day,354 the timing of the rule’s promulgation suggests that the court 
may have engaged in result-oriented residual policymaking — namely, 
using the court’s rulemaking authority to ensure that Conrad would be 
able to sell the Banks bankruptcy trust’s properties, foremost among 
them the Arcade.355 
While a bankruptcy trustee today has express authority under the 
Code to sell the bankruptcy trust’s property free and clear of any 
interest, including a mortgage, upon satisfying certain conditions,356 
the 1841 Act was unclear on the matter.  The Act clearly stated that it 
would not “annul, destroy, or impair . . . any liens, mortgages, or other 
securities on property” that were valid under state law and undisplaced 
by any specific provision of the Act. 357   One federal district court 
opined that this language reflected Congress’s “intention . . . that such 
mortgages should be protected as privileged liens.”358  Furthermore, 
the Act expressly gave the assignee the “full authority, by and under 
 
 351. Id. at 94. 
 352. NEW-ORLEANS COM. BULL., Oct. 15, 1842, at 3. 
 353. See infra text accompanying note 363. 
 354. To date, I have not located a complete set of the bankruptcy rules promulgated 
by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The materials that 
contain excerpts of these rules do not provide any background information indicating 
what prompted their adoption. See Houston Record Transcript, supra note 147, at 93; 
Nugent Record Transcript, supra note 143, at 18–19. 
 355. The discussion in infra notes 356–65 and accompanying text is excerpted, with 
some revisions, from Pardo, Bankrupted Slaves, supra note 30, at 1153–55. 
 356. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f). 
 357. See Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 2, 5 Stat. 440, 442 (repealed 1843). 
 358. Yeadon v. Planters’ & Mechs.’ Bank, 30 F. Cas. 793, 794 (D.S.C. 1843) (No. 
18,130). 
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the order and direction of the proper court in bankruptcy, to redeem 
and discharge any mortgage . . . , upon any property, real or 
personal, . . . and to tender a due performance of the conditions 
thereof.”359  But nowhere did the Act expressly give the assignee the 
power to sell the bankruptcy trust’s mortgaged property free and clear 
of such interests. 
Forced to grapple with the issue of the assignee’s sale power, federal 
courts engaged in residual bankruptcy policymaking to fashion limits 
on what the assignee could do in such a situation.  One district court 
took the view that, without a mortgage creditor’s consent, an assignee’s 
only option for removing a mortgage on the bankruptcy trust’s 
property would be to exercise the redemption power expressly granted 
by the Act — specifically, by paying the mortgage creditor the balance 
of the debt owed to it.360  Alternatively, the same court took the view 
that, with a mortgage creditor’s consent, “the court [could] order a sale 
of mortgaged premises, where the creditor applies to the court for that 
purpose, and that, under the decree ordering such sale, a good, valid, 
and sufficient legal title to the premises may be made to pass to the 
purchaser.”361   Finally, a federal circuit court held that the sale of 
mortgaged property by the assignee for an amount less than the 
amount owed to the mortgage creditor would fail to discharge the 
mortgage — that is, the third-party purchaser would take the property 
subject to the mortgage.362 
Judge McCaleb, however, took a different approach to tackle this 
issue.  The rule that he promulgated on October 10, 1842, provided 
that, upon the court’s grant of an order approving an assignee’s petition 
to sell the bankruptcy trust’s property, the court’s order would 
ipso facto annul the mortgages, liens, and privileges existing on the 
property ordered to be sold; and the recorders of the mortgages shall, 
on the presentation of such order, cancel all inscriptions existing on 
their records against such property, and the mortgages, liens, and 
privileges shall attach to the proceeds of the sale in the same manner, 
 
 359. § 11, 5 Stat. at 447. 
 360. See Yeadon, 30 F. Cas. at 794 (“I understand the law to be that the court in 
bankruptcy cannot dispose of such security of a creditor without his consent, but that 
the assignee may, under the direction of the proper court in bankruptcy, redeem and 
discharge the same.” (emphasis added)). 
 361. Id. at 794–95. 
 362. See Ex parte Christy, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 292, 326, 332 (1845) (Catron, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (incorporating opinion of Justice Henry 
Baldwin decided in his capacity as Circuit Justice for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania). 
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to the same extent, and with the same effect, as to the property 
sold.363 
Judge McCaleb thus fashioned a substantive rule that, irrespective of 
creditor consent, would wipe out a creditor’s mortgage on the 
bankruptcy trust’s property and transfer it to the sale proceeds from 
that property — a decidedly different result than that reached by the 
Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.364  While Judge 
McCaleb also promulgated a rule that would generally give mortgage 
creditors the power to dictate the terms for the sale of the property 
securing their claims,365 such a rule was tantamount to coerced consent.  
Put another way, mortgage creditors in the Eastern District of 
Louisiana could not opt out of the bankruptcy process and exercise 
their state-law rights in the bankruptcy trust’s mortgaged property.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, although the district’s assignees had relied on 
the Act’s redemption power to deal with mortgaged property prior to 
Judge McCaleb’s promulgation of the mortgage cancellation rule,366 
assignees thereafter routinely relied on the rule when administering 
bankruptcy trust property subject to a mortgage.367  And as we will see, 
Conrad relied on this rule with regard to the sale of Banks Arcade.368 
Two weeks after the rule’s promulgation, Conrad’s petition to lease 
the bankruptcy trust’s properties once again came before the court.  At 
the hearing, which was attended by Judah Benjamin representing 
Conrad and by “certain creditors . . . represented by their attorneys,” 
Judge McCaleb concluded that sufficient cause had not been shown to 
deny Conrad’s requested relief.  This conclusion prompted the court to 
 
 363. Houston Record Transcript, supra note 147, at 94 (emphasis added). 
 364. See supra note 362 and accompanying text. 
 365. Houston Record Transcript, supra note 147, at 94 (“Creditors by mortgage, 
lien, or privilege, shall in all cases be permitted to fix the terms of sale of the property 
subject to their claims; provided, that in no case shall they be permitted, in opposition 
to the assignee, to fix the terms of credit shorter than those to which the bankrupt 
himself was entitled.”). 
 366. See, e.g., Petition to Redeem Mortgages and Discount Note, In re Layet & 
Amelung, No. 18 (E.D. La. Apr. 20, 1842) (stating “that by the 11th Section of the 
Bankrupt Act, the Judge of the District has the power to authorise the Assignee to 
redeem & discharge all mortgages & liens on real & personal property”). 
 367. See, e.g., Petition of J.P. Benjamin Assignee to Sell the Property & to Erase & 
Cancel the Mortgages, In re Chase, No. 672 (E.D. La. Nov. 10, 1843); Petition to Erase 
& Cancel the Mortgages, In re Nathan, No. 620 (E.D. La. Sept. 20, 1843); Petition of 
H. Baines Assignee to Raise & Cancel Mortgages, In re Mitchell, No. 404 (E.D. La. 
Feb. 17, 1843); Petition of Wm. Christy Assignee to Erase the Mortgages Liens & to 
Sell the Property of the Bankrupt, In re Andrews, No. 260 (E.D. La. Nov. 11, 1842); 
Petition of J.A. Durel Assignee to Sell the Property and to Raise the Mortgages 
Against the Estate of the Said Bankrupt, In re Tricou, No. 381 (E.D. La. Oct. 17, 1842). 
 368. See infra text accompanying notes 382–83. 
2021] BANKRUPTCY’S PROMETHEAN GAP 869 
enter an order authorizing Conrad “to rent the property of the 
bankrupt from the first of November next, for the twelve months 
following, and to compromise with the mortgage creditors as prayed 
for in his petition.”369 
Having been given the green light by Judge McCaleb, and with the 
first of November fast approaching, Conrad immediately turned his 
attention to leasing the various spaces within Banks Arcade.  Recall 
that, in the month before the hearing, slave auctioneer Beard had 
announced the relocation of his auction office to 45 Magazine Street,370 
to which was attached his broker’s office. 371   Whatever lease 
arrangement Beard may have had for these offices in the Arcade for 
the months of September and October 1842,372 Beard entered into an 
agreement with the Banks bankruptcy trust to lease the offices for a 
one-year period beginning on November 1, 1842, at the monthly rates 
of $75 for his auction office and $16.66 for his broker’s office.373 
One of the factors motivating Beard to choose 45 Magazine Street 
as his new auction office may have been its location adjacent to the 
Arcade Exchange Room at 44 Magazine Street, the site where auctions 
took place in Banks Arcade.  While the auctioneering business of 
Hewlett & Cenas had been the tenant at that address during the earlier 
part of the year,374 Conrad leased the space on behalf of the Banks 
bankruptcy trust to J.M. Caballero, a commission merchant, 375  for 
approximately a six-month period — beginning on November 1, 1842, 
and ending on April 25, 1843 — at a monthly rate that appears to have 
been $70 for the first two months and $63 for the remainder of the lease 
 
 369. Houston Record Transcript, supra note 147, at 95 (emphasis added). 
 370. See supra text accompanying note 330. 
 371. See Auction Notice! (Sept. 15, 1842), supra note 330 (“Attached to My office is 
a Broker’s Office, for the purchase and sale of every description of property.”). 
 372. Recall that Judge McCaleb did not decree Banks to be a bankrupt until 
September 5, 1842. See supra text accompanying note 322. The possibility thus exists 
that Banks may have initially leased to Beard the space for his relocated auction office 
at 45 Magazine Street and his adjacent broker’s office. See Houston Record Transcript, 
supra note 147, at 152 (“That at the date of said application a great part of his said 
property was under leases, to expire on or about the 1st day of November then next 
succeeding, and that the said Banks had received from his tenants promissory notes to 
himself or order, payable and falling due on or after the date of his said petition in 
bankruptcy, to the farther amount of twenty thousand dollars and upwards.”). 
 373. See id. at 109–10. 
 374. See NEW ORLEANS DIRECTORY, supra note 129, at 196; Auction Notice! (May 
1, 1842), supra note 321. 
 375. See NEW ORLEANS DIRECTORY, supra note 129, at 58; see also DAILY 
PICAYUNE, Nov. 10, 1842, at 2 (reporting that, of the $23,673 of specie that arrived in 
New Orleans on the Creole, $1,030 of that specie “was consigned [to] . . . J.M. 
Caballero”). 
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term.376   Not only did Conrad’s plan prolong federal ownership of 
Banks Arcade, but it also further entrenched the U.S. government in 
the business of slavery given the commercial activity of some of the 
Arcade’s tenants.377 
After leasing the Banks Arcade properties, Conrad turned his 
attention to arranging the building’s partition in anticipation of its sale.  
He hired architect James Dakin, whose office was located at 48 Canal 
Street,378 to draw up a subdivision plan, which Dakin completed on 
January 5, 1843, after significant delay.379  The plan resulted in the 
reconfiguration of Banks Arcade into 21 separate properties.380  On 
January 6, 1843, Judge McCaleb held a hearing on Conrad’s petition to 
sell the bankruptcy trust’s properties, including the subdivided lots in 
Banks Arcade.381  In approving the petition, the court relied on the 
mortgage cancellation rule that it had adopted on October 10, 1842:382 
[I]n order to convey a title to any purchaser . . . of the property 
surrendered, it is ordered that the assignee be authorized to cause to 
be erased and cancelled from the records of the office of mortgages 
the mortgages recorded in favor of the [bankruptcy trust’s mortgage] 
creditors, reserving to them all their rights in law to the proceeds of 
the sale upon the distribution thereof.383 
Ruling on January 15, 1843, on a subsequent petition by Conrad to 
modify the terms of the court’s sale order, Judge McCaleb instructed 
 
 376. See Houston Record Transcript, supra note 147, at 34, 109–10. The Banks 
bankruptcy trust’s statement of receipts from the rental of the Banks Arcade 
properties, which misspells Caballero’s last name as “Cabalero,” indicates the 
following payments made by him for the lease of the lower part of the 44 Magazine 
Street property: (1) $70 on December 7, 1842, for the November 1842 rent; (2) $133 on 
February 2, 1843, for the December 1842 rent; (3) $63 on March 6, 1843, for the 
February 1843 rent; and (4) $63 on April 16, 1843, for the March 1843 rent. See id. at 
109–10. The statement does not include an entry specifically itemizing Caballero’s 
payment of the January 1843 rent. See id. Given that Caballero’s payment on February 
2, 1843, for the December 1842 rent was $133, and given that each of the next two 
monthly payments (i.e., for the February and March 1843 rent) was $63, it seems likely 
that Caballero’s $133 payment on February 2, 1843, represented $70 for the December 
1842 rent and $63 for the January 1843 rent. If so, then the statement does not properly 
identify the monthly installments to which the $133 payment corresponded. 
 377. See infra notes 403–07 and accompanying text. 
 378. NEW ORLEANS DIRECTORY, supra note 129, at 99. 
 379. See Houston Record Transcript, supra note 147, at 33–34, 95. 
 380. See id. at 33–37. 
 381. Id. at 98. 
 382. See supra text accompanying note 363. 
 383. Houston Record Transcript, supra note 147, at 99. 
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that the sale take place at noon on February 15, 1843, either at Banks 
Arcade or at the St. Louis Hotel’s exchange.384 
Conrad elected to hold the sale at Banks Arcade.385  The federal 
marshal, Algernon Sidney Robertson, conducted the sale,386  whose 
scope was massive: the published sale advertisement occupied two and 
a half columns on the Bee’s front page. 387   The advertisement 
announced that the Arcade had been partitioned into 21 lots, including 
Lot Nos. 4 and 5, which together constituted the Arcade Exchange 
Room.388  The sale terms required winning bidders to make a cash 
down payment of one-third the purchase price, with the balance 
payable in five equal installments at six-month intervals.389  Moreover, 
the remaining balance would be secured by a mortgage on the 
property.390  As a result, the Banks bankruptcy trust would assume the 
role of a secured creditor with respect to the purchased property, which 
would prolong the U.S. government’s involvement with it. 
In his representation of some of the auction’s winning bidders in 
Supreme Court litigation over the sale of the Arcade, Henry Clay 
described the auction as “one of the most notorious and attractive that 
ever took place in the city of New Orleans, from the conspicuous 
position, great value, and well-known character of Banks’s Arcade.”391  
He noted that the event “brought together a vast multitude” and 
further assured the Court that “it [wa]s beyond a doubt, that the 
property sold for much more than it would have commanded if it had 
been put up in block and sold for cash.”392  On this score, the auction 
results point to the financial significance of the Arcade properties to 
the Banks bankruptcy trust.  First, the sale of the 21 partitioned lots 
generated gross proceeds totaling $123,000. 393   While this amount 
represented only 35.3% of the value Banks had listed for the Arcade in 
 
 384. Id. at 95–96. For a discussion of the various names used to refer to the exchange 
at the St. Louis Hotel, see Pardo, Bankrupted Slaves, supra note 30, at 1147. 
 385. See Houston Record Transcript, supra note 147, at 33. 
 386. See id. at 38. 
 387. See U.S. Marshal Sales, NEW-ORLEANS BEE, Jan. 25, 1843, at 1. For further 
information about Robertson and his role in the Eastern District’s bankruptcy slave 
trade, see Pardo, Bankrupted Slaves, supra note 30, at 1161–65. 
 388. See U.S. Marshal Sales, supra note 387. 
 389. See id. 
 390. See id. 
 391. Houston v. City Bank of New Orleans, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 486, 494 (1848). 
 392. Id. at 494–95. On the public sensation caused by Clay’s appearance and 
argument before the Court in Houston, see CARL B. SWISHER, 5 HISTORY OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE TANEY PERIOD, 1836–64, at 145–46 
(Paul A. Freund ed., 1974). 
 393. See Houston Record Transcript, supra note 147, at 34–37. 
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his asset schedule (i.e., $123,000 of $350,000),394 the sale of the Arcade 
generated a much better return relative to the Eastern District’s 
average bankruptcy case involving an asset sale.  In such a case, the 
gross proceeds generated from the sale of assets represented only 6.2% 
of their scheduled values.395   Finally, while the Arcade’s scheduled 
value represented only 1.1% of the scheduled value of all assets sold in 
the Eastern District’s 1841 Act cases (i.e., $350,000 of $31,245,495.51), 
the gross proceeds generated by the Arcade’s sale constituted 6.3% of 
the aggregate gross proceeds from all of the district’s 1841 Act 
bankruptcy sales (i.e., $123,000 of $1,950,168). 
Importantly, a significant amount of the proceeds from the sale of 
the subdivided properties in Banks Arcade came from the sale of the 
Arcade Exchange Room, which consisted of Lot Nos. 4 and 5, with Lot 
No. 5 constituting the bulk of the room.396  William Houston from 
London, England, purchased both lots.397  Lot No. 5 generated the 
most proceeds of any of the 21 lots — that is, $19,500.398  And the gross 
proceeds from the combined sale of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 (i.e., $25,150) 
represented approximately one-fifth of the total gross proceeds 
generated from the sale of all of the Arcade’s lots (i.e., $25,150 of 
$123,000).399 
Taking a step back, Figure 2 below reveals that the Banks 
bankruptcy trust owned the Arcade Exchange Room for 275 days — 
from September 5, 1842, when the federal district court declared Banks 
a bankrupt under the 1841 Act,400 to June 7, 1843, when Conrad and 
Houston executed the act of sale transferring ownership of the room 
from the federal government to Houston.401  Furthermore, during a 
portion of this period of time, the bankruptcy trust leased the 
Exchange Room, receiving rent payments in return.402 
 
 394. See supra text accompanying note 321. 
 395. The clerk for the Eastern District’s federal district court reported to Secretary 
of State James Buchanan that the federal marshal’s sales in that district under the 1841 
Act generated $1,950,168 of gross proceeds from the sale of assets with a scheduled 
value of $31,245,495.51. See H.R. DOC. NO. 29-99, at 7 & n.† (1847). 
 396. See Houston Record Transcript, supra note 147, at 34. 
 397. See id. 
 398. See id. at 34–37. 
 399. See id. 
 400. See supra text accompanying note 322. 
 401. See Houston Record Transcript, supra note 147, at 51–54. 
 402. See supra notes 374–76 and accompanying text. 
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Figure 2: Timeline for the Bankruptcy                                     
Administration of the Arcade Exchange Room 
 
Critically, during this 275-day period of federal ownership, a 
significant amount of commercial activity directly involved in the 
business of slavery took place in the Arcade Exchange Room.  In that 
time span, at least 91 distinct notices appeared in the Bee, the 
Commercial Bulletin, and the Daily Picayune announcing 
nonbankruptcy auctions of enslaved persons in the Exchange Room.403  
Notably, approximately 68% of these auctions were to be conducted by 
Beard, who had leased his auction office adjacent to the Exchange 
Room from the Banks bankruptcy trust.404  These auctions involved at 
least 449 enslaved individuals.  Moreover, during this period, the 
federal marshal conducted auctions of enslaved persons who had been 
owned and surrendered by Eastern District bankrupts pursuant to the 
1841 Act. 405   These bankruptcy auctions, which were directed and 
controlled by Judge McCaleb,406 involved 74 enslaved individuals and 
 
 403. The reported statistics on nonbankruptcy slave auctions scheduled to take place 
in the Arcade Exchange Room during the period of federal ownership are derived 
from original data that I collected from advertisements appearing in the columns on 
auction sales published in the Bee, the Commercial Bulletin, and the Daily Picayune. 
 404. See supra notes 370–73 and accompanying text. 
 405. The reported statistics on bankruptcy slave auctions scheduled to take place in 
the Arcade Exchange Room during the period of federal ownership are derived from 
an original dataset, which is described in Pardo, Bankrupted Slaves, supra note 30, at 
1115–19. 
 406. See id. at 1142–61. 
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generated gross sale proceeds of at least $13,950.  Accordingly, during 
the 275-day period of federal ownership of the Arcade Exchange 
Room, at least 523 enslaved persons were likely to have been sold on 
the premises. 
These sales were conspicuously public and utterly dehumanizing to 
the Black Americans who were the objects of these commercial 
transactions.  On this score, a description by a European traveler who 
visited Banks Arcade in the early 1850s provides a good sense of what 
enslaved persons sold in the Arcade Exchange Room during the period 
of federal ownership likely had to endure: 
To the stranger, one of the most interesting places in the city is the 
auction-mart in Bank’s [sic] Arcade, where negroes are disposed of in 
the same manner that animals are in England. . . .  The auction-mart 
is a large room, about 150 feet long by 35 feet wide, well lighted, and 
provided with seats for the slaves, desks for the transaction of 
business, and an auctioneer’s stand.  The negroes are placed upon an 
elevated platform immediately in front of the crier . . . .  The 
auctioneer commenced by reading a printed description of the negro 
first put up . . . .  [T]he bidders caused him to strip his coat off, and 
began to examine his person.  One felt the muscles of his arm; another 
opened his mouth, and inspected his teeth, as you would those of a 
horse; and then his joints and bones were examined, to see whether 
he was in all respects sound. . . .  Jests were bandied about at the 
expense of the poor creature; and after a determined effort on the 
part to make the most of his man, the boy was sold to the highest 
bidder and removed from the platform.407 
Long after the bankruptcy administration and sale of the Banks 
Arcade, the business of slavery continued there in robust fashion, much 
of it conducted by Beard.408  We should not lose sight of the fact that 
one of the primary locations of the slave trade in New Orleans and that 
one of the city’s most successful slave auctioneers owed much of their 
financial rehabilitation to the bankruptcy benefits provided by the 
federal government pursuant to the 1841 Act.409 
 
 407. New Orleans, 18 CHAMBERS’S EDINBURGH J. 314, 315 (1853). 
 408. See, e.g., Pardo, Federally Funded Slaving, supra note 196, at 801–02, 841–42. 
 409. What remains of the original building today is the St. James Hotel. In describing 
its history, the hotel refers to the transformation of Banks Arcade over time without 
ever mentioning the site’s prominent role in the business of slavery. Instead, the hotel 
trumpets that it “maintains the historical charm of a day-gone-by and pays homage to 
the romance, colors and legends of New Orleans.” About Us, ST. JAMES HOTEL, 
https://www.saintjameshotel.com/about-us [https://perma.cc/ZY5W-FXCV] (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2021). The hotel’s ignorance of or indifference to its past connections to 
slavery perpetuates what former New Orleans Mayor Mitch Landrieu described in his 
2017 remarks addressing the removal of the city’s Confederate monuments — that is, 
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CONCLUSION 
Having recounted the story of the bankruptcy administration and 
sale of Banks Arcade, what lessons can we draw from this episode to 
inform our thinking about the use of bankruptcy law to respond to 
financial crises, particularly in urban environments?  As alluded to in 
the Introduction,410 and as illustrated by the story of Banks Arcade, the 
bankruptcy process has the potential to reinvent critical components of 
a city’s infrastructure, an opportunity that becomes far-reaching when 
depressed economic conditions adversely affect a greater number of 
commercial enterprises.  And yet, a failure to recognize that a federal 
instrumentality facilitates such reinvention will have the effect of 
channeling decisions by the system’s administrators away from giving 
due consideration, if any at all, to the community’s interest in how the 
city might be remade.411  Viewing the bankruptcy trust’s financially 
distressed property as belonging to the federal government,412 and thus 
to the citizenry, makes it imperative that the public have a meaningful 
opportunity to advocate for its interests in the administration of the 
bankruptcy trust, for the reason that such input could result in a better 
redeployment of nationalized assets.413 
 
“[o]ne story forgotten or maybe even purposefully ignored.” Mitch Landrieu’s Speech 
on the Removal of Confederate Monuments in New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 
2017), https://nyti.ms/2qTgzmx [https://perma.cc/K78M-FC9G]. 
 410. See supra notes 22–25 and accompanying text. 
 411. Cf. Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of 
Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 772 (1991) (“Once the estate is viewed as a 
dynamic and evolving enterprise, the fundamental question for bankruptcy discourse 
is altered. The question is no longer ‘what to do with the estate,’ as the model of the 
estate as a static pool might suggest. Rather, the question becomes: ‘what shall the 
estate exist to do.’ The estate is not merely an economic pie to be deployed and 
distributed. It is a medium by which the enterprise’s moral, political, social, and 
economic aims are defined and redefined. By debating the aims of the estate as 
enterprise, participants express and explore the incommensurable values that 
accompany financial distress.”). 
 412. It is beyond the scope of this Article to analyze whether today’s bankruptcy 
trust, like the 1841 Act bankruptcy trust, constitutes a federal instrumentality. Given 
the substantial similarities between the statutory schemes responsible for creating the 
two trusts, the remainder of the Conclusion proceeds on the assumption that the 
Code’s bankruptcy trust is a federal instrumentality. Placing that assumption aside, 
courts and commentators should, at the very least, adopt Melissa Jacoby’s argument 
that, “[b]y statutory design, the U.S. business bankruptcy system can be conceptualized 
as a public-private partnership.” Melissa B. Jacoby, Corporate Bankruptcy Hybridity, 
166 U. PA. L. REV. 1715, 1729 (2018). 
 413. Cf. id. at 1723 (“Even a minimalist government-provided system . . . involves 
coercive government power. At the very least, the public has a stake in who makes the 
key decisions in corporate bankruptcy and whether that process comports with basic 
constitutional and democratic norms. The interests of the public grow alongside the 
scope of a government-supplied bankruptcy system.” (footnote omitted)); Korobkin, 
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To demonstrate this, let us consider a counterfactual relating to 
Banks Arcade.  This Article has argued that those responsible for 
administering the 1841 Act found themselves in a Promethean gap.  
They did not have the perspective to understand that the uniquely 
innovative Act created a federal instrumentality that nationalized 
financially distressed assets.414  Had they understood this, they may 
have been willing to consider the public interest when determining how 
the federal district courts should direct and control an assignee’s 
authority “to sell, manage, and dispose of the [bankruptcy trust’s 
assets].”415  In the case of the Arcade, had Judge McCaleb considered 
community concerns, the building’s history, both during and after 
bankruptcy, may have been quite different. 
In such a scenario, Judge McCaleb would have had to define the 
relevant community (or communities) whose interests were to be 
accounted for by the 1841 Act bankruptcy system.416  For example, 
would he have looked beyond New Orleans and accounted for regional 
interests, including the North’s, in determining what to do with the 
Arcade?  When it came to selling the properties belonging to the Banks 
bankruptcy trust, Judge McCaleb and Conrad had been willing to 
 
supra note 411, at 772 (“Modern corporate bankruptcy law allows for realization of the 
potential of the corporation, whatever form that potential ultimately takes. It does so 
by replacing the historical corporation with an enterprise constituted not merely by the 
physical assets or even the business of the corporation, but by the various values and 
concerns of all the participants in the corporation’s financial distress. Bankruptcy law 
creates conditions for an ongoing debate in which, by expressing these conflicting and 
incommensurable values, participants work towards defining and redefining the 
fundamental aims of the enterprise.”); Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy and the 
Entitlements of the Government: Whose Money Is It Anyway?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 993, 
1000, 1056 (1995) (arguing “that the government’s role in creating and supervising the 
bankruptcy system entitles it to use any value created by that system to further any 
legitimate interests of the government” and noting the need “to press the analysis 
onward to consider what types of policies the government should pursue with the 
entitlements it garners from its creation and operation of the bankruptcy system”). 
 414. In Ex parte Christy, Associate Justice John Catron incorporated into his partial 
dissent the 1843 opinion by former Associate Justice Baldwin in In re Kerlin, which 
Justice Baldwin decided in his capacity as Circuit Justice for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania. See Ex parte Christy, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 292, 326 (1845) (Catron, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). In Kerlin, Justice Baldwin wrote the 
following: “That the act of 1841 is anomalous in its provisions, unlike any other known 
in any legislation here or elsewhere, cannot be doubted.” Id. at 327. 
 415. Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 3, 5 Stat. 440, 443 (repealed 1843). 
 416. Cf. KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE 
BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 211–14 (paperback ed. 1999) (proposing a tripartite test for 
identifying community interests that should be recognized by a bankruptcy system). 
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target prospective Northern purchasers,417 although those plans fell by 
the wayside.418  In light of this, Judge McCaleb might also have been 
willing to consider the North’s input on the Arcade’s disposition had 
he deemed community interests to be relevant to that decision-making 
process. 
We can be fairly confident that the North’s abolitionists, one of the 
region’s many communities, would have vociferously objected to any 
disposition of the Arcade in connection with the slave trade given their 
criticism that the 1841 Act would further implicate the North in the 
business of slavery.419  It also seems reasonable to conclude that, as “a 
willing, able, and active participant in the Eastern District’s bankruptcy 
slave trade,” 420  Judge McCaleb would not have recognized such 
objections in the first instance. 
On the other hand, Judge McCaleb would likely have given serious 
consideration to input from a community segment consisting of 
individuals like James Robb, a prominent New Orleanian banker who 
was among the “‘progressive’ southern merchant capitalists . . . 
[advocating for a] close relationship between business and 
government” in order to encourage “the investments necessary for the 
city to modernize its economic base, whether through diversifying into 
industrial enterprises or buttressing and expanding [its] trade territory 
 
 417. See Houston Record Transcript, supra note 147, at 93 (stating that “it would 
also be advantageous to have advertisements inserted in the newspapers of some of 
the northern and eastern cities”). 
 418. See id. at 95 (stating “that the creditors in New Orleans, who are chiefly 
interested in the sale, are most urgent for immediate insertion of said advertisement, 
and strenuously object to a delay of the sale beyond the fifteenth of next month . . . 
[and] that an advertisement at the North for a sale on that day would now be useless 
and productive of expense only, without any corresponding advantage”); id. at 95–96 
(“[I]t is therefore ordered that the publication of the property of the bankrupt in the 
northern papers, for sale, be dispensed with; [and] that advertisement of said property 
be inserted, according to the previous order of this court, in two of the newspapers of 
this city . . . .”). 
 419. Cf. Southern Chattels Coming North, 2 NAT’L ANTI-SLAVERY STANDARD 
(NEW YORK) 54 (1841) (“We speak advisedly when we assure our readers that the 
slaves are coming north! They are not coming on foot, as heretofore, ‘fugitives from 
justice,’ but in companies — the whole gang of a plantation together! The slaves are 
coming north, and, as so often predicted, will be found in our stores and banking 
houses, wherever trade and money making are known! . . . It is now quite well 
understood that we are to have a General Bankrupt law. Its provisions must require 
the surrender of all the property of the bankrupt debtor into the hands of his creditor. 
The South is at least semi-bankrupt. The North is the creditor. So soon, therefore, as 
the bankrupt law comes in force, at least one half of southern slave property must be 
consigned to northern creditors. Thus the slaves are coming north.”). 
 420. Pardo, Bankrupted Slaves, supra note 30, at 1143. 
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by means of transportation improvements such as railroads.”421  Such 
feedback might have convinced Judge McCaleb that recommitting the 
Arcade to its prominent role in the purchase and sale of enslaved 
persons would unfavorably preserve the status quo, pursuant to which 
“merchants recycled profits into further commodity speculations, or 
into conspicuous consumption, slaves, and real estate — but not into 
factories, nor into railroads.”422  Recognizing the unique opportunity 
to repurpose the nationalized Arcade, Judge McCaleb might have 
limited its sale to a buyer committed to bringing a manufacturing 
enterprise into the building.  Thus, even when viewing the issue from 
the Southern perspective, those in the Crescent City who decried 
underinvestment in its industrial sector may have deemed the actual 
administration and sale of the Arcade by the Banks bankruptcy trust 
to have been suboptimal. 
Returning to the present, can our current system recognize the 
public interest when it comes to questions of how the bankruptcy trust 
may use, sell, or lease estate property?423  This Article argues that the 
Bankruptcy Code’s statutory language permits such recognition.  The 
Code mandates that 
at any time, on request of an entity that has an interest in property 
used, sold, or leased, or proposed to be used, sold, or leased, . . . the 
court . . . shall prohibit or condition such use, sale, or lease as is 
necessary to provide adequate protection of such interest.424 
The Code does not define “interest in property,”425 and it “places no 
explicit limit on the interest being protected” when it comes to the use, 
sale, or lease of estate property.426  Statutory guideposts elsewhere in 
 
 421. MARLER, supra note 28, at 55, 57, 83. 
 422. Id. at 78; cf. “The Gentleman in Black.,” PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Mar. 9, 
1837, at 2 (“Heretofore, some half dozen of the heaviest concerns have done all the 
principal exchange business — have carried on the greatest monopolies in cotton, 
sugar, molasses, &c. — now they are gone to the devil, the business will be done by ten 
times the number of men, who, thank God, have not the means, had they the 
inclination, to monopolize. They will be able to check one another, if attempts are 
made by any of them to engross too large a portion of the business, and a much more 
healthy state of things will ensue.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 423. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 363 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-259). 
 424. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (emphasis added). 
 425. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 101 (Westlaw) (providing definitions applicable throughout 
the Bankruptcy Code); 11 U.S.C. § 363(a) (defining “cash collateral” for purposes of 
the Bankruptcy Code’s provision on the use, sale, and lease of estate property). 
 426. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 135, ¶ 365.05[1]. 
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the Code indicate that the phrase “interest in property” is sufficiently 
broad to recognize the public interest.427 
The Bankruptcy Code mandates that, for application of certain 
provisions specific to railroad reorganization cases under the Code, 
“the court and the trustee shall consider the public interest in addition 
to the interests of the debtor, creditors, and equity security holders.”428  
This command expressly recognizes that various types of “interests” 
can be implicated and weighed when administering the bankruptcy 
system, including those of the public.  While a court’s mandatory 
obligation to consider the public interest is limited to the specific 
context of railroad reorganization cases,429 this does not mean that a 
court lacks discretion to consider the public interest pursuant to other 
Code provisions.  As long as the statutory language of the relevant 
provision can accommodate such a consideration, then a court should 
be open to such an inquiry under the right set of circumstances.430  
Significantly, the Code’s provision governing the bankruptcy trust’s 
use, sale, and lease of estate property expressly requires “due 
consideration” of the privacy interests of third parties when the 
 
 427. Cf. United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 
365, 371 (1988) (“The term ‘interest in property’ certainly summons up such concepts 
as ‘fee ownership,’ ‘life estate,’ ‘co-ownership,’ and ‘security interest’ more readily than 
it does the notion of ‘right to immediate foreclosure.’ Nonetheless, viewed in the 
isolated context of § 362(d)(1), the phrase could reasonably be given the meaning 
petitioner asserts. Statutory construction, however, is a holistic endeavor. A provision 
that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the 
statutory scheme — because the same terminology is used elsewhere in a context that 
makes its meaning clear or because only one of the permissible meanings produces a 
substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.” (citations omitted)). But 
cf. GROSS, supra note 416, at 227 (“If community is to be recognized, some specific 
amendments to the Code are needed.”); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Equity in 
Bankruptcy Courts: Public Priorities, 94 AM. BANKR. L.J. 203, 221 (2020) (“Up to now, 
it remains unclear that public interests are regarded as legitimate elements of decisions 
[in bankruptcy cases]. Instead, in the face of the plain meaning rule and the lack of 
specific language in the statute recognizing the weight to be given public interests, 
judges may feel precluded from explicitly addressing those interests.”). 
 428. 11 U.S.C. § 1165 (emphasis added). For further discussion of how these specific 
Code provisions relate to the bankruptcy system’s recognition of the public interest 
and community interests, see GROSS, supra note 416, at 219–23. 
 429. See 11 U.S.C. § 103(h). 
 430. Cf. Susan Block-Lieb, The Logic and Limits of Contract Bankruptcy, 2001 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 503, 519–20 (“[B]ankruptcy rules should maximize collective welfare, not 
simply the collective welfare of creditors. Creditor welfare offers too narrow a 
perspective from which to judge bankruptcy law and policy. A bankruptcy system 
should maximize the welfare of all the parties affected by the debtor’s financial distress 
— not only the welfare of creditors, equity holders, employees, and other parties with 
standing to appear and be heard in the bankruptcy case; but also, more broadly, the 
remainder of society affected by the financial failure of the firm.” (footnote omitted)). 
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bankruptcy trust proposes to sell or lease their personally identifiable 
information if, among other things, (1) the debtor obtained the 
information when offering, but not necessarily selling, a prebankruptcy 
product or service to the third parties; and (2) the information is subject 
to a prebankruptcy policy of the debtor that prohibits the transfer of 
such information and that is still in effect at the commencement of the 
case.431 
When Congress installed this specific framework for protecting 
privacy interests, a species of what one might refer to as “nonclaim 
interests,”432 it did so within a Code section that already included a 
general mechanism for parties to request adequate protection of their 
interests in property to be used, sold, or leased by the bankruptcy 
trust.433  One would expect the specific framework to have been placed 
elsewhere in the Code had Congress deemed nonclaim interests to be 
irrelevant for purposes of the bankruptcy trust’s sale or lease of estate 
property.  And even though Congress singled out one such interest for 
specific treatment, this does not mean that nonclaim interests are 
beyond the scope of consideration when determining the interests in 
property that might need to be adequately protected as a result of the 
bankruptcy trust’s use, sale, or lease of estate property.  After all, 
Congress has previously amended Code provisions consisting of 
general mechanisms to include specific mandatory mechanisms to deal 
with a particular matter, and courts have used their residual 
policymaking authority to conclude that such amendments do not 
preclude consideration of the issue under the preexisting general 
 
 431. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1)(B); see also id. § 332(b) (providing examples of the 
types of considerations that may be relevant to a court’s decision to authorize the 
bankruptcy trust’s sale or lease of personally identifiable information, including “the 
potential losses . . . of privacy to consumers”). 
 432. See Westbrook, supra note 427, at 213–14. Broadly speaking, a claim in 
bankruptcy can be based on either a “right to payment” or a “right to an equitable 
remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment.” 11 
U.S.C. § 101(5). 
 433. The original Bankruptcy Code provided that,  
at any time, on request of an entity that has an interest in property used, sold, 
or leased, or proposed to be used, sold, or leased, . . . the court shall prohibit 
or condition such use, sale, or lease as is necessary to provide adequate 
protection of such interest. 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 363(e), 92 Stat. 2549, 2572 
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 363(e)). In 2005, Congress amended the Code’s 
provision for the sale, use, or lease of estate property to provide a specific framework 
for protecting privacy interests in the personally identifiable information of third 
parties. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. 
L. No. 109-8, § 231(a), 119 Stat. 23, 72 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)). 
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mechanism.434   Accordingly, pursuant to the residual policymaking 
authority that Congress conferred on the judiciary to define the scope 
of what constitutes an “interest in property” meriting adequate 
protection,435 courts should deem it appropriate to consider nonclaim 
interests, including the public interest or community interests, when it 
comes to determining whether the sale, use, or lease of estate property 
warrants adequately protecting such interests in the property at 
issue.436  To the extent that concerns arise from the recognition of such 
interests, those concerns can be tempered by the requirement that 
 
 434. See, e.g., Piazza v. Nueterra Healthcare Physical Therapy, LLC (In re Piazza), 
719 F.3d 1253, 1260–71 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that a court may consider whether an 
individual debtor’s bad-faith filing of a Chapter 7 case warrants its dismissal pursuant 
to Code § 707(a)’s “for cause” standard, notwithstanding Congress’s amendment in 
2005 of Code § 707(b), which imposed a mandate on courts to consider in certain 
circumstances whether a consumer debtor’s bad-faith filing of a Chapter 7 case 
warrants its dismissal on the basis of “abuse”); see also Pardo & Watts, supra note 256, 
at 404 (“An individual debtor — whether filing for Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 relief — 
faces the possibility of having the case dismissed ‘for cause.’ The Code does not define 
what constitutes cause, but rather provides a non-exhaustive list of factors that could 
constitute cause for dismissal. Without specific criteria to demarcate the bounds of 
‘cause,’ Congress has given courts substantial discretion to develop policy regarding 
how wide the gate to the bankruptcy forum ought to be open. For example, although 
unenumerated as a ‘for cause’ dismissal factor, courts have deemed lack of good faith 
to be an appropriate basis for dismissing an individual debtor’s bankruptcy case.” 
(footnotes omitted)). See generally Pardo, Eliminating the Judicial Function in 
Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 39, at 473–88 (discussing the evolution of the Code’s 
provision governing the dismissal of Chapter 7 cases). 
 435. See Pardo & Watts, supra note 256, at 413 (“In sum, Congress has given courts 
primary interpretive authority over the Code, which contains substantial gaps. 
Although scholars often say that courts fill these gaps by using traditional tools of 
statutory construction to discern Congress’s intent, we have demonstrated that courts 
have ample opportunity to engage in residual policymaking by resolving ambiguities 
in the Code that Congress either intentionally or inadvertently did not resolve.”). 
 436. Cf., e.g., In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 01-00056 (PJW), 2001 WL 
1820326, at *14 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 2, 2001) (“Finally, there is a substantial public 
interest in preserving the value of TWA as a going concern and facilitating a smooth 
sale of substantially all of TWA’s assets to American. This includes the preservation of 
jobs for TWA’s 20,000 employees, the economic benefits the continued presence of a 
major air carrier brings to the St. Louis region, and preserving consumer confidence in 
purchased TWA tickets American will assume under the sale.”). This view is consonant 
with the idea that the public interest or community interests can be relevant to the 
application of other Code provisions. For example, recall the provision that authorizes 
a Chapter 7 trustee to operate a debtor’s business. See supra note 156 and 
accompanying text. A leading bankruptcy treatise’s discussion of the provision notes 
that “financial gain to the estate is not the sole basis on which a court may authorize 
the trustee to operate the debtor’s business” and that “if the sudden termination of the 
debtor’s business would cause great hardship to the general public or innocent third 
parties, authorization of the chapter 7 trustee to operate the debtor’s business at a loss 
might be appropriate.” 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 135, ¶ 721.02 
(emphasis added). 
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anyone seeking adequate protection of those interests will bear the 
burden of proof to establish their validity.437 
* * * 
This Article has sought to provide a historical perspective that 
enables us to think about the role of the public interest in bankruptcy 
from a new vantage.  As we encounter opportunities to remake urban 
enterprise through the bankruptcy system, especially during financial 
crises, we should keep in mind a key concept: given that “[o]ne way the 
Government can regulate without accountability is by passing off a 
Government operation as an independent private concern,” 438  the 
bankruptcy trust’s federal instrumentality status must not go 
unrecognized; otherwise, we run the risk of not holding the trust 
properly accountable.439 
 
 437. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(p)(2); cf. GROSS, supra note 416, at 214 (“Agreeing to 
consider a community interest does not mean that that interest will prevail.”); 
Ponoroff, supra note 21, at 475 n.112 (“Of course, recognizing that non-creditor 
interests should have ‘standing’ to press their demands in bankruptcy is not tantamount 
to saying that their interests must be vindicated in every case.”). For a discussion of 
how standing issues ought to be addressed for purposes of considering nonclaim 
interests in bankruptcy proceedings, see Nathalie D. Martin, Noneconomic Interests 
in Bankruptcy: Standing on the Outside Looking In, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 429, 446–61 
(1998). See generally Pfander & Birk, supra note 219, at 1452 (“Whatever sense the 
Court’s three-pronged inquiry makes when one party seeks redress from an opponent 
following an invasion of his rights, it simply does not fit with the realities of non-
contentious jurisdiction as practiced by federal courts. In deploying non-contentious 
jurisdiction, Congress can create individual rights and enable individuals to bring an ex 
parte action in federal court to secure formal recognition of the right in question. Such 
individuals have not suffered an ‘injury-in-fact’; rather, they seek to establish a legal 
interest through the assertion of their claim.”). 
 438. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 575 U.S. 43, 57 (2015) (Alito, J., 
concurring). 
 439. Cf. Jacoby, supra note 412, at 1723 (stating that “Congress’s exercise of its 
constitutional authority to create uniform bankruptcy laws . . . triggers the need for 
accountability and due process safeguards”). 
